Real Reason why Hillary Lost - (NOT because of Russia)- Was Because Her Campaign Was Too Intelligent

[Hans Gruber]

Has anyone else ever been so good at something that they lost?

What about being too intelligent so you fail a test?

I am so used to winning at everything in life personally....was just needing some opinions on why you think you (personally) lose so much. ( @JDragon ....just kidding buddy)

The only thing I that remember losing happened at an early age. It was my virginity (lost it to a hot chick that was 2 years older than me) so it has been quite a while since I lost something.


Also would like opinions on the article.

Anyway...here is the article:


The hardest thing about explaining very close election defeats is that you can talk yourself into believing any number of factors, large or small, could have made the crucial difference. Hillary Clinton’s defeat came down to 100,000 votes in three states out of nearly 130 million cast nationally. That’s a deficit so tiny that the search for a single culprit will probably take political detectives down the dark road to madness.

It is understandable that within the ranks of the Clinton campaign’s own high command, it is an article of faith that FBI director James Comey cost HRC the presidency by making the ridiculous email-server issue the dominant subject of conversation during the crucial last days of the campaign. It was an external event that came out of the blue (or more specifically, out of the fevered libido of Anthony Weiner) and reinforced doubts about Clinton’s trustworthiness among a small group of undecided voters in key states.

But an equally plausible case can be made that the Clinton campaign itself was so convinced it could not lose that it missed the danger signs emanating from the three Clinton firewall states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) that eventually awarded Trump the presidency despite a 2 percent deficit in the national popular vote. Focusing on what happened in Michigan, Politico’s Edward-Isaac Dovere provides a wealth of anecdotal evidence of a national campaign that could not believe and thus did not pay attention to distress signals about “base” turnout and defections to Trump.

It is illuminating to compare Dovere’s piece to a September Politico articleby Shane Goldmacher in which Clinton campaign operatives celebrate the transcendent genius of its data-analytics arm, anchored in what worked for Barack Obama in 2012. Clinton analytics chief Elan Kriegel was the hero of the story, and readers came away with the impression that nothing could happen anywhere in the U.S. electorate without a Kriegel-developed algorithm instantly kicking in to adjust campaign resources and sustain the flight path to victory.


Unsurprisingly, as Dovere found, this all-knowing analytics system and the iron self-confidence it inspired made “Brooklyn” (Clinton’s national headquarters) largely impervious to feedback:


The anecdotes are different but the narrative is the same across battlegrounds, where Democratic operatives lament a one-size-fits-all approach drawn entirely from pre-selected data — operatives spit out “the model, the model,” as they complain about it — guiding [campaign manager Robby] Mook’s decisions on field, television, everything else.
Now the Clinton campaign was not unique in its reliance on a “model” for understanding election dynamics. One of the big trends since 2012 among political practitioners and observers alike has been the gradual displacement of random-sample polling with models of the electorate based on voter-registration files, supplemented by tracking polls of this fixed universe of voters. This approach tends to create a more static view of the electorate and its views, and probably builds in a bias for thinking of campaigns as mechanical devices for hitting numerical “targets” of communications with voters who are already in your column. You could see this new conventional wisdom (and the pseudoscientific certainty it bred) inpre-election models published by Bloomberg Politics and in an Election Day modeling experiment conducted by Slate. Having invested heavily in its own “model” for what it needed to do when and where, the Clinton campaign was naturally resistant to conflicting signals from the ignoramuses on the ground.

It is in that respect that just about everyone within and beyond the Clinton campaign erred in crediting it with a state-of-the-art “ground game” worth a point or two wherever it was deployed. Clinton had lots of field offices, to be sure. She had more money for get-out-the-vote operations. Team Clinton did much, much more targeted outreach to key voters in key states than did Team Trump. But in the end “Brooklyn’s” decisions were based on assumptions that had very little to do with actual developments on the “ground;” its hypersophisticated sensitivity to granular data about many millions of people made it fail to see and hear what was actually happening in the lead-up to the election.

