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The story of Belal Muhammad as a fighter is a story of discipline, preparedness, and persistence. He’s never been the best in any single phase, nor even at blending phases together. But few fighters in MMA take full advantage of their strengths and maximize their chances of victory through sound decision-making the way Muhammad does. His early UFC fights didn’t give off the air of a surefire contender, but Muhammad stuck around making incremental improvements, refining and adding tools while honing his in-fight instincts.
After his loss to Geoff Neal in 2019, Muhammad went on a ten fight unbeaten streak that finally lined him up for a title shot against Welterweight champion, Leon Edwards. But Muhammad’s early losses, as well as his performance against Edwards in their first No Contest, posed a big issue for his rematch with Edwards. Long-range southpaw kickers like Neal and Edwards have historically been a nightmare matchup for Muhammad, representing two of his three losses in MMA, and both of his unavenged losses.
I wrote before the fight about why Muhammad has such a hard time with southpaw kickers. To sum it up, his left-side dominant attack is more difficult to pull off given the stance matchup and the longer distance involved, and his right side is comparatively weak. Since Muhammad prefers to fight on the outside, he’s used to having the more effective long range weapons in his versatile jab and left kick. But against the southpaw kicker, those tools are hampered and the southpaw’s rear kick becomes the most effective long distance tool.
As Muhammad is outgunned at range, he ends up needing to close distance. I outlined Muhammad’s three main methods of closing distance against southpaws and explored how Edwards posed problems with those tactics, in particular how Muhammad’s habit of circling constantly outside the southpaw’s lead foot leaves them with a constant escape route back to kicking range. But my main critique was that Muhammad relies so much on discrete distance-closing tactics in the first place:
Well Muhammad and his camp must have had similar thoughts, since he significantly re-tooled his process and fixed a lot of the issues that plagued him in his first fight with Edwards. He spent most of that fight conceding Edward’s preferred range, either closing distance in ineffective spurts before going back to the outside, or circling around the lead leg, allowing Edwards to retreat diagonally toward the open side and recover to a comfortable distance.
This time, Muhammad refused to let Edwards off so easily. He shot out intent on pressuring from the opening bell, but his pressure was as smart and measured as it was insistent. He advanced with shorts steps behind a flicking jab and a controlling lead hand covering Edwards’ own. Careful not to overextend onto counters, Muhammad opened up sparingly in open space, knowing his best opportunities would come once he maneuvered Edwards toward the cage.
I previously pointed out Muhammad’s discomfort moving toward a southpaw’s open side, but here he stopped circling around the lead foot and instead prioritized occupying space in front of Edwards. He stepped down the middle with feints and probing jabs, forcing Edwards to deal with the ever present threat of an opponent right in front of him, right now.
By staying in front of Edwards rather than stepping around, Muhammad remained in position to track his movement and crowd him when he circled to the open side. Edwards was forced to decide whether to give ground, circle, or strike rather than being able to comfortably slide out the side door in reaction, and Muhammad would wait for him to pick one before punishing or tracking him. Muhammad also made effective use of herding strikes, cutting off his lateral movement with a rear body kick and left hook.
In terms of pressure footwork, it was a disciplined demonstration of the value of keeping one’s opponent straight in front of them at all times. But discipline and sound footwork was not all that it took to execute Muhammad’s gameplan. In fighting, mitigating risk is heavily dependent on the specifics of matchups and can at times be paradoxical. When faced with a thunderous puncher, the natural instinct is often to retreat and avoid the knockout blow. But for a certain type of fighter, the best way to maximize the chance of victory and avoid the knockout is to walk right into the weapon, daring the puncher to do his worst.
Leon Edwards is exactly the type of fighter whose flame is best extinguished by walking through it, not by running away or playing stick and move. When opponents retreat and circle, he picks them off from the outside and beats them with speed and efficiency. When they rush in, he plants his feet and smacks them with a counter. But when they chew up space methodically but unwavering, the cracks in his own composure and skillset start to show, as he starts retreating in straight lines and forgetting his lateral movement.
I discussed these positioning flaws in Leon Edwards: Sharpshooter:
In the first round, Muhammad ate a huge intercepting knee to the body and a clean counter uppercut while walking Edwards down. Lots of fighters would learn the lesson that pressure gets them hit hard and consequently back off, conceding Edwards’ preferred distance. But Muhammad was disciplined and intelligent enough to stick to the plan, realizing that keeping Edwards on the back foot might get him hit hard in a particular instance, but ultimately reduces the time Edwards would spend in position to him him hard, while putting himself in position to apply his own offense.
