To answer your question - you can of course offer guidance case-by-case, but it would be done on an individualistic basis not typically generalized to what would constitute a scientific truth about mankind in general (or you try to generalize and end up with a theory of uncooperative tit angles in the fridge mothers of anal-stage infants, or something like that). What's most important is that the client gets to where they want to go
Gotcha.
If you read the DSM, a qualifying condition (or one of them) for many diagnoses is significant interference with the client's daily life. I don't really have a substance addiction until the behaviour stemming from that addiction starts to fuck up my day-to-day. Now I can treat the addiction with the goal of restoring the day-to-day, and there's all sorts of good science about how to do that. There's less about how or why the day-to-day was problem in the first place. There's plenty of talk about it, but less science about it. It may not after all be a scientific question.
Funny enough, my first thought was, "No, it's a
psychological question," but that would mean that psychology and science are distinct, which, I'm sure, would ruffle more than a few feathers. But then isn't that why there's the distinction between psych
iatrists, who are trained in science and medicine, and psych
ologists, who are trained in therapy? It seems like psychiatry belongs in the science camp while psychology belongs in the philosophy camp.
What say you to that bit of rambling?
A close friend of mine with a Philosophy Ph.D. does a bit of work now as a "philosophical counselor" (I actually was a client of hers, but we became friends when she decided I was beyond redemption). Her approach struck me as much more systematic then other therapists who used a grab-bag of hackneyed psychological tactics - it was a lot about examining one's understanding of the world and correcting potential errors before doing anything else. I think you'd like it.
When I was 16 and started having panic attacks I went to a therapist and it was a colossal waste of time, primarily because the dude seemed like a hack. I love the
idea of "talk therapy" and would love to be able to find a good therapist to talk shit out with, but it's hard for me to imagine finding someone who I wouldn't think was a buffoon
When I say "strictly logical problem" I don't mean "exists in some theoretical realm with absolutely no contact with any practical realm". I mean the problem is in the structure of the argument rather than the content, as it is in a logical fallacy.
Affirming the consequent is another fallacy of logic. People use it to generate false beliefs all the time, and you don't correct them by addressing each individual instance of error, you correct them in principle. That's enough contact with practical reality for me.
Now I'm starting to think that the reason that I'm confused is because this type of shit relies - or at least appears to rely - on the analytic-synthetic dichotomy. Much like it's difficult for me to walk in the shoes of someone who thinks that the is-ought "problem" is a problem, it's difficult for me to parse logic and reality the way that you seem to be parsing them here. Is-ought, analytic-synthetic, necessary-contingent, theory/practice, structure/content, logical/actual - how are these not all false dichotomies that just muddy the waters?
Either there's no such thing as a problem that's limited to the structure of an argument or you've yet to provide me with the example that can clarify for me what a problem that's limited to the structure of an argument looks like
See my "Good Syllogism-Bad Syllogism" outline. In the first case the premises guarantee the truth of the conclusion - it could be no other way. The second case not only fails to guarantee the conclusion - there's no conceivable way it could guarantee such a conclusion without a presupposing value (or a disguised one, as in the example of rights). That's what I mean about the domains being orthogonal.
Two things.
1) You want to know how you can guarantee-100%-no-chance-of-failure confuse me? Use math words. "Orthogonal"? I enjoy conversing with you,
Caveat, but not enough to where I'm going to try to understand math words. I vowed the day I took the GRE and answered all of the math questions "666" because math is evil that I'd never again give a single fuck about math
2) Maybe "orthogonal" so threw me that I missed it, but how is this an answer to my question about where the "values can't be derived from facts" premise was coming from? I get that your "Bad Syllogism" is bad. What I'm not getting is what that has to do with, much less how it corroborates (assuming that's what you're taking it to be doing), the "values can't be derived from facts" premise. If it helps, I've never studied formal logic; I just rely on common sense when judging shit to be either smart shit or stupid shit.
Would you mind articulating that once more? Where does this "promotion of life" premise come from, and what does it mean (I don't think that's fully captured in the essay below)?