For now it probably doesn’t matter whether it was James Comey or the campaign’s faulty self-confidence that cost Clinton the election. But when it comes time to build the next presidential general-election campaign, the people setting up the organization and paying the bills might want to rely a bit less on any system that values analytical omniscience at the expense of a willingness to change the game plan if there are signs that that is needed.

If, God forbid, I were running a future presidential campaign, the headquarters would be plastered with posters emblazoned with the title of the autobiography of the great, data-driven baseball manager Earl Weaver: “It’s What You Learn After You Know It All That Counts.”

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/12/clinton-campaign-may-have-been-too-smart-to-win.html

 

[Rockapotomuss]

That was great. Thank you.

 

[Hans Gruber]

That was great. Thank you.

Thank you sir.

Also being part of the winning @Palis and @Dr J campaign made me realize that I can't lose (even on the internet) so was looking for opinions as to whether being too intelligent could actually cause you to lose or not?

 

[Unknown Pleasures]

Being president certainly largely comes down to playing to what the masses want to hear.

It is brilliant about Obama's hidden recorded speech about playing to people who are religious and so forth to win their vote. People criticise him for that, but that is very obviously what someone needs to do. And candidates knowingly make campaign promises they will not follow through on, because it is what people want to hear, even if it completely impossible or illogical to implement.

It's why academics don't have a chance to run for presidency. Their modus operandi is truth, evidence, and research. That is simply suicide in politics. Anyone who admits they don't believe the fairy tale of a guy in the sky, or gets into the nuances or realities of foreign policy is simply going to crash and burn in an election. Politics is SPIN SPIN SPIN.

Clinton was a very unpopular candidate through both Bush/Clinton fatigue, and moments of being a real jackal which lead many (correctly) to believe she is much more a wolf in sheep's clothing than she would have you believe. She ran a very polished campaign in terms of production values and such, but anyone that says if you want to elect a political outsider or someone different vote for her because she fits the bill because.....she'd be the first female president ... ugh! That is too political and polished answers such that you feel like you're not dealing with a real person.

But at the end of the day, that is the beauty of our system. The ignoramuses that get catered to and get all emotional over who will become president will remain ignoramuses regardless who wins. And the successful, go getters will keep being successful go getters regardless who wins.

 

[Pixelated Porn]

well, I didn't get to fuck cindy crawford because I was too fooking hawt and my dick was 12 inches too big to fit in her party hole

 

[lilelvis]

Yeah, they're too smart for the common man. Distillery's greatness went right over our heads.

 

[Thunderflash500]

Yes, us deplorables just don't understand why a corrupt piece of shit is not going to work in our best interest. It's the same story. The media has run so far off track they still can't recognize how full of shit they are. A lot of democrats don't even like her, let alone actual Republicans. Why don't they have a real candidate that supports liberty, supports the working class? Oh that's right, because it's racist to support workers, and liberty offends people so it should be outlawed.

Republicans and conspiracy theorists are worried about communism, really the Democrats should worry about it. Cultural Marxism is causing the implosion of their party. They don't even recognize they've been infected.

 

[Philo-Publius]

Has anyone else ever been so good at something that they lost?

What about being too intelligent so you fail a test?

I am so used to winning at everything in life personally....was just needing some opinions on why you think you (personally) lose so much. ( @JDragon ....just kidding buddy)

The only thing I that remember losing happened at an early age. It was my virginity (lost it to a hot chick that was 2 years older than me) so it has been quite a while since I lost something.


Also would like opinions on the article.

Anyway...here is the article:


The hardest thing about explaining very close election defeats is that you can talk yourself into believing any number of factors, large or small, could have made the crucial difference. Hillary Clinton’s defeat came down to 100,000 votes in three states out of nearly 130 million cast nationally. That’s a deficit so tiny that the search for a single culprit will probably take political detectives down the dark road to madness.