I was particularly impressed with Muhammad’s composure in close range engagements. He’s always preferred to stick around the edge of jabbing range, as he tends not to see strikes coming too well and likes to defend by giving ground. But in this fight he made efforts to stay close in the face of danger and avoid giving up too much ground when Edwards lashed out. One sequence from the fourth round stands out to me in particular:
Edwards shows his rear hand to get Muhammad slipping into a head kick and Muhammad bites, but he’s able to roll his shoulder in front of the kick in time to stop it, aided by the close distance that prevented Edwards from fully extending the kick. Muhammad then steps in to a range where the rear hand becomes more of a threat then the head kick, avoiding a straight with a deeper slip. But Edwards uses Muhammad’s reaction to turn off the cage, and now that he’s bought himself some time and space, he’s ready to bite down and swing a bit to maintain it. Edwards initiates an exchange and Muhammad sways back just enough to avoid the rear hand and counter - neither lands anything significant, but Muhammad avoids losing any more ground. But in the next exchange, Edwards steps into a combination and lands a big left hook that Muhammad clearly feels. He’s backed off and forced to concede space, but it only takes a second before Muhammad gets right back to his pressure, forcing Edwards to keep fighting for any inch of space he wants to take. And as Muhammad continues to advance, Edwards’ efforts to lash out and back him off become more half-hearted with each attempt until Muhammad once again has him on the cage.
While Muhammad’s exaggerated reactions to the open side attacks were still exploitable, his willingness to put himself in harm’s way kept Edwards from finding comfortable positions to capitalize on them.
Once Muhammad put Edwards’ back on the cage, his offense opened up. Edwards largely forgot about his lateral movement in open space, but once his back neared the cage, he would often square his stance, extend his arms or fold the lead arm across his face, and look to circle in a wide arc. He used this tactic successfully in his third fight with Kamaru Usman to block Usman’s wide hooks and overhands while turning off the cage, but the fight also revealed some holes in it as Usman was able to sneak jabs through the middle of the guard.
Muhammad would keep the jab buzzing up the middle while tracking Edwards’ movement or look to cut him off with a quick left hook. After going with the hook a couple times and encouraging Edwards to keep the guard wide, Muhammad found a clean leaping lead uppercut up the middle in what likely ended up the deciding strike of a close first round. One of the big problems with the way Edwards uses this sort of guard is that he rarely counters out of it, so seeing it became a trigger for Muhammad to follow his movement without worrying much about counters.
Backing Edwards up to the cage also allowed Muhammad to put his wrestling into play. Edwards’ habit of extending his hands along the cage ended up serving his hips to Muhammad, who was able to hit consistent double leg takedowns. Muhammad’s pressure footwork played an important role in keeping Edwards straight in front of him to line up the clean entries.
Muhammad would distract Edwards upstairs with throwaway punches or time him reaching out to shoot in on his hips. With the cage wall as a backstop, Edwards had nowhere to retreat and Muhammad had a chance to quickly finish the takedown before Edwards could establish grips. The keys here are an immediate locking of the hands underneath the butt, and the quick penetration of Muhammad’s right leg.
By distracting Edwards with punches and drawing his guard up, Muhammad was able to create a clean route to the hips and lock hands. Locking hands around the legs is basically the “locked in rear naked choke” of cage-adjacent takedown defense. Once the grip is established, the defender has to act immediately or he’s likely going for a ride, and Muhammad was able to consistently enter into that position without having to go through Edwards’ large and skillful repertoire of grip-fighting tactics.
By quickly following through with his right leg and stepping deep toward the cage, Muhammad gave himself the power and hip alignment to quickly lift Edwards and dump his back to the mat. When you see Edwards making easy work of takedowns from better pure wrestlers than Muhammad such as Kamaru Usman or Colby Covington, it’s usually because he was able to prevent them from locking hands in the first place, or establish a grip before they could bring the rear leg forward to power their lift.
After Muhammad had scored several relatively clean and easy cage doubles, Edwards adjusted and started turning his hips perpendicular to the cage so he could get a sprawl with more hip drive. Muhammad stopped finding his clean lifts, but he was still able to use Edwards’ side on stance to drive past his overhook or duck under toward his back.
