Why the universe exists necessarily

[meauneau]

Before I get to the argument here's a primer on modal language copied from Wikipedia:

• True propositions are those that are true in the actual world (for example: "Richard Nixon became president in 1969").
• False propositions are those that are false in the actual world (for example: "Ronald Reagan became president in 1969"). (Reagan did not run for president until 1976, and thus couldn't possibly have been elected.)
• Possible propositions are those that are true in at least one possible world (for example: "Hubert Humphrey became president in 1969"). (Humphrey did run for president in 1968, and thus could have been elected.) This includes propositions which are necessarily true, in the sense below.
• Impossible propositions (or necessarily false propositions) are those that are true in no possible world (for example: "Melissa and Toby are taller than each other at the same time").
• Necessarily true propositions (often simply called necessary propositions) are those that are true in all possible worlds (for example: "2 + 2 = 4"; "all bachelors are unmarried").[1]
• Contingent propositions are those that are true in some possible worlds and false in others (for example: "Richard Nixon became president in 1969" is contingently false and "Hubert Humphrey became president in 1969" is contingently true).

Now the argument:

All possible worlds have something in common, namely, that they exist. Just like all triangles in all possible worlds have something in common, namely, that they have three corners. So if in every possible world the world exists and triangles have three corners, then the world, our world, exists necessarily and trinagles necessarily have three corners. With this argument we can establish that the world (which includes all that exists, universe or multiverse, etc.), exists necessarily, i.e., it couldn't have not existed (worlds exist in all possible worlds).

I think this also shows that the question typically formulated as "why is there something rather than nothing?" has been formulated the wrong way round, it should be "why isn't there nothing rather than something"? The default is something, as established above since the world exists necessarily, and we should now wonder why there isn't nothing, if it is even coherent to talk about absolute nothingness.

 

[ultramanhyata]

Is this like your version of an enjoyable, stimulating game of chess? Or do you really anticipate some type of breakthrough in these millennia-old natural theology dialogues that might change the course of mankind and our understanding of reality?

 

[Not A Theist]

Just off the bat, I'm a bit confused.

"All possible worlds have something in common, namely, that they exist."

If the world is possible and not necessary in some sense, then why must it exist? Doesn't the possibility of something happening have the possibility of it not happening packed into it?

 

[meauneau]

Is this like your version of an enjoyable, stimulating game of chess? Or do you really anticipate some type of breakthrough in these millennia-old natural theology dialogues that might change the course of mankind and our understanding of reality?

lol the former of course.

 

[meauneau]

Just off the bat, I'm a bit confused.

"All possible worlds have something in common, namely, that they exist."

If the world is possible and not necessary in some sense, then why must it exist? Doesn't the possibility of something happening have the possibility of it not happening packed into it?

If a word exists, it exists necessarily if all the possible worlds have existence in common. Existence is true of all possible worlds is the same as saying that all triangles have three angles therefore this triangle necessarily has three angles. In other worlds it is necessarily true that triangles have three angle even though it doesn't exist. In this case the claim is that if a world exists it exists necessarily.

 

[Amerikuracana]

Some of that made very little sense. You can ask either, and it is essentially asking the exact same thing.

The universe and existence isn't more complicated than we can currently understand; it's more complicated than we can't understand.

 

[Amerikuracana]

There almost cannot be nothing, because the concept wouldn't exist without something. In order for there to be nothing, there kind of has to be something.

 

[Higus]

@meauneau
That which cannot be measured is not worth discussion. The question is just mental masturbation. No answer you come up with will satisfy you.

 

[Prokofievian]

How does this not assume the conclusion?

 

[dontsnitch]

@Caveat, I believe I remember you taking issue with my use of this argument (there should be nothing). Care to weigh in?

 

[TribalDrumz]

 

[Not A Theist]

If a word exists, it exists necessarily if all the possible worlds have existence in common. Existence is true of all possible worlds is the same as saying that all triangles have three angles therefore this triangle necessarily has three angles. In other worlds it is necessarily true that triangles have three angle even though it doesn't exist. In this case the claim is that if a world exists it exists necessarily.

I may be missing something, but I'm still not entirely clear what you're doing here. It seems like you're importing the actuality of existence, and even the necessity of that actuality, into the possibility of existence, and I'm missing how this is accomplished.

In the case of triangles, all triangles have three angles because it is built into the concept of triangle - this is a formal property of a triangle. Three angles is, by definition, part of what a triangle is. When you say that "all possible worlds have existence in common" and liken that necessity of existence to the formal quality of triangles having three angles, I don't see how you're determining that a formal property of "possible world" is "it necessarily exists." To the best of my understanding, a formal property of a "possible world" is that it possibly exists - not that it does exist, or that it necessarily exists. Formally, it seems that a part of the character of the possible is that it is both possible to be, and possible to not. I am still not getting your reasoning here.

