A russian ultra-nationalist take on why is this kind of special operation war instead of full mobilization not really promising for Russia:
To questions like: "what's new on the fronts?" It's hard for me to answer now. On the fronts, almost everywhere - battles. Somewhere positional, somewhere offensive and (increasingly) defensive. In general, with the exception of the Donbass and the Kharkiv region, the front is stable. Ours and ukry are digging in. And it's very bad. Why? - Yes, because if a month and a half ago, in the Nikolaev and Krivoy Rog directions, the enemy had only mobile defense, now they are intensively creating strongholds on the front line and in their near rear, which then will inevitably have to be taken VERY LONG AND WITH GREAT LOSSES. Like Mariupol, like Popasnaya, Izyum, Rubizhne and Severodonetsk. We will again have to wage stubborn bloody battles for every village, every grove and skyscraper ... it is expensive to pay with Russian blood for every few hundred meters traveled. And it seems that there will be no one to "ask" for this - "of course, by the objective course of events it turned out that way" ... although this is not at all the case.
At the beginning of the operation, the RF Armed Forces were just demonstrating highly maneuverable actions, deep strategic breakthroughs for tens and even hundreds of kilometers. Which ended in "zilch" for reasons that I have repeatedly called and described. (Initially, a fundamentally wrong assessment of the operational situation, which was the basis of military planning and the extreme lack of forces and means associated with this assessment to consolidate and control the territory passed, etc.). Nevertheless - despite the final discouraging "semi-failure" (there was no "run to the border" in the south), the first stage of the operation - it (compared to the "Second Concrete") - looks much more "alive" than that " bloody push-pull" into which the fighting has degenerated since late April to this day. Simply because at the first stage there was no conscious purposeful and even "pre-glorified" near-military "experts" sticking the active army into a STRATEGIC DEADLOCK. The military decisions were bold and aimed at achieving a decisive victory.
While even the FULL success (which is not visible in the near future) of the second stage, at best, will only lead to costly (in terms of losses in people and equipment) relatively small territorial acquisitions achieved by PUSHING the enemy out of Donbass.
Imagine for a moment that the enemy in the next few weeks will still be completely defeated by continuous frontal and flank attacks and completely driven out of the LDNR. - AND? - And what will it give? Will it end the war? - No, not at all. The maximum will shorten the front line somewhat and nothing more. Suppose the enemy suffers heavy losses (he still bears them). But in these few weeks, he will be able (due to ongoing mobilizations) to prepare new fresh reserves. Moreover, he already has these reserves! - The enemy is so confident in the strategic stability of his front (on which the surrender of 1-2 settlements in 2-3 days has no effect) that he continues to keep a relatively large grouping on the border with Transnistria and even created a new one (several army BTGs) on the border with Belarus. And he continues to form new units and formations both in the deep rear and in the Sumy and Chernihiv regions abandoned by the Russian troops during the "run to the border".
That is, when our formations, weakened by the hardest battles and bloody assaults, reach the borders of the LDNR, they will be met by fresh and well-equipped formations of the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the lines prepared in advance for defense. And even if these fresh formations do not want (for some reason) to seize the initiative and launch a counter-offensive (one or more) - all the same, the Russian Federation will face the prospect of a long positional war in full growth - a war, almost (with a reservation - in current realities) fatal for our economy, social and socio-political stability.