If we're going to dig into Objectivism, then we need to establish some common ground, and there's no better ground than the ground of Rand's own words and formulations. Additionally, given how much time and energy went into the writing of
Atlas Shrugged, and in particular the famous "This is John Galt speaking" radio address, that's always my first stop when it comes to Rand's words and formulations relevant to discussions of Objectivist ideas and principles.
On the "promotion of life" thing and its relevance to Rand's take on the is-ought "problem," the role of values in life, etc., here's an excerpt from
Atlas Shrugged:
"Man's mind is his basic tool of survival. Life is given to him, survival is not. His body is given to him, its sustenance is not. His mind is given to him, its content is not. To remain alive, he must act, and before he can act he must know the nature and purpose of his action [...] To remain alive, he must think.
But to think is an act of choice. The key to what you so recklessly call 'human nature,' [...] is the fact that man is a being of volitional consciousness. Reason does not work automatically; thinking is not a mechanical process; the connections of logic are not made by instinct. The function of your stomach, lungs or heart is automatic; the function of your mind is not. In any hour and issue of your life, you are free to think or to evade that effort. But you are not free to escape from your nature, from the fact that reason is your means of survival - so that for you, who are a human being, the question 'to be or not to be' is the question 'to think or not to think.'
A being of volitional consciousness has no automatic course of behavior. He needs a code of values to guide his actions. 'Value' is that which one acts to gain and keep, 'virtue' is the action by which one gains and keeps it. 'Value' presupposes an answer to the question: Of value to whom and for what? 'Value' presupposes a standard, a purpose and the necessity of action in the face of an alternative. Where there are no alternatives, no values are possible.
There is only one fundamental alternative in the universe - existence or nonexistence - and it pertains to a single class of entities - to living organisms [...] It is only a living organism that faces a constant alternative: The issue of life or death. Life is a process of self-sustaining and self-generated action. If an organism fails in that action, it dies [...] It is only the concept of 'Life' that makes the concept of 'Value' possible. [...] A plant must feed itself in order to live; the sunlight, the water, the chemicals it needs are the values its nature has set it to pursue; its life is the standard of value directing its actions. But a plant has no choice of action; there are alternatives in the conditions of its encounters, but there is no alternative in its function: It acts automatically to further its life, it cannot act for its own destruction.
[...]
Man has no automatic code of survival. His particular distinction from all other living species is the necessity to act in the face of alternatives by means of volitional choice. He has no automatic knowledge of what is good for him or evil, what values his life depends on, what course of action it requires. Are you prattling about an instinct of self-preservation? An instinct of self-preservation is precisely what man does not possess. An 'instinct' is an unerring and automatic form of knowledge. A desire is not an instinct. A desire to live does not give you the knowledge required for living. And even man's desire to live is not automatic [...] Man must obtain his knowledge and choose his actions by a process of thinking, which nature will not force him to perform [...] Man has been called a rational being, but rationality is a matter of choice - and the alternative his nature offers him is: Rational being or suicidal animal. Man has to be man - by choice; he has to hold his life as a value - by choice; he has to learn to sustain it - by choice; he has to discover the values it requires and practice his virtues - by choice."
Then, for a non-fiction supplement to the above excerpt from
Atlas Shrugged, I think that her essay "The Objectivist Ethics" from
The Virtue of Selfishness is your best bet. Here are some bits from it:
"The first question is: Does man need values at all—and why? Is the concept of value, of 'good or evil,' an arbitrary human invention, unrelated to, underived from, and unsupported by any facts of reality—or is it based on a metaphysical fact, on an unalterable condition of man’s existence? (I use the word 'metaphysical' to mean: that which pertains to reality, to the nature of things, to existence.) Does an arbitrary human convention, a mere custom, decree that man must guide his actions by a set of principles—or is there a fact of reality that demands it? Is ethics the province of whims: of personal emotions, social edicts, and mystic revelations—or is it the province of reason? Is ethics a subjective luxury—or an objective necessity?
In the sorry record of the history of mankind’s ethics—with a few rare, and unsuccessful, exceptions—moralists have regarded ethics as the province of whims, that is: of the irrational. Some of them did so explicitly, by intention—others implicitly, by default. A 'whim' is a desire experienced by a person who does not know and does not care to discover its cause.