 

[meauneau]

In this argument I do not assume modal realism which is the thesis that possible worlds are real. Here I assume that possible worlds are sets of conjunctions of all of the propositions that would be true if that world were actual. So if all these sets of propositions we call "possible worlds" contain the proposition "this world exists" as a member, then this is a necessary truth. Therefore the actual world exists necessarily.

 

[meauneau]

I may be missing something, but I'm still not entirely clear what you're doing here. It seems like you're importing the actuality of existence, and even the necessity of that actuality, into the possibility of existence, and I'm missing how this is accomplished.

In the case of triangles, all triangles have three angles because it is built into the concept of triangle - this is a formal property of a triangle. Three angles is, by definition, part of what a triangle is. When you say that "all possible worlds have existence in common" and liken that necessity of existence to the formal quality of triangles having three angles, I don't see how you're determining that a formal property of "possible world" is "it necessarily exists." To the best of my understanding, a formal property of a "possible world" is that it possibly exists - not that it does exist, or that it necessarily exists. Formally, it seems that a part of the character of the possible is that it is both possible to be, and possible to not. I am still not getting your reasoning here.

I am looking for the source of the argument. I can't remember where I read it. But I think the solution to this problem has to do with the existence not being an essential property of the thing but a value of the proposition. Something to do with the de re /de dicto distinction. I will keep looking for it.

 

[cooks1]

Before I get to the argument here's a primer on modal language copied from Wikipedia:

• True propositions are those that are true in the actual world (for example: "Richard Nixon became president in 1969").
• False propositions are those that are false in the actual world (for example: "Ronald Reagan became president in 1969"). (Reagan did not run for president until 1976, and thus couldn't possibly have been elected.)
• Possible propositions are those that are true in at least one possible world (for example: "Hubert Humphrey became president in 1969"). (Humphrey did run for president in 1968, and thus could have been elected.) This includes propositions which are necessarily true, in the sense below.
• Impossible propositions (or necessarily false propositions) are those that are true in no possible world (for example: "Melissa and Toby are taller than each other at the same time").
• Necessarily true propositions (often simply called necessary propositions) are those that are true in all possible worlds (for example: "2 + 2 = 4"; "all bachelors are unmarried").[1]
• Contingent propositions are those that are true in some possible worlds and false in others (for example: "Richard Nixon became president in 1969" is contingently false and "Hubert Humphrey became president in 1969" is contingently true).

Now the argument:

All possible worlds have something in common, namely, that they exist. Just like all triangles in all possible worlds have something in common, namely, that they have three corners. So if in every possible world the world exists and triangles have three corners, then the world, our world, exists necessarily and trinagles necessarily have three corners. With this argument we can establish that the world (which includes all that exists, universe or multiverse, etc.), exists necessarily, i.e., it couldn't have not existed (worlds exist in all possible worlds).

I think this also shows that the question typically formulated as "why is there something rather than nothing?" has been formulated the wrong way round, it should be "why isn't there nothing rather than something"? The default is something, as established above since the world exists necessarily, and we should now wonder why there isn't nothing, if it is even coherent to talk about absolute nothingness.

Whatever you are taking- lower the dosage. There is no difference between hypothesizing theories through your rectal cavity and talking out of your ass.

Cut that tripe in half 2-3 times and maybe we will have something to discuss.

 

[Not A Theist]

I am looking for the source of the argument. I can't remember where I read it. But I think the solution to this problem has to do with the existence not being an essential property of the thing but a value of the proposition. Something to do with the de re /de dicto distinction. I will keep looking for it.

Post it if you find it. I'm not familiar with this line of argument, so I'm curious to see what kind of logic jiu jitsu is being whipped out.

 

[meauneau]

Whatever you are taking- lower the dosage. There is no difference between hypothesizing theories through your rectal cavity and talking out of your ass.

Cut that tripe in half 2-3 times and maybe we will have something to discuss.

What theory? I put forth an argument not a theory.

 

[ShadBo]

How would respond to a theist who tacks on "if a God could exist in any possible world, God would then necessarily exist in all possible worlds" following nearly the exact modial chain, and conclude therefore God exists in our world?

 

[Phr3121]

'Cogito, ergo sum' = I think, therefore I am.
Rene Descartes

We cannot doubt of our existence while we doubt. I doubt, therefore I think, therefore I am.

 

[OverCoronavirus Pressure]

Now the argument:

All possible worlds have something in common, namely, that they exist.

Unless I'm misunderstanding, this is fallacious right off the bat.

All possibilities don't necessarily exist unless you want to invoke multiverse drivel.