Trump Reneges on Iran Nuclear Deal, Citing Non-Existent Violations

[Rod1]

Source?

Spoiler

 

[lfd0311]

Of course, neither does the SecDEF, the CJSC, the IAEA inspectors and all the other nuclear countries.

Only Netanyahu, Trump and lfd0311 know the truth.

Uh.... I read the agreement, and I just posted a link to a Government think tank that says the exact same thing. Maybe you should actually read for yourself sometime. Like actually read the reports themselves, and not someone else's incorrect reporting of them. That way you won't so consistently be wrong. Because you're real wrong on this one.

 

[lfd0311]

Spoiler

OK, I'll stop now, since you're intent on owning yourself.

 

[Rod1]

http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable




The last bullet point is a big concern. a little over 1 and a half months. in 2015.

This report provides an estimate of how soon Iran could have fueled a nuclear weapon before the implementation of the new nuclear agreement reached in 2015.

 

[Rod1]

OK, I'll stop now, since you're intent on owning yourself.

At least im not posting sources that directly contradict my claim.

 

[lfd0311]

This report provides an estimate of how soon Iran could have fueled a nuclear weapon before the implementation of the new nuclear agreement reached in 2015.

And you don't understand the 2015 agreement, or apparently my overall point.

 

[Sauron]

I don't think congress will kill the deal. While i have zero faith in US politicians, any abrogation of the deal will turn the word of the US into garbage. They know this.

Whether Trump does something retarded is entirely different. He has all the power he needs to up-end the deal. He's just punted to congress to save face.

 

[Rod1]

They have 15 years to comply with this requirement. Actually read the agreement before ignorantly posting. They haven't given up anything, and that is completely my point.

Dude. Learn to read. No it's not. Once again, they have 15 years to comply with this. They have a graduated amount of time to fulfill certain requirements, the shortest of those is 8 years. They gave up nothing right away. In 10 -15 years they won't be able to rush to build a bomb anymore, once the requirements of this deal are met. They agreed to give up literally nothing on day one, or even within the first few years. LEARN TO READ.

I dont think you understand what the Iranian deal actually does.

 

[lfd0311]

At least im not posting sources that directly contradict my claim.

Rod, you can barely read, let's not be silly. You not being able to understand isn't my fault. We've been over this.

 

[Rod1]

And you don't understand the 2015 agreement, or apparently my overall point.

