A brief overview of the situation at the front from the perspective of a russian military analyst. With forecasts:
1. "Border" front (from the borders with Belarus to the Kharkov region):
No significant changes. The situation is gradually but steadily heating up. Artillery skirmishes, the actions of the DRG. The enemy is stepping up shelling and drone attacks deep into Russian territory. The goal is to force the RF Armed Forces to carry out a maneuver with the available air defense units to cover cities, weakening the cover of troops at the front and in the near rear + "further raise the prestige of the Russian authorities and the president personally among the population of the shelled settlements." To the border, both sides are gradually pulling troops. I predict that by the end of summer (if not earlier) this front will also become quite active - which - in the absence of mobilization measures in the Russian Federation - will only be beneficial to the enemy, due to his mobilization, he will soon be able to field a much larger number of "linear" units and formations, although -to and light infantry.
2. Kharkov Front - no significant changes. Artillery skirmishes, aviation actions, local battles. Forecast - can potentially become the main one in the upcoming "battle for the initiative". How it will be in reality - we'll see. In any case, the extended configuration of the front will inevitably lead to attempts by one or the other (or both) sides to carry out offensive operations with decisive or partial goals.
3. "Izyum-Slavyansk direction".
The transfer of almost all combat-ready artillery and infantry forces of the RF Armed Forces and the LDNR Armed Forces near Lisichansk led to a local superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine over our troops, as a result of which a number of attacks on the settlement were unsuccessful. Krasnopolie and in this direction in general. The enemy, having strengthened his front (despite the battle near Lisichansk) with fresh reserves, managed to regain lost tactical positions in several places.
Forecast: the grouping of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDNR in this direction will certainly be strengthened due to the forces released after the victory near Lisichansk, however, I do not expect an attack on the Slavyansk-Barvenkovo line (at least not successfully), since the enemy troops are well entrenched on the ground , quite numerous, active. And the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (and the military-political leadership) attaches special importance to the retention of the Slavyansk-Kramatorsk agglomeration.
4. Donetsk front. Section Seversk-Ugledar-Bakhmut (Artemovsk):
At present, the advancing units of the LDNR Armed Forces and the RF Armed Forces are trying to advance in the Seversk region "on the shoulders of the retreating enemy." However, the enemy prepared in advance here and occupied new lines of defense with fresh troops, continues to dig in. Forecast: unfortunately, I do not expect significant success and a breakthrough of the front of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in this area. Probably the gradual fading of the fighting.
5. Donetsk front. Section Avdeevka-Marinka.
Positional battles with superiority of the Armed Forces of Ukraine (the advantage is achieved due to good artillery support and the activity of drones - both reconnaissance and light strike). There may be attempts by the command of the RF Armed Forces to build on the previously achieved success north of Avdiivka, which will now be much more difficult than during the initial breakthrough of the front (which was sacrificed for the transfer of forces to Severodonetsk-Lysichansk).
6. Donetsk front. Southern area. - Without changes. The same picture, in general, as well as to the north. I predict purely positional battles in the near future.
7. Zaporozhye front. Positional battles, artillery skirmishes. The growing activity of the DRG of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the near and far rear of our troops. Potentially - one of the probable directions of the enemy offensive.
8. Kherson front. Without changes. At the forefront - gradually increasing shelling of artillery of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The line of contact has not been formed everywhere, in some areas - the defense of both sides is of a focal nature (in settlements). One of the most likely areas of "Battle for the Initiative".
General points:
1. Opponent.
- Over the past month, the Armed Forces of Ukraine have been continuously increasing the number of troops and military equipment in all directions - both "active" and "sleeping", creating a steady superiority in manpower, artillery and armored vehicles in many of them. At the same time, the enemy continued to form strategic reserves, limiting their entry into battle even at the height of the battle for Severodonetsk-Lysichansk.
- As a new element of the tactics of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, special attention is noted to the destruction by rocket artillery and unmanned aircraft of important rear facilities of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the Armed Forces of the LDNR, primarily large ammunition depots that were not covered or weakly covered by air defense forces.
- Local superiority in manpower allowed the enemy in many areas to occupy previously abandoned territories without a fight, complicating the tactical position of our units and subunits operating in these areas.
- Apparently, the emphatically defensive nature of the battle for Severodonetsk-Lysichansk on the part of the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine was deliberate. The battles were only dragged out with the aim of gaining as much time as possible and inflicting maximum losses on the Russian strike force. After the loss of the main positions was a foregone conclusion, the command of the Armed Forces of Ukraine managed to withdraw the core of its defending troops, avoiding the encirclement of even a small part of them - both in Severodonetsk and in the area of Lysichansk and Zolote-Gorskoye. At the same time, however, most of the defenders' equipment was irretrievably lost.
Conclusion: The Armed Forces of Ukraine are completing preparations for their own active operations in one or more directions. Whether the enemy will first wait for a new attack by the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation or will take his actions in a proactive manner - I will not undertake to predict.
2. Our troops.
- The offensive potential of the strike force that took Lisichansk is practically exhausted. To continue the offensive without an operational pause necessary for the replenishment and rest of the troops is fraught with additional heavy losses without significant results. Regrouping and determining the next offensive targets are required, as well as taking measures to repel probable enemy attacks.
- Russian troops are experiencing growing difficulties in confronting the Armed Forces of Ukraine at the tactical level due to the growing superiority of the enemy in manpower, as well as an increase in modern military equipment at his disposal.
- The lack of replenishment and the impossibility of rotation (especially for those who stay on the front line for 3-4 months without changing the mobilized units of the LDNR Armed Forces) - leads to a slow but constant decrease in the actual combat readiness and morale of our units and formations on the defensive (whereas the morale of those who suffered heavy losses, but the advancing assault units remain high).
- The military-political and military leadership of the Russian Federation will not be able to allow themselves to "strengthen in positions", giving the initiative completely into the hands of the enemy, since the prolongation of hostilities in these conditions only leads to an increase in the enemy's forces while weakening their forces. Therefore, I expect the prepared reserves to be brought into battle in a new offensive operation as part of the "Battle for the Initiative" immediately after a certain operational pause.
General conclusion for May-June:
The "second stage of the NWO" ended without the full achievement of the set goals. The grouping of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the Donbass has not been defeated and not completely driven back from its territory. It was only possible to break up and push out part of the enemy grouping from the "ledge" along the Seversky Donets, completely freeing the territory of the LPR and the cities of Popasnaya, Krasny Liman, Severodonetsk, Lisichansk, and a number of smaller settlements.
The operation demonstrated that the "peacetime army" of the Russian Federation, significantly reinforced by the LDNR Armed Forces and "surrogates" of various PMCs, will solve the problem of completely defeating the Armed Forces of Ukraine and victoriously completing the so-called "SVO" is no longer capable.
Delay in mobilization measures in the Russian Federation itself may in the coming months cause a crisis in certain sectors of the "Ukrainian front", and further ignoring the above inability may negatively affect the situation on a strategic scale.
