Others were detained in Balakliia’s police station. Two men - one a firefighter, the other an inspector in the emergency services - said their jailers beat them with wooden batons and administered electric shocks. Russian soldiers questioned the inspector repeatedly about his calls with his supervisor in Kharkiv. They accused him of compiling a list of Ukrainians who had collaborated with the Russians, which he denies. The firefighter said he was accused of hiding weapons and organising a local partisan group, which he too denies. Albina Strilets, a 33-year-old logistics coordinator for the emergency services, recounted that she and other women were held simply for being “pro-Ukrainian.”
“I heard men being beaten so badly that at one point I heard a Russian soldier say, ‘bring a body bag,’” Strilets said. “Another time I heard a woman being raped upstairs and crying for hours.” Strilets said she broke the cell’s toilet so “it sounded like a waterfall” and would block out the woman’s screaming.
Albina Strilets, who works for Ukraine’s emergency services, said she was detained by Russian soldiers in August. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
The Kremlin and Russia’s Defence Ministry didn’t respond to questions about events in Balakliia. Russia has said previously its forces do not target civilians.
Kharkiv regional police said Ukrainian investigators had discovered 22 torture chambers across newly liberated towns and villages in the region. “We cannot count the number of people who were detained. We are talking about hundreds of people. But every crime has a name and we will surely find those responsible,” regional police chief General Volodymyr Tymoshko said.
In an office opposite the police station, relatives of prisoners sometimes petitioned the Russian known as Commandant V. “Granit” to free their loved ones. Tetiana Tovstokora, 57, a school principal, said her husband was turned away when he sought information about her detention, which lasted several days. None of the detainees and families interviewed by Reuters had any success in swaying “Granit.”
Tetiana Tovstokora, a school principal, said Russian troops held her for several days in a cell at this police station in Balakliia. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
Tetiana Tovstokora shows reporters how the Russian soldiers covered her head each time she was led in or out of her cell. REUTERS/Zohra Bensemra
Under occupation, much of the policing of the population fell to the force from separatist Luhansk. It was a rag-tag group with even fewer resources than their Russian counterparts, the documents show. One Luhansk corporal was 64 years old. Another fighter was treated for finger wounds after the chamber of his Mosin rifle exploded, a medic wrote. The rifle was developed in the late 19th century and went out of production decades ago, as
Reuters reported in April.
A spreadsheet at the Balakliia bunker showed a typical Russian sergeant was paid 202,084 roubles ($3,200) a month in salary plus bonuses, while a sergeant in the separatist force received just 91,200 roubles ($1,400). The head of a Luhansk flame-thrower company recorded in one document that eight of his subordinates had previous convictions - including one man for rape and sexual assault.
“!!! The commander of the ZVO (Western Military District) ordered that Hrakove is not to be surrendered.”
Extract from notebook of the anonymous staff officer
A narrow victory
On July 19, four months after seizing the area, the Russian occupiers encountered their first serious challenge from Ukraine’s armed forces, the documents reviewed by Reuters show.
At the regular morning meeting in the bunker, reports submitted to the commander, Colonel Popov, were normal: The previous night had been relatively quiet and enemy positions were unchanged. On the agenda for the day: some scheduled artillery fire on Ukrainian positions.
But by early afternoon, a column of Ukrainian soldiers, supported by tanks and under cover of an artillery barrage, attacked the Russian front line at Hrakove – a village on the north-western edge of the territory held by the Balakliia force.
Troops belonging to Russia’s 9th motorised rifle regiment were holed up in a concrete grain elevator in Hrakove. They’d positioned guns along the top of the structure. A Reuters reporter who visited the facility in October saw signs the men slept on the grain conveyor belts.
By 15:00, an unnamed Russian on the front line at Hrakove radioed his commanders in Balakliia: His position was being overrun, he said, and he had to retreat. He requested artillery strikes to destroy the post he was abandoning. Then communication was lost.
In the Balakliia bunker, the anonymous staff officer wrote in his notebook: “The munitions are running out.”
The commander of the Western Military District, one of Russia’s most senior officers, demanded a briefing on the situation and “ordered that Hrakove must not be surrendered,” further notebook entries said. According to official records, the commander at the time was Colonel-General Alexander Zhuravlyov, since fired by Putin. Independent Russian military analysts CIT have said, however, that Zhuravlyov was replaced by July by Lieutenant-General Andrei Sychevoi. Reuters was unable to reach Zhuravylov. Sychevoi didn’t respond to a request for comment.
Russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu and Alexander Zhuravlyov, then Commander of the Western Military District, are pictured with President Vladimir Putin in 2020. Sputnik/Alexei Druzhinin/Kremlin via REUTERS
In the hours that followed, Russian commanders sent in reinforcements and mobilised attack helicopters. By 18:00, the Ukrainians were retreating and Russian forces were retaking lost ground. But the cost was high. The Russians lost a tank, two armoured personnel carriers and other equipment. Thirty-nine men were wounded, seven were dead, and 17 were reported missing, according to a report that was presented to Popov on July 21.
Among the Russian dead was Corporal Aleksandr Yevsevleev, a tank commander. A list of casualties inside the command bunker said his abdomen had been torn open, exposing his intestines, and he had shrapnel injuries to his right upper thigh. His parents, contacted by Reuters, said their son was fatally wounded when his position came under fire near Hrakove from a Ukrainian helicopter.