[...]
Most philosophers took the existence of ethics for granted, as the given, as a historical fact, and were not concerned with discovering its metaphysical cause or objective validation. Many of them attempted to break the traditional monopoly of mysticism in the field of ethics and, allegedly, to define a rational, scientific, nonreligious morality. But their attempts consisted of trying to justify them on social grounds, merely substituting society for God.
[...]
This could hardly be called rational, yet most philosophers have now decided to declare that reason has failed, that ethics is outside the power of reason, that no rational ethics can ever be defined, and that in the field of ethics—in the choice of his values, of his actions, of his pursuits, of his life’s goals—man must be guided by something other than reason. By what? Faith—instinct—intuition—revelation—feeling—taste—urge—wish—whim. Today, as in the past, most philosophers agree that the ultimate standard of ethics is whim [...] and the battle is only over the question or whose whim: one’s own or society’s or the dictator’s or God’s. Whatever else they may disagree about, today’s moralists agree that ethics is a subjective issue.
[Here she rehearses, and even quotes from, the previously cited bit from Atlas Shrugged and then continues on from there...]
Only a living entity can have goals or can originate them. And it is only a living organism that has the capacity for self-generated, goal-directed action [...] What standard determines what is proper in this context? The standard is the organism’s life, or: that which is required for the organism’s survival.
No choice is open to an organism in this issue: that which is required for its survival is determined by its nature, by the kind of entity it is. Many variations, many forms of adaptation to its background are possible to an organism, including the possibility of existing for a while in a crippled, disabled or diseased condition, but the fundamental alternative of its existence remains the same: if an organism fails in the basic functions required by its nature—if an amoeba’s protoplasm stops assimilating food, or if a man’s heart stops beating—the organism dies. In a fundamental sense, stillness is the antithesis of life. Life can be kept in existence only by a constant process of self-sustaining action. The goal of that action, the ultimate value which, to be kept, must be gained through its every moment, is the organism’s life.
An ultimate value is that final goal or end to which all lesser goals are the means—and it sets the standard by which all lesser goals are evaluated. An organism’s life is its standard of value: that which furthers its life is the good, that which threatens it is the evil.
Without an ultimate goal or end, there can be no lesser goals or means: a series of means going off into an infinite progression toward a nonexistent end is a metaphysical and epistemological impossibility. It is only an ultimate goal, an end in itself, that makes the existence of values possible. Metaphysically, life is the only phenomenon that is an end in itself: a value gained and kept by a constant process of action. Epistemologically, the concept of 'value' is genetically dependent upon and derived from the antecedent concept of 'life.' To speak of 'value' as apart from 'life' is worse than a contradiction in terms.
[...]
In answer to those philosophers who claim that no relation can be established between ultimate ends or values and the facts of reality, let me stress that the fact that living entities exist and function necessitates the existence of values and of an ultimate value which for any given living entity is its own life. Thus the validation of value judgments is to be achieved by reference to the facts of reality. The fact that a living entity is, determines what it ought to do. So much for the issue of the relation between 'is' and 'ought.'
[...]
Nothing is given to man on earth except a potential and the material on which to actualize it. The potential is a superlative machine: his consciousness; but it is a machine without a spark plug, a machine of which his own will has to be the spark plug, the self-starter and the driver; he has to discover how to use it and he has to keep it in constant action. The material is the whole of the universe, with no limits set to the knowledge he can acquire and to the enjoyment of life he can achieve. But everything he needs or desires has to be learned, discovered and produced by him—by his own choice, by his own effort, by his own mind.