While most of Muhammad’s takedowns came with Edwards’ back already on the cage, Muhammad also demonstrated the effectiveness of shooting takedowns as a tool for enforcing pressure.
After his loss to Geoff Neal in 2019, Muhammad went on a ten fight unbeaten streak that finally lined him up for a title shot against Welterweight champion, Leon Edwards. But Muhammad’s early losses, as well as his performance against Edwards in their first No Contest, posed a big issue for his rematch with Edwards. Long-range southpaw kickers like Neal and Edwards have historically been a nightmare matchup for Muhammad, representing two of his three losses in MMA, and both of his unavenged losses.
I wrote before the fight about why Muhammad has such a hard time with southpaw kickers. To sum it up, his left-side dominant attack is more difficult to pull off given the stance matchup and the longer distance involved, and his right side is comparatively weak. Since Muhammad prefers to fight on the outside, he’s used to having the more effective long range weapons in his versatile jab and left kick. But against the southpaw kicker, those tools are hampered and the southpaw’s rear kick becomes the most effective long distance tool.
As Muhammad is outgunned at range, he ends up needing to close distance. I outlined Muhammad’s three main methods of closing distance against southpaws and explored how Edwards posed problems with those tactics, in particular how Muhammad’s habit of circling constantly outside the southpaw’s lead foot leaves them with a constant escape route back to kicking range. But my main critique was that Muhammad relies so much on discrete distance-closing tactics in the first place:
Well Muhammad and his camp must have had similar thoughts, since he significantly re-tooled his process and fixed a lot of the issues that plagued him in his first fight with Edwards. He spent most of that fight conceding Edward’s preferred range, either closing distance in ineffective spurts before going back to the outside, or circling around the lead leg, allowing Edwards to retreat diagonally toward the open side and recover to a comfortable distance.
This time, Muhammad refused to let Edwards off so easily. He shot out intent on pressuring from the opening bell, but his pressure was as smart and measured as it was insistent. He advanced with shorts steps behind a flicking jab and a controlling lead hand covering Edwards’ own. Careful not to overextend onto counters, Muhammad opened up sparingly in open space, knowing his best opportunities would come once he maneuvered Edwards toward the cage.
I previously pointed out Muhammad’s discomfort moving toward a southpaw’s open side, but here he stopped circling around the lead foot and instead prioritized occupying space in front of Edwards. He stepped down the middle with feints and probing jabs, forcing Edwards to deal with the ever present threat of an opponent right in front of him, right now.
By staying in front of Edwards rather than stepping around, Muhammad remained in position to track his movement and crowd him when he circled to the open side. Edwards was forced to decide whether to give ground, circle, or strike rather than being able to comfortably slide out the side door in reaction, and Muhammad would wait for him to pick one before punishing or tracking him. Muhammad also made effective use of herding strikes, cutting off his lateral movement with a rear body kick and left hook.
In terms of pressure footwork, it was a disciplined demonstration of the value of keeping one’s opponent straight in front of them at all times. But discipline and sound footwork was not all that it took to execute Muhammad’s gameplan. In fighting, mitigating risk is heavily dependent on the specifics of matchups and can at times be paradoxical. When faced with a thunderous puncher, the natural instinct is often to retreat and avoid the knockout blow. But for a certain type of fighter, the best way to maximize the chance of victory and avoid the knockout is to walk right into the weapon, daring the puncher to do his worst.
Leon Edwards is exactly the type of fighter whose flame is best extinguished by walking through it, not by running away or playing stick and move. When opponents retreat and circle, he picks them off from the outside and beats them with speed and efficiency. When they rush in, he plants his feet and smacks them with a counter. But when they chew up space methodically but unwavering, the cracks in his own composure and skillset start to show, as he starts retreating in straight lines and forgetting his lateral movement.
I discussed these positioning flaws in Leon Edwards: Sharpshooter:
In the first round, Muhammad ate a huge intercepting knee to the body and a clean counter uppercut while walking Edwards down. Lots of fighters would learn the lesson that pressure gets them hit hard and consequently back off, conceding Edwards’ preferred distance. But Muhammad was disciplined and intelligent enough to stick to the plan, realizing that keeping Edwards on the back foot might get him hit hard in a particular instance, but ultimately reduces the time Edwards would spend in position to him him hard, while putting himself in position to apply his own offense.
