That's the sort of thing that only standup comics have been successful tapping into
And that Bill Burr has tapped into better than anyone else, at least with respect to discussions of gender relations. There have been times when Peterson was for all intents and purposes working from Burr's stand-up material. I even saw an interview with him once where he actually referenced Burr's stand-up but he incorrectly attributed one of his bits to the massively overrated and unfunny Louis CK (I realize that, given your AV, I may have just made an enemy out of you, but, if you're wondering: Yes, I hated Louis CK's stand-up even before MeToo).
That bit from Burr is what Peterson's been trying to get at. It's just easier for people to hear it in a comedic context where they can comfortably avoid taking it seriously than in a serious context where they actually have to uncomfortably work through the social and psychological implications whatever they might be.
The subtlety goes away and then young men start punching their girlfriends.
I think that Burr himself would probably reject this line of thinking.
Read this book and tell me again what the heck is special about JP?
As someone who loves both Peterson and Campbell, I'm going to side-step the polemical thrust there and respond sincerely by saying that what's special about Peterson's mythological exegeses is not only his scientific perspective but the way that he's able to "update" the material. The closest Campbell got to doing that was occasionally referencing Kubrick's
2001. Peterson, by contrast, is able to go just as deep into the annals of mythology but then at the same time is able to connect that with perceptive and resonant analyses of shit like
Pinocchio and
Harry Potter.
Personally, I've always seen Peterson as Campbell 2.0. And I can't see any reason to pit them against one another. Hell, someone could make the exact same post that you made about Peterson to Campbell about Campbell to Jung. Jung did the same shit Campbell did. But that's not what's important. What's important is that Campbell continued on and amplified what Jung was doing. And now Peterson is continuing on and amplifying what both Jung and Campbell were doing.
In short: Don't pit players on the same team against one another. Why pit Michael Jordan and Scottie Pippen against one another when the point is that together they're fucking awesome?
Also, from a therapeutic point of view, although Peterson claims to have great respect for Jung, his “self help” advice is overly rational to the EXTREME.
I actually think he's basically in-step with Jungian ideas. In particular, so much of Jung's
The Undiscovered Self has found its way into both Peterson's clinical practice and his critical practice. What exactly do you find so frustrating?
Peterson's dismissal of Campbell for his interpretation of Jung is something that surprised me. Up to that very second I was very much convinced that Peterson was continuing Campbell's work in spirit. Campbell's interview with Bill Moyer echo's much of the same social psychology frame work Peterson presents today.
I've always been surprised by his antipathy towards Campbell, as well. Then I realized that it's because he had long been operating on a misguided assessment of Campbell's relationship to Jungian thought. Peterson (existentialist that he is) never liked what he perceived to be Campbell's overly-positive, pie-in-the-sky type of optimistic reading of Jung, epitomized in his view by what he always hated as Campbell's pseudo-Jungian injunction to "find your bliss." Funny enough, it was Russell Brand of all people who clued Peterson in to the fact that his was a faulty and reductive reading of Campbell.
Obviously, if you haven't seen that conversation, the whole thing is worthwhile. But I time-stamped it at the relevant part. It's also worth mentioning that that's a rather recent encounter of Peterson's, so the potential for him to cast Campbell in a different light has yet to manifest in his work (at least it hasn't as far as I know). But it's encouraging for me as a huge fan of both Campbell and Peterson to know that Peterson is no longer (or, at least, should no longer be) operating on the same prior assessment of Campbell.
Well, I'm not going to read all the posts here but I am going to read this article and discuss interesting points as I find them.
Great breakdown. Thanks for saving me the time and energy having to do it myself.
Seemingly "basic" things need elaborate explaining in these times.
QFT. To quote an apt line from A.J. Ayer (in his classic
The Problem of Knowledge) which may serve to corroborate this sentiment (a sentiment that was also expressed by
@n...not crazy) and which may also serve as a rebuttal to all those who complain that Peterson isn't "groundbreaking" enough:
"Here, as so often in philosophy, the important work consists not in the formulation of an answer, which often turns out to be almost platitudinous, but in making the way clear for its acceptance."
But he seriously missteps when he hops on the "Cultural Marxists are out to shake the foundation of civilization" thing. That's internet forum dumbass territory right there. At worst, it's right-wing terrorist talk.
That's actually a longstanding objection that's been voiced in academic circles for decades, by people Left, Right, and Center and from any number of academic disciplines. Aside from Peterson, you can check out Alan Sokal and Jean Bricmont's
Intellectual Impostures and Sir Roger Scruton's
Fools, Frauds, and Firebrands. People like Noam Chomsky and Daniel Dennett also like to take shots at that nonsense in talks and interviews.
And then, of course, there's Stephen R.C. Hicks'
Explaining Postmodernism, in which he convincingly argues in support of the following thesis:
So no, Peterson hasn't taken any serious missteps regarding the "unholy alliance" between Marxism and postmodernism. He's just joining the chorus of those who have long been saying - quite rightly - that this silly emperor not only has no clothes but is actually dangerous despite being bare ass naked.
I don't know what you mean by "if applied."
There are a million examples to pick from. I picked that one because it just happened this week.
But you paranoids take a broad current in philosophy that exists mainly in lit departments in college and treat it as a modern Mein Kampf.
It's not paranoia if it's true. And, for the record, if it's anything, it's the modern
Das Kapital, not the modern
Mein Kampf.