• Iran's current stockpile of low-enriched uranium will be reduced by 98 percent, from 10,000 kg to 300 kg. This reduction will be maintained for fifteen years.[34][52][53][54] For the same fifteen-year period, Iran will be limited to enriching uranium to 3.67%, a percentage sufficient for civilian nuclear power and research, but not for building a nuclear weapon.[52][53][55]However, the number of centrifuges is sufficient for a nuclear weapon, but not for nuclear power.[56] This is a "major decline" in Iran's previous nuclear activity; prior to watering down its stockpile pursuant to the Joint Plan of Action interim agreement, Iran had enriched uranium to near 20% (medium-enriched uranium).[52][53][54] These enriched uranium in excess of 300 kg of up to 3.67% will be down blended to natural uranium level or be sold in return for natural uranium, and the uranium enriched to between 5% and 20% will be fabricated into fuel plates for the Tehran Research Reactor or sold or diluted to an enrichment level of 3.67%. The implementation of the commercial contracts will be facilitated by P5+1. After fifteen years, all physical limits on enrichment will be removed, including limits on the type and number of centrifuges, Iran's stockpile of enriched uranium, and where Iran may have enrichment facilities. According to Belfer, at this point Iran could "expand its nuclear program to create more practical overt and covert nuclear weapons options".[51][57]
• For ten years, Iran will place over two-thirds of its centrifuges in storage, from its current stockpile of 19,000 centrifuges (of which 10,000 were operational) to no more than 6,104 operational centrifuges, with only 5,060 allowed to enrich uranium,[34][52] with the enrichment capacity being limited to the Natanz plant. The centrifuges there must be IR-1 centrifuges, the first-generation centrifuge type which is Iran's oldest and least efficient; Iran will give up its advanced IR-2M centrifuges in this period.[32][53][54] The non-operating centrifuges will be stored in Natanz and monitored by IAEA, but may be used to replace failed centrifuges.[58][59] Iran will not build any new uranium-enrichment facilities for fifteen years.[52]
• Iran may continue research and development work on enrichment, but that work will take place only at the Natanz facility and include certain limitations for the first eight years.[32]This is intended to keep the country to a breakout time of one year.[52]
• Iran, with cooperation from the "Working Group" (the P5+1 and possibly other countries), will modernise and rebuild the Arak heavy water research reactor based on an agreed design to support its peaceful nuclear research and production needs and purposes, but in such a way to minimise the production of plutonium and not to produce weapons-grade plutonium. The power of the redesigned reactor will not exceed 20 MWth. The P5+1 parties will support and facilitate the timely and safe construction of the Arak complex.[60] All spent fuel will be sent out of the country.[32] All excess heavy water which is beyond Iran's needs for the redesigned reactor will be made available for export to the international market based on international prices. In exchange, Iran received 130 tons of uranium in 2015 and in late 2016 was approved to receive 130 tons in 2017.[61] For 15 years, Iran will not engage in, or research on, spent fuel reprocessing.[62] Iran will also not build any additional heavy-water reactors or accumulate heavy water for fifteen years.[32]
• Iran's Fordow facility will stop enriching uranium and researching uranium enrichment for at least fifteen years; the facility will be converted into a nuclear physics and technology center. For 15 years, Fordow will maintain no more than 1,044 IR-1 centrifuges in six cascades in one wing of Fordow. "Two of those six cascades will spin without uranium and will be transitioned, including through appropriate infrastructure modification," for stable radioisotope production for medical, agricultural, industrial, and scientific use. "The other four cascades with all associated infrastructure will remain idle." Iran will not be permitted to have any fissile material in Fordow.[32][52][54]
• Iran will implement an Additional Protocol agreement which will continue in perpetuity for as long as Iran remains a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The signing of the Additional Protocol represents a continuation of the monitoring and verification provisions "long after the comprehensive agreement between the P5+1 and Iran is implemented".[63]
• A comprehensive inspections regime will be implemented in order to monitor and confirm that Iran is complying with its obligations and is not diverting any fissile material.[52][53][c]
  • The IAEA will have multilayered[74] oversight "over Iran's entire nuclear supply chain, from uranium mills to its procurement of nuclear-related technologies".[75] For declared nuclear sites such as Fordow and Natanz, the IAEA will have "round-the-clock access" to nuclear facilities and will be entitled to maintain continuous monitoring (including via surveillance equipment) at such sites.[75][76] The agreement authorizes the IAEA to make use of sophisticated monitoring technology, such as fiber-optic seals on equipment that can electronically send information to the IAEA; infrared satellite imagery to detect covert sites, "environmental sensors that can detect minute signs of nuclear particles"; tamper-resistant, radiation-resistant cameras.[44][77] Other tools include computerized accounting programs to gather information and detect anomalies, and big data sets on Iranian imports, to monitor dual-use items.[74]
  • The number of IAEA inspectors assigned to Iran will triple, from 50 to 150 inspectors.[44]
  • If IAEA inspectors have concerns that Iran is developing nuclear capabilities at any non-declared sites, they may request access "to verify the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities or activities inconsistent with" the agreement, informing Iran of the basis for their concerns.[76] The inspectors would only come from countries with which Iran has diplomatic relations.[78] Iran may admit the inspectors to such site or propose alternatives to inspection that might satisfy the IAEA's concerns.[76] If such an agreement cannot be reached, a process running to a maximum of 24 days is triggered.[76] Under this process, Iran and the IAEA have 14 days to resolve disagreements among themselves.[76] If they fail to, the Joint Commission (including all eight parties) would have one week in which to consider the intelligence which initiated the IAEA request. A majority of the Commission (at least five of the eight members) could then inform Iran of the action that it would be required to take within three more days.[79][80]The majority rule provision "means the United States and its European allies—Britain, France, Germany and the EU—could insist on access or any other steps and that Iran, Russia or China could not veto them".[79] If Iran did not comply with the decision within three days, sanctions would be automatically reimposed under the snapback provision (see below).[80]

