Newest letter from Strelkov from prison:
Thus, the situation for the Russian Federation is characterized negatively: by the end of the third year of the war, none of the tasks previously declared as "objectives of the NWO" have been accomplished or are close to being accomplished:
1) The "Zelensky regime" has not been overthrown, but is holding on stronger than in 2022. "Under the war", the "derussification" of Ukraine continued at an accelerated pace, the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate was reformed, Nazi propaganda "brainwashed" the population, hatred of Russia not only did not decrease, but also increased many times over.
2) No "demilitarization of Ukraine" has been achieved. On the contrary, - in front of our front there is a huge (several hundred thousand) group, armed perhaps better than before the start of the NWO, well organized, experienced, resilient and (despite war fatigue) showing no signs of imminent disintegration. Part of this group is conducting combat operations in the territory of the "old regions" of the Russian Federation - in the Kursk region, from where our troops have not been able to dislodge the enemy in more than 4 months. The Armed Forces of Ukraine are increasing missile and drone attacks on the deep rear of our troops, reaching the Volga and further, hitting industrial and infrastructure facilities on an increasing scale month by month.
3) The territories of the "new regions" (except for the Lugansk People's Republic) have not been liberated from the enemy: the enemy continues to firmly hold the capital and the right-bank part of the Kherson region, the capital and a significant part of the Zaporizhia region, significant territories of the DPR. Our successes in the Kharkov region are insignificant and have not gone beyond purely tactical. There is no chance that all the "constitutional" territories of the Russian Federation can be liberated by military means in the near future.
To summarize - the SVO, in the form in which it began, has failed (did not achieve its objectives). At one time, one general, looking at the field of an already lost battle, said to Napoleon: "The battle is lost, but we still have time to win the second one." (This was in the Battle of Marengo, which ended with the defeat of the seemingly victorious Austrian army). The fact is that General Desaix brought reserves with him and they completely changed the course of the battle. Do we and the enemy have reserves?
In the first case, the answer is ambiguous. Theoretically - "yes!" Yes, and very significant ones. Our country is still not at war, only the army is. The mobilization of the armed forces and industry (rear, the entire economy, etc.) was not carried out, except for individual (non-complex) measures of a "one-time" nature. As a result, we still have significant mobilization potential, which, theoretically, could be used. But "in practice" - we have a completely opposite and depressing picture: the army, which did not receive timely and sufficient means to achieve a decisive victory, is exhausted and bled dry. Its forces are still sufficient to hold the front and even in places ("at a snail's pace") with difficulty move forward, achieving purely tactical (but very "costly") successes. But the prospects for achieving a strategic victory - to defeat the opposing enemy forces and force him (at least!) to sign peace "on our terms" are more than doubtful. Simply put - our troops can "drag out time in the hope of maybe" for quite a long time, but not win. At least in their current form. Will general mobilization help us now (I emphasize!)? - But I find it difficult to answer this question unequivocally. On the one hand, Napoleon (as in the battle of Marengo) would have been able to masterfully use all the available reserves. On the other hand, we don't have any "Napoleons" in sight. The country, the army, and the population are already very tired of the three-year bloody and, to put it mildly, not very successful military campaign. The industry is acutely feeling the lack of technical resources, and the reserves of military equipment, in all likelihood, are close to exhaustion ("thanks" to the "Syrian adventure", the "sales" for free/on credit from Rosoboronexport, "gifts" to "our African friends", etc., etc.). I am not sure (I do not have the information, but I have doubts): can the Ministry of Defense now arm, clothe, shoe, train, organize, feed, form into units and formations, and then introduce into battle at least another half a million fighters? And for a strategic victory over "Ukraine" alone (I emphasize!) no less is needed (and not one and a half to two times more), and these half a million need to be "sent to the front" not "by bringing water in glasses", but immediately or (in extreme cases) in two or three stages. In addition to the "technical issues", a second question arises: how will the country/people react to this very general mobilization now - after "three years of bloody tedium"? Will we not receive, instead of the long-awaited large reserves for the front, "fuel" for a revolt of the mobilized? Similar to what happened in Petrograd in February 1917? But the prerequisites for this exist, as there are (I am more than sure of this) forces in the so-called "elite" ready to initiate such a revolt, the discontent of the "liberal-Western" part of which is hardly a secret for the country's leadership and the special services. It seems that