If this is indeed the focus of Russia’s approach, then the emphasis on Russia‘s ability to take major cities as a metric of success will have been an analytical error, as Russia appears more intent on pinning Ukrainian forces in cities like Kharkiv while it bypasses them
Is Kiev a major city? What would you call sending troops to threaten a city that the goal of isn't to capture? I use feint.
If they had made easy gains in Kiev would they have taken advantage? Undoubtedly but I still don't believe that was the goal.. as for reasons I've stated. Are you really shocked that Putin/ Russia would throw lives away on a feint?
I could easily be wrong. But your comment on no military analysis believing Kiev wasn't and isn't a goal is incorrect.
Actually some go further and believe the demilitarisation could be completed with still armed defence in Kiev.
Not quite sure I buy that definition of " demilitarisation " personally
Viewed in conjunction, these advances present a troubling picture whereby the Ukrainian forces opposite Donetsk and Luhansk are at risk of encirclement on the eastern side of the Dnieper. If this is indeed the focus of Russia’s approach, then the emphasis on Russia's ability to take major cities as a metric of success will have been an analytical error, as Russia appears more intent on pinning Ukrainian forces in cities like Kharkiv while it bypasses them. Indeed, preparations for an amphibious assault on Odessa may have been a feint, given that the ground forces such an assault could have linked up with appear to be moving north.
A strategy of exterior lines presents challenges too, however, it lends itself to some Russian strengths and is closer in theory to Russian assessments of modern conflict. As observed by Alex Vershinin, Russian logistics are not designed to operate at range from their railheads, and they lack the airlift to overcome short-term deficiencies. Their truck fleet is also limited in its ability to support Russian operations and could be overwhelmed if Russian forces advanced more than 90 km from their staging posts. Exterior lines can address logistics problems by requisitioning and looting the needed supplies from the population, which has been observed in Ukraine. In addition, exterior lines have enabled the Russian army to divide Ukraine’s forces, leading to the diversion of some critical resources such as air defence systems to Kyiv and leaving frontline forces exposed. Using exterior lines, Russia is also better able to concentrate forces to overwhelm and defeat Ukrainian units at critical points. Furthermore, any successes can be reinforced, bringing local numerical superiority that the Ukrainians are unable to match. The movement of elements from the 336th Naval Infantry Brigade into the south of Ukraine is early evidence of this.
Altogether, this suggests that Russia has deliberately pursued a strategy of exterior lines in the hope of dividing and thereby weakening Ukrainian resistance. As stated above, the Russian army has positioned itself to defeat Ukraine’s military in line with the goal of ‘demilitarisation’.
