Snyder’s absurd and atextual reading of the statute is one only today’s Court could love. Ignoring the plain text of §666—which, again, expressly targets officials who “corruptly” solicit, accept, or agree to accept payments “intending to be influenced or rewarded”—the Court concludes that the statute does not criminalize gratuities at all. This is so, apparently, because “tate and local governments often regulate the gifts that state and local officials may accept,” ante, at 1, which, according to the majority, means that §666 cannot. The Court’s reasoning elevates nonexistent federalism concerns over the plain text of this statute and is a quintessential example of the tail wagging the dog. Section 666’sregulation of state, local, and tribal governments reflects Congress’s express choice to reach those and other entities receiving federal funds. And Congress not only had good reasons for doing so, it also had the authority to take such legislative action, as this Court has already recognized. See Sabri v. United States, 541 U. S. 600, 605, 608 (2004). We have long held that when Congress has appropriated federal money, it “does not have to sit by and accept the risk of operations thwarted by local and state improbity.” Id., at605. Both the majority and Snyder suggest that interpreting §666 to cover gratuities is problematic because it gives “federal prosecutors unwarranted power to allege crimes that should be handled at the State level.” App. 14–15 (emphasis added); see also ante, at 10–11. But woulds, coulds, and shoulds of this nature must be addressed across the stree twith Congress, not in the pages of the U. S. Reports. We have previously and wisely declined “to express [a] view as to [§666’s] soundness as a policy matter.” Sabri, 541 U. S., at 608, n. But, today, the Court can stay silent no longer. Its decision overrides the intent of Congress—and the policy preferences of the constituents that body represents—as unequivocally expressed by the plain text of the statute.
www.pbs.org