I was particularly impressed with Muhammad’s composure in close range engagements. He’s always preferred to stick around the edge of jabbing range, as he tends not to see strikes coming too well and likes to defend by giving ground. But in this fight he made efforts to stay close in the face of danger and avoid giving up too much ground when Edwards lashed out. One sequence from the fourth round stands out to me in particular:
Edwards shows his rear hand to get Muhammad slipping into a head kick and Muhammad bites, but he’s able to roll his shoulder in front of the kick in time to stop it, aided by the close distance that prevented Edwards from fully extending the kick. Muhammad then steps in to a range where the rear hand becomes more of a threat then the head kick, avoiding a straight with a deeper slip. But Edwards uses Muhammad’s reaction to turn off the cage, and now that he’s bought himself some time and space, he’s ready to bite down and swing a bit to maintain it. Edwards initiates an exchange and Muhammad sways back just enough to avoid the rear hand and counter - neither lands anything significant, but Muhammad avoids losing any more ground. But in the next exchange, Edwards steps into a combination and lands a big left hook that Muhammad clearly feels. He’s backed off and forced to concede space, but it only takes a second before Muhammad gets right back to his pressure, forcing Edwards to keep fighting for any inch of space he wants to take. And as Muhammad continues to advance, Edwards’ efforts to lash out and back him off become more half-hearted with each attempt until Muhammad once again has him on the cage.
While Muhammad’s exaggerated reactions to the open side attacks were still exploitable, his willingness to put himself in harm’s way kept Edwards from finding comfortable positions to capitalize on them.
Once Muhammad put Edwards’ back on the cage, his offense opened up. Edwards largely forgot about his lateral movement in open space, but once his back neared the cage, he would often square his stance, extend his arms or fold the lead arm across his face, and look to circle in a wide arc. He used this tactic successfully in his third fight with Kamaru Usman to block Usman’s wide hooks and overhands while turning off the cage, but the fight also revealed some holes in it as Usman was able to sneak jabs through the middle of the guard.
Muhammad would keep the jab buzzing up the middle while tracking Edwards’ movement or look to cut him off with a quick left hook. After going with the hook a couple times and encouraging Edwards to keep the guard wide, Muhammad found a clean leaping lead uppercut up the middle in what likely ended up the deciding strike of a close first round. One of the big problems with the way Edwards uses this sort of guard is that he rarely counters out of it, so seeing it became a trigger for Muhammad to follow his movement without worrying much about counters.
Backing Edwards up to the cage also allowed Muhammad to put his wrestling into play. Edwards’ habit of extending his hands along the cage ended up serving his hips to Muhammad, who was able to hit consistent double leg takedowns. Muhammad’s pressure footwork played an important role in keeping Edwards straight in front of him to line up the clean entries.
Muhammad would distract Edwards upstairs with throwaway punches or time him reaching out to shoot in on his hips. With the cage wall as a backstop, Edwards had nowhere to retreat and Muhammad had a chance to quickly finish the takedown before Edwards could establish grips. The keys here are an immediate locking of the hands underneath the butt, and the quick penetration of Muhammad’s right leg.
By distracting Edwards with punches and drawing his guard up, Muhammad was able to create a clean route to the hips and lock hands. Locking hands around the legs is basically the “locked in rear naked choke” of cage-adjacent takedown defense. Once the grip is established, the defender has to act immediately or he’s likely going for a ride, and Muhammad was able to consistently enter into that position without having to go through Edwards’ large and skillful repertoire of grip-fighting tactics.
By quickly following through with his right leg and stepping deep toward the cage, Muhammad gave himself the power and hip alignment to quickly lift Edwards and dump his back to the mat. When you see Edwards making easy work of takedowns from better pure wrestlers than Muhammad such as Kamaru Usman or Colby Covington, it’s usually because he was able to prevent them from locking hands in the first place, or establish a grip before they could bring the rear leg forward to power their lift.
After Muhammad had scored several relatively clean and easy cage doubles, Edwards adjusted and started turning his hips perpendicular to the cage so he could get a sprawl with more hip drive. Muhammad stopped finding his clean lifts, but he was still able to use Edwards’ side on stance to drive past his overhook or duck under toward his back.
While most of Muhammad’s takedowns came with Edwards’ back already on the cage, Muhammad also demonstrated the effectiveness of shooting takedowns as a tool for enforcing pressure.