It is understandable that within the ranks of the Clinton campaign’s own high command, it is an article of faith that FBI director James Comey cost HRC the presidency by making the ridiculous email-server issue the dominant subject of conversation during the crucial last days of the campaign. It was an external event that came out of the blue (or more specifically, out of the fevered libido of Anthony Weiner) and reinforced doubts about Clinton’s trustworthiness among a small group of undecided voters in key states.

But an equally plausible case can be made that the Clinton campaign itself was so convinced it could not lose that it missed the danger signs emanating from the three Clinton firewall states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) that eventually awarded Trump the presidency despite a 2 percent deficit in the national popular vote. Focusing on what happened in Michigan, Politico’s Edward-Isaac Dovere provides a wealth of anecdotal evidence of a national campaign that could not believe and thus did not pay attention to distress signals about “base” turnout and defections to Trump.

It is illuminating to compare Dovere’s piece to a September Politico articleby Shane Goldmacher in which Clinton campaign operatives celebrate the transcendent genius of its data-analytics arm, anchored in what worked for Barack Obama in 2012. Clinton analytics chief Elan Kriegel was the hero of the story, and readers came away with the impression that nothing could happen anywhere in the U.S. electorate without a Kriegel-developed algorithm instantly kicking in to adjust campaign resources and sustain the flight path to victory.


Unsurprisingly, as Dovere found, this all-knowing analytics system and the iron self-confidence it inspired made “Brooklyn” (Clinton’s national headquarters) largely impervious to feedback:


The anecdotes are different but the narrative is the same across battlegrounds, where Democratic operatives lament a one-size-fits-all approach drawn entirely from pre-selected data — operatives spit out “the model, the model,” as they complain about it — guiding [campaign manager Robby] Mook’s decisions on field, television, everything else.
Now the Clinton campaign was not unique in its reliance on a “model” for understanding election dynamics. One of the big trends since 2012 among political practitioners and observers alike has been the gradual displacement of random-sample polling with models of the electorate based on voter-registration files, supplemented by tracking polls of this fixed universe of voters. This approach tends to create a more static view of the electorate and its views, and probably builds in a bias for thinking of campaigns as mechanical devices for hitting numerical “targets” of communications with voters who are already in your column. You could see this new conventional wisdom (and the pseudoscientific certainty it bred) inpre-election models published by Bloomberg Politics and in an Election Day modeling experiment conducted by Slate. Having invested heavily in its own “model” for what it needed to do when and where, the Clinton campaign was naturally resistant to conflicting signals from the ignoramuses on the ground.

It is in that respect that just about everyone within and beyond the Clinton campaign erred in crediting it with a state-of-the-art “ground game” worth a point or two wherever it was deployed. Clinton had lots of field offices, to be sure. She had more money for get-out-the-vote operations. Team Clinton did much, much more targeted outreach to key voters in key states than did Team Trump. But in the end “Brooklyn’s” decisions were based on assumptions that had very little to do with actual developments on the “ground;” its hypersophisticated sensitivity to granular data about many millions of people made it fail to see and hear what was actually happening in the lead-up to the election.

For now it probably doesn’t matter whether it was James Comey or the campaign’s faulty self-confidence that cost Clinton the election. But when it comes time to build the next presidential general-election campaign, the people setting up the organization and paying the bills might want to rely a bit less on any system that values analytical omniscience at the expense of a willingness to change the game plan if there are signs that that is needed.

If, God forbid, I were running a future presidential campaign, the headquarters would be plastered with posters emblazoned with the title of the autobiography of the great, data-driven baseball manager Earl Weaver: “It’s What You Learn After You Know It All That Counts.”

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/12/clinton-campaign-may-have-been-too-smart-to-win.html

Hmmm...so what does that make Trump's deplorable voter base? I can't quite figure out what they're getting at here.

Great tactic to win back the voter base. Call them stupid...

 

[Egelo]

Her being frail and weak is what did her in.