A being who does not know automatically what is true or false cannot know automatically what is right or wrong, what is good for him or evil. Yet he needs that knowledge in order to live. He is not exempt from the laws of reality, he is a specific organism of a specific nature that requires specific actions to sustain his life. He cannot achieve his survival by arbitrary means nor by random motions nor by blind urges nor by chance nor by whim. That which his survival requires is set by his nature and is not open to his choice. What is open to his choice is only whether he will discover it or not, whether he will choose the right goals and values or not. He is free to make the wrong choice, but not free to succeed with it. He is free to evade reality, he is free to unfocus his mind and stumble blindly down any road he pleases, but not free to avoid the abyss he refuses to see. Knowledge, for any conscious organism, is the means of survival; to a living consciousness, every 'is' implies an 'ought.' Man is free to choose not to be conscious, but not free to escape the penalty of unconsciousness: destruction."
Afterward I'll throw out the real proper objections, if they still apply.
Object away
I believe the activity of philosophy is reason and the result is the happy life [...] According to my idea of philosophy, none is irrational; it would be a contradiction in terms. Lots of people I disagree with put forth arguments that are rational and rely on reason. Some are flawed, but I don't call them irrational. I think they did not know better. The ontological argument is flawed, but I won't call Descartes or Anselm irrational because of it.
All right, so, before I dig in here, I want to draw your attention to the edit that you made to this post.
Edit : I would say pyrrhonism is anti-reason. It rationnaly argues for two sides of a question to show that reason is not that great. This was used to push for a certain lifestyle of indifference. It is on the limits of philosophy : more like a critic of philosophy that leads to a way of life. There is a use of reason (to destroy it) and leads to a lifestyle. It thus fits my definition and is anti-reason.
On the basis of this edit, it seems that it's at least
possible for you to judge someone/something that purports to be a "good" "philosopher"/"philosophy" as either a
bad philosopher/philosophy or
not a philosopher/philosophy properly so called. I'd like to apply some more pressure to you here because, well, that's just the kind of fun-loving guy that I am
In the interest of conducting a grammatical investigation of your position on philosophy, let's use your definition of philosophy, which, for our purposes here, we can formulate as: "Philosophy is the activity of reason which results in a happy life." If this is our definition of philosophy, then, to the extent that (to use a choice example) Jacques Derrida lived a miserable life and was torn apart by doubts and contradictions right up to his death*, wouldn't you have to conclude, based on
your own terms and according to
your own definition, that deconstruction is either
bad philosophy (i.e., if you wish to grant to Derrida the sanction of reason and if you do not feel that withdrawing from deconstruction the banner of philosophy is warranted, surely you must at least deem his philosophy bad to the extent that it failed to result in his living a happy life) or
not philosophy (i.e., if "philosophy" just
means "the activity of reason which results in a happy life," and if Derrida's "activity" didn't result in a happy life, then surely you must conclude that his "activity" was not reasonable and, hence, not philosophy properly so called)? Why insist on moral neutrality at the expense of logical coherence? Why not just acknowledge the bad and the irrational when and as you come across it?
*For reference, I have in mind remarks of his from an interview conducted with him in 2004 mere weeks before his death (and which I cite in
one of my critiques of poststructuralism), which include him admitting that, "it is true, I am at war with myself, and you have no idea to what extent, more than you can guess, and I say things that contradict each other, that are, let's say, in real tension with each other, that compose me, that make me live and that will make me die," and confessing that he sees life as this state of war, "a terrifying and painful war."
About stoicism : it is your loss.
They have a very interesting ethics that deserves consideration.
What have I been doing throughout this discussion of Stoicism if not considering it?
For example, they have a similar reflection to what you attributed to Rand, but they go further to universalize it.
(1)The action of animals is wired toward its conservation (oikeiôsis) ; (2) This action is justifiable considering they like themselves (3) I am an animal, I act toward conservation and I like myself. (4) I have to preserve myself.
You're right, this is close to Rand's position. The difference is that plants and animals have no concept of "justification" and have no self-regard vis-à-vis liking or not liking themselves.
Then, with our reason we come to realize that the ''I'' in this reasoning has no logical importance (you could place an x instead, a you, a him). A sense of non-importance of the individual arises thus and the objective character of reason develops. Adults can go beyond subjectivity and objectify themselves.
"A sense of non-importance of the individual" is a collection of words that'd make Rand's head explode
You seem to be very stuck dichotomies. You can disagree with something and value it.