As a result of the above, the "breakout time"—the time in which it would be possible for Iran to make enough material for a single nuclear weapon—will increase from two to three months to one year, according to U.S. officials and U.S. intelligence.[34][52][81][d] An August 2015 report published by a group of experts at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs concurs in these estimates, writing that under the JCPOA, "over the next decade would be extended to roughly a year, from the current estimated breakout time of 2 to 3 months".[51] The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation also accepts these estimates.[83][84] By contrast, Alan J. Kuperman, coordinator of the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Project at the University of Texas at Austin, disputed the one-year assessment, arguing that under the agreement, Iran's breakout time "would be only about three months, not much longer than it is today".[85]

The longer breakout time would be in place for at least ten years; after that point, the breakout time would gradually decrease.[34][81] By the fifteenth year, U.S. officials state that the breakout time would return to the pre-JCPOA status quo of a few months.[34][81] The Belfer Center report states: "Some contributors to this report believe that breakout time by year 15 could be comparable to what it is today—a few months—while others believe it could be reduced to a few weeks."[51]


https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joint_Comprehensive_Plan_of_Action#Nuclear

 

[lfd0311]

I dont think you understand what the Iranian deal actually does.

Why don't you explain it to me, in your own words, free of links or copy and paste?

 

[Rod1]

Rod, you can barely read, let's not be silly. You not being able to understand isn't my fault. We've been over this.

Over what? you are literally calling Mattis and Dunford, either liars or stupid.

This isnt me vs you, its the entire world vs neocons.

 

[Rod1]

Why don't you explain it to me, in your own words, free of links or copy and paste?

Iran has to give up its already enriched stockpile (the biggest constraint to any nuclear weapon program) and had to put 2 thirds of their centrifugues in storage.

The above was certified by the IAEA (as in it already happened as of Oct 2017).

 

[Anung Un Rama]

http://www.iranwatch.org/our-publications/articles-reports/irans-nuclear-timetable




The last bullet point is a big concern. a little over 1 and a half months. in 2015.

IranWatch.org?????

That's also old news from 11/15.
A lot changed just 1 month later:


This is from 12/28/15:

A Russian ship left Iran on Monday carrying almost all of Iran’s stockpile of low-enriched uranium, fulfilling a major step in the nuclear deal struck last summer and, for the first time in nearly a decade, apparently leaving Iran with too little fuel to manufacture a nuclear weapon.

https://www.google.com/amp/s/mobile...ckpile-of-enriched-uranium-to-russia.amp.html

 

[Sauron]

The Iran deal is good regardless of the strength of the deal. That's what you don't understand.

The JCPOA is an opportunity to fix relations, but instead Trump is obsessed with trying to undo everything Obama has done. So instead of looking to improve relations with a country of 80 million people, rich in natural and human resources, he's looks to placate a client state (Israel) and a bunch of backward salafists who have more in common with ISIS than they have differences.

 

[OverCoronavirus Pressure]

I agree with your second paragraph.

When I think of the years post-Trump I wonder if we'll be able to find a politician who can honestly put the US first without being afraid of looking bad after the way the Trump presidency has been playing out.

Broken agreements everywhere, not much about this presidency is honest.

 

[Sauron]

Fact of the matter is that the deal is working, and more importantly, everyone knows it's working. People who say Iran is in violation are lying, and their agenda is regime change.

 

[PEB]

 

[Rod1]

And people think this is getting old.

There would be more memes but i dont want to get banned.

 

[Fugazy]

Broken agreements everywhere, not much about this presidency is honest.

I'd say there are certainly better ways to go about restructuring agreements.