No populous ever will vote for whom they perceive as weak. Be it mentally physically or emotionally.

 

[Hans Gruber]

Her being frail and weak is what did her in.

No populous ever will vote for whom they perceive as weak. Be it mentally physically or emotionally.

I hear what you are saying but according to the article her brain was very strong.


I mean...looking at some of her quotes really puts things in perspective.

Example:

Without her pointing out things like this I would have never known.

Just plain "too intelligent to win"

 

[panamaican]

I don't know if I agree with the article but I do agree with the principle:

The trouble with the world is that the stupid are cocksure and the intelligent are full of doubt.

Most people would sooner die than think; in fact, they do so

 

[HereticBD]

This only applies to when right wingers win. When Clinton and Obama won, it was because people were more intelligent.

 

[KnightTemplar]

Has anyone else ever been so good at something that they lost?

What about being too intelligent so you fail a test?

I am so used to winning at everything in life personally....was just needing some opinions on why you think you (personally) lose so much. ( @JDragon ....just kidding buddy)

The only thing I that remember losing happened at an early age. It was my virginity (lost it to a hot chick that was 2 years older than me) so it has been quite a while since I lost something.


Also would like opinions on the article.

Anyway...here is the article:


The hardest thing about explaining very close election defeats is that you can talk yourself into believing any number of factors, large or small, could have made the crucial difference. Hillary Clinton’s defeat came down to 100,000 votes in three states out of nearly 130 million cast nationally. That’s a deficit so tiny that the search for a single culprit will probably take political detectives down the dark road to madness.

It is understandable that within the ranks of the Clinton campaign’s own high command, it is an article of faith that FBI director James Comey cost HRC the presidency by making the ridiculous email-server issue the dominant subject of conversation during the crucial last days of the campaign. It was an external event that came out of the blue (or more specifically, out of the fevered libido of Anthony Weiner) and reinforced doubts about Clinton’s trustworthiness among a small group of undecided voters in key states.

But an equally plausible case can be made that the Clinton campaign itself was so convinced it could not lose that it missed the danger signs emanating from the three Clinton firewall states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) that eventually awarded Trump the presidency despite a 2 percent deficit in the national popular vote. Focusing on what happened in Michigan, Politico’s Edward-Isaac Dovere provides a wealth of anecdotal evidence of a national campaign that could not believe and thus did not pay attention to distress signals about “base” turnout and defections to Trump.

It is illuminating to compare Dovere’s piece to a September Politico articleby Shane Goldmacher in which Clinton campaign operatives celebrate the transcendent genius of its data-analytics arm, anchored in what worked for Barack Obama in 2012. Clinton analytics chief Elan Kriegel was the hero of the story, and readers came away with the impression that nothing could happen anywhere in the U.S. electorate without a Kriegel-developed algorithm instantly kicking in to adjust campaign resources and sustain the flight path to victory.


Unsurprisingly, as Dovere found, this all-knowing analytics system and the iron self-confidence it inspired made “Brooklyn” (Clinton’s national headquarters) largely impervious to feedback:


The anecdotes are different but the narrative is the same across battlegrounds, where Democratic operatives lament a one-size-fits-all approach drawn entirely from pre-selected data — operatives spit out “the model, the model,” as they complain about it — guiding [campaign manager Robby] Mook’s decisions on field, television, everything else.
Now the Clinton campaign was not unique in its reliance on a “model” for understanding election dynamics. One of the big trends since 2012 among political practitioners and observers alike has been the gradual displacement of random-sample polling with models of the electorate based on voter-registration files, supplemented by tracking polls of this fixed universe of voters. This approach tends to create a more static view of the electorate and its views, and probably builds in a bias for thinking of campaigns as mechanical devices for hitting numerical “targets” of communications with voters who are already in your column. You could see this new conventional wisdom (and the pseudoscientific certainty it bred) inpre-election models published by Bloomberg Politics and in an Election Day modeling experiment conducted by Slate. Having invested heavily in its own “model” for what it needed to do when and where, the Clinton campaign was naturally resistant to conflicting signals from the ignoramuses on the ground.