If I'm "stuck" on anything then it's on refuting
false dichotomies. This an interesting point to consider, though, because I disagree with the proposition (and hence do not value the proposition) that "you can disagree with something and value it." In this case, we're talking about Stoicism: I disagree with the proposition that Stoicism provides a valid model of how one should comport oneself - which means that I do not value Stoicism as a model of how to comport oneself. To disagree with something implies an estimate of that something as not valuable.
Now, if you were to limit the alternatives to two - between, say, wallowing in miserable self-pity on the one hand and taking a Stoic stance on whatever it is that is causing you to wallow in miserable self-pity on the other - then I would agree that the latter would be preferable, which is to say that I'd be of the opinion that Stoicism would be valuable if it were the only alternative to wallowing in miserable self-pity because wallowing in miserable self-pity is of no value.
In any situation, assenting to something indicates a conferral of value on the something to which one is assenting and vice-versa. How is this not the case?
Also, it is important to stress that the Stoic ideal of the virtuous is, in their own words, impossible (or quasi-impossible, I don't remember the passage now) to achieve.
If the Stoic ideal is impossible then it's worse than nonsense and you yourself should condemn it based on your own terms and your own definition of philosophy. If the Stoic is doomed to live in failure, then happiness is beyond him, which means that his philosophy cannot result in his living a happy life, which means that Stoicism, on your terms and according to your own definition, is either bad philosophy or isn't philosophy at all. Either that or Stoics are deranged durfwads who've deluded themselves into thinking that the bad is the good and the good is the bad...
like Kramer
There is no ''tell Spartacus to be happy''. This is an oversimplification of a complex philosophy which is primarily meant as a practice, a hard practice with exercises. Once again, you seem to lack nuances.
Do I lack nuances or do you lack the ability/willingness to reduce philosophical outlooks to their fundamental presuppositions? In any event, my point with the Spartacus example was to demonstrate that, per Stoicism, the existence of a Spartacus is impossible - which means that, since Stoicism has no space within its philosophy for the existence of a Spartacus, and since Spartacus was a great and heroic individual, Stoicism is not an ideal philosophy.
I'm going to read Courage under Fire: Testing Epictetus's Doctrines in a Laboratory of Human Behavior soon. I might interest you as well. It's a Vietnam guy that was tortured and had read Epictetus.
Ha, I haven't read that but I did come across it once years ago and it's what flipped the switch in my movie brain and got me thinking about writing something on Rambo and Stoicism.
Opposites and negation is not the same. The opposite of white is black but non-white is not necessarily black.
For someone like you, who appears to so loath black-and-white thinking, you couldn't have picked a more fitting example to use
Something dead is neither great nor shit : it has lost all contact with such things. You seem to argue that dead people go to some place which is shit. I agree with Epicurus' statement on this. Death is cessation : we are not us anymore when we are dead, it is neither great nor shit.
How it can even seem implicit in anything that I've said that I think that "dead people go to some place" is inconceivable to me given my clear and explicit rejection as nonsense all such thinking. I most certainly am
not arguing that dead people go anywhere.
It can be shit for you when, as a living being, you are afraid of it, but I could say that for me it is great because I hate living. Such judgements are subjective.
First, it seems that I'll never stop having to reiterate: Preferring being alive to dying ≠ Being afraid of dying. I prefer steak to salmon. That doesn't mean that I'm afraid of salmon. Second, this line of argument goes back to what I was saying to
Caveat in the context of the is-ought "problem": Saying that I
can say x and you
can say y doesn't mean that the concepts of right/wrong, good/bad, better/worse - in short, that the concept of objectivity - has no place in the discussion. You
can hate being alive, but you
ought to love it, and anyone who
does say that he hates being alive (all things being equal) is, if not "wrong," then sure as shit "not right."
To quote a particularly pithy bit from Wittgenstein in
On Certainty:
"In certain circumstances a man cannot make a
mistake. ('Can' is here used logically, and the proposition does not mean that a man cannot say anything false in those circumstances.) If [a man] were to pronounce the opposite of those propositions which [are] certain, we should not just not share his opinion: we should regard him as demented."
There you have it: Stoics are demented.
