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The Economist came out with a report on the future landscape of international banking. A key theme in it is whether China could begin to rise in prominence as a rival to the US. Key concerns here are the original infrastructure or "plumbing" with banking which has allowed the US to have far reaching international control could shift a lot in the near future with easier/faster digital payment methods. Beyond that, with America using it's cash reserve power to punish foes like Iran and others, does this cause enough pushback internationally to possibly a new globally-preferred currency than the dollar?
Geopolitics and technology threaten America’s financial dominance
The Economist
China wants to make the yuan a central-bank favourite
The Economist
The financial world’s nervous system is being rewired
The Economist
If you get a free account, you will be able to read all five articles on this. You also could buy a subscription as it's a pretty great publication.
When people bring up ideas of WWIII or a war between developed countries, I come to think of this stuff as far more likely and inevitable. Countries have agreed to compete in a global financial system which the US had a large hand in creating. We haven't had a significant competitor to control that system since it's creation. Losing reserve currency status would signal a very big decline in the country and all the domestic arguments we have now would become much more harder with how we fiscally manage things the past few decades.
Geopolitics and technology threaten America’s financial dominance
The Economist
Three things are driving change. First, the “push” factor of geopolitics. America’s centrality allows it to cripple rivals by denying them access to the world’s liquidity supply. Yet until recently it refrained from doing so. The financial system was seen as neutral infrastructure for promoting trade and prosperity. The first cracks appeared after 2001, when America started using it to choke funding for terrorism. Organised crime and nuclear proliferators soon joined the list. It persuaded allies by presenting such groups as threats to international security and the integrity of the financial system, says Juan Zarate, a former adviser to George W. Bush who designed the original programme.
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Such advances result from the second driver of the new trends: the “pull” factor of attempts to meet the needs in emerging economies. Tech firms have sights on the world’s 2.3bn people with little access to financial services. Helped by plentiful capital and permissive rules, they have created cheap-to-run systems they are starting to export. Some also aim to enable commerce in regions where credit cards are rare but mobile phones common. Propped up by their huge home market, China’s “superapps” run ecosystems in which users spend their way without using actual money.
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The third factor helping insurgents is covid-19, which could lead to a tipping-point. Already hobbled by rising tariffs, global trade is likely to fragment further. As disruption far away causes local shortages, governments want to shorten supply chains. That will give regional powers like China more room to write their own rules. The economic fallout in America—not least the fiscal impact of its $2.7trn stimulus measures—could dent confidence in its ability to repay debt, which underpins its bonds and currency.
China wants to make the yuan a central-bank favourite
The Economist
Yet the flattering snapshot masks an ominous process. Aware of the power that issuing an international currency confers, China is on a charm offensive. Cautious to avoid past mistakes, it is advancing methodically. And it is playing a big trump card: opening up its $13trn bond market, which accounts for 51% of all bonds issued by emerging economies. So far, all is going according to plan.
There are three types of benefits to the issuers of a reserve currency. One is reduced transaction costs. Banks can access central-bank liquidity at will. Firms can borrow cheaply overseas and suffer less foreign-exchange risk.
A second, bigger prize is macroeconomic flexibility. To outsiders, dollars are an attractive asset they use for cross-border purposes. Yet, for America, foreign ownership of its notes is like a loan from abroad. Hunger for dollars allows it to finance deficits with its own money instead of forcing its residents to spend less. That reduces the elemental need to balance the money that comes in with what goes out, freeing America to pursue the monetary and fiscal policy it wants. When the country suffered its first-ever credit-rating downgrade in 2011, investors rushed to buy dollar assets, making it even cheaper for it to borrow.
That autonomy, as well as the world’s dependence on greenbacks, gives it leverage—its third big advantage. America can extract concessions by rewarding allies with vital liquidity while denying it to foes. Last year three Chinese banks pledged swift compliance when suspected of flouting sanctions against North Korea. Monetary clout grants influence on international regulation: European bankers complain that global capital-adequacy ratios are harsher on them than on Americans.
The financial world’s nervous system is being rewired
The Economist
China has gone furthest. In 2015 it launched cips, an interbank messaging system to ease international payments in yuan. It uses the same language as swift, allowing it to talk to other countries’ payment systems. For now just 950 institutions use it—less than 10% of swift’s membership. But “what matters is it’s there,” says Eswar Prasad of Cornell University.
The real revolution is happening in low-value transfers. Like swift, the network of American card schemes is tricky to displace. Member banks and merchants trust each other because they adhere to tested rules. They also like the convenience of the schemes’ settlement platforms, which compute “net” positions between all banks that they square up at the end of the day. So rival schemes struggle to make a dent. In 2014, fearing sanctions could block it from using American schemes, Russia created its own, which now accounts for 17% of domestic cards. But its 70m tally is dwarfed by Visa and Mastercard’s 5bn. Size is not a problem for UnionPay, China’s own club. Just 130m of its 7.6bn cards were issued outside the mainland, however, where it is mostly used by Chinese tourists.
If you get a free account, you will be able to read all five articles on this. You also could buy a subscription as it's a pretty great publication.
When people bring up ideas of WWIII or a war between developed countries, I come to think of this stuff as far more likely and inevitable. Countries have agreed to compete in a global financial system which the US had a large hand in creating. We haven't had a significant competitor to control that system since it's creation. Losing reserve currency status would signal a very big decline in the country and all the domestic arguments we have now would become much more harder with how we fiscally manage things the past few decades.