After the battle, five soldiers needed treatment for “acute reaction to stress.” Next to each of their names in the medical record was written: “Does not require evacuation.”
A soldier in his twenties was listed as having suffered blast injuries. Contacted by Reuters, the man said he remembered little, only that “the fighting was fierce.” He spoke on the condition of anonymity.
Following the battle, Colonel Popov applied to his superiors for 34 of his subordinates to be given medals for their bravery. The documents did not detail how his superiors responded. Two of the soldiers told Reuters they have yet to receive their awards.
Pyotr Kalinin, a 25-year-old commander of a reconnaissance platoon, was also on Popov’s list. Kalinin is from Crimea and briefly served as a cadet in Ukraine’s armed forces before Russia annexed the peninsula in 2014, according to his social media. A photograph shows him in a Ukrainian uniform. Kalinin didn’t respond to messages from Reuters seeking comment.
Pyotr Kalinin, commander of a Russian platoon, previously served as a cadet in Ukraine’s army. This picture is from his social media account.
Quadcopters - !!! Urgent - !”
Handwritten note on a July 19 briefing document
Near breaking point
Documents in the bunker show that Russian commanders understood the shortcomings of their force.
On July 19, hours before the battle of Hrakove, an unnamed officer scribbled on the daily briefing note a plea for drones to track the enemy: “Quadcopters!!! Urgent!” Quadcopter drones are generally not military grade and can be bought in store and on the internet. As Reuters
reported in June, Russian troops have relied on crowdfunding to buy drones.
The Balakliia force finally took receipt of three off-the-shelf Mavic-3 quadcopter drones on July 20, the daily report recorded. They weren’t ready to fly, however, because their software wasn’t yet installed. The same daily report stated 15 soldiers were being trained how to operate them.
Ukrainian forces, meanwhile, were busy flying drones over Russian positions, their task made all the easier because two of the Russian force’s three jamming devices were out of action in need of repair, according to a note on a report by the electronic warfare unit.
The daily report on July 21 contained even more alarming news for Colonel Popov, the commander of the Balakliia force: Russian intelligence agency, the FSB had learned that Ukrainian forces were bringing to the area three highly accurate HIMARS missile launchers, supplied by the United States. And Ukraine had pinpointed the locations of one Russian command post and four warehouses that were being used by the Balakliia force.
Ukraine’s Defence Ministry and military did not respond to questions about weaponry and tactics.
Three days later, on July 24, the author of the handwritten notebook recorded that a HIMARS strike had killed 12 Russian soldiers belonging to the 336th marines brigade of the Baltic Fleet.
The fight further eroded morale and discipline among the soldiers.
Artyom Shtanko commanded a platoon that was in the thick of the Hrakove battle and suffered losses, according to his father Alexei and Plakat Junior 888, the officer who served in the Balakliia force.
Alexei said Shtanko refused an order from his company commander to “send his men into artillery fire.” Plakat Junior 888 identified the commander as Viktor Alyokhin, who was operating from a command post near Hrakove. Contacted by Reuters, Alyokhin confirmed he was in charge of a company during the battle but declined to comment further.
At the base in Balakliia, the notebook’s anonymous author wrote on July 24 – five days after the Hrakove battle – that Shtanko was a “bastard” facing disciplinary action because he “pulled back his platoon and took it into the rear.”
Shtanko’s commanders moved him to a different unit, his father told Reuters. He said Shtanko is still fighting in Ukraine.
The notebook also recorded the desertion of Roman Elistratov, a corporal in the 9th motorised rifle regiment, which felt the full force of the Ukrainian onslaught. Elistratov didn’t respond to messages from Reuters. Later, the author wrote of a soldier who deliberately shot himself in the hand to avoid further action. Command should be notified of the incident, he added.
None of these details made it into the official reports seen by Reuters.
“However many machine gunners you change, the machine gun still won’t work if it has no bullets inside.”
Extract from notebook of the anonymous staff officer
“No supplies”
By the end of July, Russian officers were convinced Ukrainian forces were preparing a counter-offensive to “take control of Balakliia,” the documents in the bunker show. Intercepted communications indicated an attack was imminent. Some of the communications were from cell phones registered to countries including Estonia, Britain, the Netherlands and the United States. Russian officers in the command bunker concluded the phones were in the possession of mercenaries or foreign instructors helping the Ukrainian military. Approached for this article, Estonia said its defence forces were not operating inside Ukraine. Britain, the United States and the Netherlands didn’t respond.
Around the same time, Russian military-electronics experts arrived in Balakliia. They wanted to see if Russia’s “Pole-21” system for jamming satellite navigation systems could be adapted to counter HIMARS missiles, according to the daily report of Aug 4.
Whatever the outcome of that experiment, Ukrainian strikes continued. Interviews with Russian servicemen, relatives of dead soldiers, and local residents indicate that at least three Russian command posts in northeast Ukraine were hit by HIMARS missiles in the weeks that followed.
Faced with increased Ukrainian attacks, the Balakliia command set about drafting in more troops, according to daily reports and records in the staff officer’s handwritten notebook. Yet a spreadsheet dated Aug. 30 showed that the force was at only 71% of full strength. Some units were far worse off, according to the same spreadsheet. The 2nd assault battalion had 49 personnel. It should have had 240. The 9th BARS brigade, an irregular unit, was at 23% of its intended manpower.