It is in that respect that just about everyone within and beyond the Clinton campaign erred in crediting it with a state-of-the-art “ground game” worth a point or two wherever it was deployed. Clinton had lots of field offices, to be sure. She had more money for get-out-the-vote operations. Team Clinton did much, much more targeted outreach to key voters in key states than did Team Trump. But in the end “Brooklyn’s” decisions were based on assumptions that had very little to do with actual developments on the “ground;” its hypersophisticated sensitivity to granular data about many millions of people made it fail to see and hear what was actually happening in the lead-up to the election.

For now it probably doesn’t matter whether it was James Comey or the campaign’s faulty self-confidence that cost Clinton the election. But when it comes time to build the next presidential general-election campaign, the people setting up the organization and paying the bills might want to rely a bit less on any system that values analytical omniscience at the expense of a willingness to change the game plan if there are signs that that is needed.

If, God forbid, I were running a future presidential campaign, the headquarters would be plastered with posters emblazoned with the title of the autobiography of the great, data-driven baseball manager Earl Weaver: “It’s What You Learn After You Know It All That Counts.”

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/12/clinton-campaign-may-have-been-too-smart-to-win.html

 

[Hans Gruber]

I don't know if I agree with the article but I do agree with the principle:

The trouble with the world is that the stupid are cocksure and the intelligent are full of doubt.

Most people would sooner die than think; in fact, they do so

Brilliant.

You were the perfect example of this.

You often touted your intelligence in the Sherdog election but @Palis / @Dr J and @JDragon soundly beat you (by a lot I might add....I mean a lot...we are talking Big League here)


Thank you for chiming in and proving that there is some merit to this article if you are as intelligent as you state that you are.

 

[RetiredSlave]

People dont like Hillary, end of story. Too intelligent a campaign? The arrogance is stunning and thats also part of the reason. Self perceived intellectual superiority always goes over well.

 

[Pale Man In Black]

LOL, she phoned it in. She let the media campaign on her behalf while she hid in the shadows tossing back vodka martinis, dead sure she had it in the bag, and why not? The media was basically a pro-HRC propaganda mill.
Trump busted his ass. Trump related to the common man, HRC behaved as if she was above them.
What I find illuminating is that this is supposed to be the best they could dredge up. A corrupt, incompetent, negligent (at the very least) spasm addled frigid and very unlikable shrew with temper issues that just assumed it was hers for the taking. Watching her defeat was one of the highlights of the decade.

 

[Satsui Ryu]

She lost because she was an unlikable old woman who potentially did a bunch of shady shit. Outside of die hards and people who really hated Trump I did not see much enthusiasm for her.

 

[Gunny]

Has anyone else ever been so good at something that they lost?

What about being too intelligent so you fail a test?

I am so used to winning at everything in life personally....was just needing some opinions on why you think you (personally) lose so much. ( @JDragon ....just kidding buddy)

The only thing I that remember losing happened at an early age. It was my virginity (lost it to a hot chick that was 2 years older than me) so it has been quite a while since I lost something.


Also would like opinions on the article.

Anyway...here is the article:


The hardest thing about explaining very close election defeats is that you can talk yourself into believing any number of factors, large or small, could have made the crucial difference. Hillary Clinton’s defeat came down to 100,000 votes in three states out of nearly 130 million cast nationally. That’s a deficit so tiny that the search for a single culprit will probably take political detectives down the dark road to madness.

It is understandable that within the ranks of the Clinton campaign’s own high command, it is an article of faith that FBI director James Comey cost HRC the presidency by making the ridiculous email-server issue the dominant subject of conversation during the crucial last days of the campaign. It was an external event that came out of the blue (or more specifically, out of the fevered libido of Anthony Weiner) and reinforced doubts about Clinton’s trustworthiness among a small group of undecided voters in key states.