The author does a great job in pointing out the irony of Peterson always rallying against postmodernism and modern academia while falling in the same traps they often do; the way of hiding, often simpler, concepts behind grandiose language heavy on terminology.
It must be stated, though, that there's a HUGE difference between what I would call, to borrow from Ayn Rand, the
readable versus the
unreadable. Writing like Peterson's, which is at times heavy on the technical terminology, is, despite any
initial difficulty, not only as easy to read as any other kind of writing once you get a handle on the terminology, but, even at its most difficult, eminently readable. Unreadable writing, by contrast, is not only
initially difficult; it is
forever difficult. It is designed specifically to
confound readers. The purpose of the jargony gobbledygook isn't to
enhance understanding but to
prevent it. Hence, such writing is obnoxiously unreadable.
As Rand herself put it with specific reference to academia:
"Within a few years [of the publication of an unreadable book or essay], commentators will begin to fill libraries with works analyzing, 'clarifying,' and interpreting its mysteries. Their notions will spread all over the academic map, ranging from the appeasers, who will try to soften [its] meaning—to the glamorizers, who will ascribe to it nothing worse than their own pet inanities—to the compromisers, who will try to reconcile its theory with its exact opposite—to the avant-garde, who will spell out and demand the acceptance of its logical consequences. The contradictory, antithetical nature of such interpretations will be ascribed to [its] profundity—particularly by those who function on the motto: 'If I don’t understand it, it’s deep.' The students will believe that the professors know the proof of [its] theory, the professors will believe that the commentators know it, the commentators will believe that the author knows it—and the author will be alone to know that no proof exists and that none was offered. Within a generation, the number of commentaries will have grown to such proportions that the original [unreadable book or essay] will be accepted as a subject of philosophical specialization, requiring a lifetime of study—and any refutation of [its] theory will be ignored or rejected if unaccompanied by a full discussion of the theories of all the commentators, a task which no one will be able to undertake."
Anyone who would accuse Peterson of what Rand is indicting there is just plain wrong. In support of that claim, compare the following two passages and see if you don't agree that there's a world of difference between the readable and the unreadable (to say nothing of the fact that Peterson's writing is eminently readable).
First, a passage from Peterson's
Maps of Meaning (page 134 for anyone who thinks I'm cheating):
"This development might also be regarded as an illustration of the increasing psychologization, abstraction, and internalization of religious ideation: In the earliest stages of representation, deities are viewed as pluralistic, and as individualistic and fractious members of a supracelestial (that is, transpersonal and immortal) community. Later, they are integrated into a hierarchy, as the culture becomes more integrated, more sure about relative valuation and moral virtue – and a single god, with a multitude of related features, comes to dominate. Development of monotheism thus parallels intrapsychic and intracultural moral integration. As the average citizen identifies more and more clearly with this monotheistic, integrated pattern, its external nature, as an attribute of the gods, recedes. It becomes more clearly an attribute of the individual human being."
Second, a passage from Jacques Derrida's
Of Grammatology (page 9 of the Johns Hopkins "corrected edition" of 1997 for anyone who thinks I'm cheating):
"For some time now, as a matter of fact, here and there, by a gesture and for motives that are profoundly necessary, whose degradation is easier to denounce than it is to disclose their origin, one says 'language' for action, movement, thought, reflection, consciousness, unconsciousness, experience, affectivity, etc. Now we tend to say 'writing' for all that and more: to designate not only the physical gestures of literal pictographic or ideographic inscription, but also the totality of what makes it possible; and also, beyond the signifying face, the signified face itself. And thus we say 'writing' for all that gives rise to an inscription in general, whether it is literal or not and even if what it distributes in space is alien to the order of the voice: cinematography, choreography, of course, but also pictorial, musical, sculptural 'writing.' One might also speak of athletic writing, and with even greater certainty of military or political writing in view of the techniques that govern those domains today. All this to describe not only the system of notation secondarily connected with these activities but the essence and the content of these activities themselves. It is also in this sense that the contemporary biologist speaks of writing and
pro-gram in relation to the most elementary processes of information within the living cell. And, finally, whether it has essential limits or not, the entire field covered by the cybernetic
program will be the field of writing. If the theory of cybernetics is by itself to oust all metaphysical concepts - including the concepts of soul, of life, of value, of choice, of memory - which until recently served to separate the machine from man, it must conserve the notion of writing, trace, gramme, or grapheme, until its own historico-metaphysical character is also exposed. Even before being determined as human (with all the distinctive characteristics that have always been attributed to man and the entire system of significations that they imply) or nonhuman, the
gramme - or the
grapheme - would thus name the element. An element without simplicity. An element, whether it is understood as the medium or as the irreducible atom, of the arche-synthesis in general, of what one must forbid oneself to define within the system of oppositions of metaphysics, of what consequently one should not even call
experience in general, that is to say the origin of
meaning in general."
Now, if you were to compare the passage from Peterson's
Maps of Meaning with a passage from
12 Rules for Life, I'd imagine that the passage from the latter would not be anywhere near as technical as the passage from the former. But the key point to be made is that even the technical passage from
Maps of Meaning, in which Peterson refers to more abstract concepts like "supracelestial" - which he significantly defines
immediately in parentheses, indicating his desire to communicate rather than to confound - and "intrapsychic," he's still very clear and direct with the intention of being (relatively) easily understood.
Does anyone honestly think that the same can be said of the passage from
Of Grammatology? Is there anyone who can look at those two passages side-by-side and say that they're on the same level and written with the same intent? Are people really comfortable equating someone like Peterson with someone like Derrida?