A (not so) brief overview of the situation at the front (with a bit of analysis) from a russian telegram:
1. "Border" front (from the border with Belarus to the Kharkov region).
Both sides, suspecting the enemy of the ability to inflict an insidious unexpected blow (I don’t know whether it is justified or not), are gradually building up strength, trying to cover the border. The former "respectable Kyiv partners" do it somewhat better - they have more human resources. In this regard, they also take the initiative, shelling Russian military and civilian facilities on our side of the border and sending in DRGs, having already twice (from what has become widely known) destroyed small units of border guards (6 and 4 killed, both times with impunity) .
Probably, both sides are not yet ready to create a continuous "active" front in this extended area due to a lack of resources. Which does not at all exclude the "attack" of one of the parties with tactical or propaganda purposes.
2. Kharkov front.
Fights of local significance continue in the northern and central sectors. The Russian troops, apparently, either do not have the strength to develop the offensive, or the desire to develop it. The "partners" have a desire, but they lack heavy weapons. The Russian troops, moving forward, created a "safety zone" covering the adjacent regions of the Russian Federation from shelling and capable of acting as a springboard for a future attack on Kharkov.
In the southern sector (Balakleya area) - the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been trying all last week to endanger the Izyum grouping of the RF Armed Forces with a flank strike. The matter did not progress further than local battles.
3. Slavyansk direction.
Along the entire front south of Izyum (from Bolshaya / Velikaya Kamyshevakha to the Seversky Donets) - battles of local importance, artillery skirmishes and actions of reconnaissance and sabotage groups. The Armed Forces of the Russian Federation did not carry out offensive actions in the classical sense of the word, concentrating their efforts on attempts to "squeeze" the Severodonetsk-Lysichansk agglomeration. Although "probing" the positions of the enemy and attempts at tactical advancement continue. The Armed Forces of Ukraine, slightly counterattacking in places, continue to fortify with their main forces on the outskirts of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk fortress and along the Slavyank-Barvenkovo line, hoping to fight a decisive defensive battle here if the command of the RF Armed Forces decides to storm this fortified area in the forehead.
4. Severodonetsk-Lysichansk agglomeration.
Fierce battles continued throughout the week along the entire front with heavy losses for both sides (on our side, the lion's share fell again on the NM LDNR). The enemy managed to withdraw the remnants of his forces from the bridgehead on the left bank of the Seversky Donets (south of Severodonetsk), abandoning most of the heavy weapons and suffering significant losses in manpower. However, the units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine and mercenary units that were defending here avoided complete defeat and destruction. The situation was similar in the "fortress" Gorskoye-Zolotoye - despite heavy losses, the enemy managed to withdraw the core of his garrison from the operational encirclement, leaving in the "cauldron" only small units and groups of demoralized deserters forgotten during the general withdrawal. Few prisoners were taken. - We can say that our "mites captured the air." However, the dangerous ledge in the rear of the advancing west of the Popasnaya group has now been "cut off" and the integrity of the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine on the southern and southeastern outskirts of Lisichansk has been violated. The Armed Forces of the LDNR and the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation went directly to the southern outskirts of Lisichansk, and to the west they almost took it into an operational encirclement, which, however, had not yet been completed as of yesterday evening. I assume the possibility of a gradual (certainly with fighting) withdrawal of the garrison of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the direction of Seversk and the completion of the battle for this area within a week (if the Armed Forces of Ukraine do not bring large fresh reserves into battle).
5. Front Seversk-Bakhmut-Soledar.
No significant changes. Here passes the second strip of long-term defensive structures built by the Armed Forces of Ukraine during the period of the "non-alternative Minsk agreements." All these cities have, in addition, concentric defensive contours. In Artemovsk and Soledar there are also Soviet-built military bases (moreover, in Soledar there is a heavily deepened and fortified underground storage base). The assault on the second lane, occupied by a sufficient number of troops, will not be successful without the tension of all the forces of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the NM of the LDNR, and I do not predict it in the near future (unless, of course, the Russian military command decides otherwise, contrary to common sense).
6. Donetsk front.
Wedging into the first line of defense of the Armed Forces of Ukraine near Avdiivka did not receive further development for the same reason - an acute shortage of combat-ready units and an equally acute shortage of manpower in the existing units. At the front from Horlivka/Toretsk (Dzerzhinsk) to Marinka, there are positional battles, the activity of enemy drones and snipers, and debilitating shelling (most often alternately; yesterday, for example, Gorlovka was smashed) of military facilities, life-support facilities and just residential areas of front-line cities by artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine .
7. Southern Donetsk front.
Within a few days, the enemy managed to push our troops in the area south of Ugledar, throwing back the "secondary" units of the "mobiks" defending here by 2-3 kilometers (in some places a little more) and moving the front line to the villages of Pavlovka and Yegorovka. The strike was clearly limited and distracting in nature - in order to ease the pressure of the strike force of the RF Armed Forces and the NM LDNR on Lisichansk. Nevertheless, he demonstrated the relative weakness of our front in a fairly important sector.
8. On the Zaporozhye and Kherson fronts.
In general - no changes. Everywhere there is a growing activity of the enemy and, especially, his artillery, as well as the DRG.
General conclusions:
1) The protracted battle of the "Second ("Concrete") stage of the NWO" is gradually ending. Whether it will end with an operational pause or immediately turn into a “Battle for the Initiative” (the “effective stage” announced by Kadyrov) I can’t guess, but I still expect that this battle will begin outside the Donbass. The battle ends with tactical successes of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, but strategically - on the whole unsuccessful, because by the beginning of the 5th month of the NMD, the grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbass could not be defeated, and simply ousted from most positions - similarly.
2) The defeat of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the battle for Severodonetsk-Lysichansk, on the one hand, and the failure of the strategic operation to liberate the Donbass of the RF Armed Forces, on the other, have already led to a further increase in military supplies for the Armed Forces of Ukraine from "dear Western partners" (not mine). Much will be decided in July-August after the deployment of reserves on both sides. Time works against the so-called. "Ukraine", and against the Russian Federation. But time works more against the Russian Federation. All the more so because, seduced by local (and costly) successes, the Russian political authorities are critically slowly realizing the need to put the country's economy on a war footing as soon as possible.