But an equally plausible case can be made that the Clinton campaign itself was so convinced it could not lose that it missed the danger signs emanating from the three Clinton firewall states (Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin) that eventually awarded Trump the presidency despite a 2 percent deficit in the national popular vote. Focusing on what happened in Michigan, Politico’s Edward-Isaac Dovere provides a wealth of anecdotal evidence of a national campaign that could not believe and thus did not pay attention to distress signals about “base” turnout and defections to Trump.

It is illuminating to compare Dovere’s piece to a September Politico articleby Shane Goldmacher in which Clinton campaign operatives celebrate the transcendent genius of its data-analytics arm, anchored in what worked for Barack Obama in 2012. Clinton analytics chief Elan Kriegel was the hero of the story, and readers came away with the impression that nothing could happen anywhere in the U.S. electorate without a Kriegel-developed algorithm instantly kicking in to adjust campaign resources and sustain the flight path to victory.


Unsurprisingly, as Dovere found, this all-knowing analytics system and the iron self-confidence it inspired made “Brooklyn” (Clinton’s national headquarters) largely impervious to feedback:


The anecdotes are different but the narrative is the same across battlegrounds, where Democratic operatives lament a one-size-fits-all approach drawn entirely from pre-selected data — operatives spit out “the model, the model,” as they complain about it — guiding [campaign manager Robby] Mook’s decisions on field, television, everything else.
Now the Clinton campaign was not unique in its reliance on a “model” for understanding election dynamics. One of the big trends since 2012 among political practitioners and observers alike has been the gradual displacement of random-sample polling with models of the electorate based on voter-registration files, supplemented by tracking polls of this fixed universe of voters. This approach tends to create a more static view of the electorate and its views, and probably builds in a bias for thinking of campaigns as mechanical devices for hitting numerical “targets” of communications with voters who are already in your column. You could see this new conventional wisdom (and the pseudoscientific certainty it bred) inpre-election models published by Bloomberg Politics and in an Election Day modeling experiment conducted by Slate. Having invested heavily in its own “model” for what it needed to do when and where, the Clinton campaign was naturally resistant to conflicting signals from the ignoramuses on the ground.

It is in that respect that just about everyone within and beyond the Clinton campaign erred in crediting it with a state-of-the-art “ground game” worth a point or two wherever it was deployed. Clinton had lots of field offices, to be sure. She had more money for get-out-the-vote operations. Team Clinton did much, much more targeted outreach to key voters in key states than did Team Trump. But in the end “Brooklyn’s” decisions were based on assumptions that had very little to do with actual developments on the “ground;” its hypersophisticated sensitivity to granular data about many millions of people made it fail to see and hear what was actually happening in the lead-up to the election.

For now it probably doesn’t matter whether it was James Comey or the campaign’s faulty self-confidence that cost Clinton the election. But when it comes time to build the next presidential general-election campaign, the people setting up the organization and paying the bills might want to rely a bit less on any system that values analytical omniscience at the expense of a willingness to change the game plan if there are signs that that is needed.

If, God forbid, I were running a future presidential campaign, the headquarters would be plastered with posters emblazoned with the title of the autobiography of the great, data-driven baseball manager Earl Weaver: “It’s What You Learn After You Know It All That Counts.”

http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/12/clinton-campaign-may-have-been-too-smart-to-win.html

Lol, well I'll be if that's not the typical liberal response to every political disagreement "I'm really just too smart for you to understand how smart I am and I really don't have time to explain it to you." More often than not, the actual basis for the disagreement is the liberal's lack of real world experience.

 

[asdffdsa]

I guess since Hillary ran for president she shoulda made sure that she did something to determine who was gonna win.

 

[Joe]

Hillary has an inability to be a good personable politician. Not as good as bill or Obama to overcome her major issue . The hacks were embarrassing but a better personality would have over came them