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Several members (@Jeffy37 , @lsa, can't remember the other names) have asked where it's possible to find factual information on the Russo-Ukrainian war so that they can better understand things and sort through the piles of propaganda being put out by both sides in the conflict. We'll start with a video from the Austrian Armed forces which was posted by @Cole train in the stickied thread. Unfortunately the videos are usually behind current events by a few months, but they do explain the actual events without any bias towards either side.
Next, there's the excellent Operational Art of War channel on youtube which is run by a Canadian military historian and graduate of the Staff College which is where they teach strategy and how to plan wars & operations. He has 8 videos so far on the opening stage of the war including the offensive on Kiev. The videos are long & somewhat dry, but they're packed with shitloads of background info and explained in a way that people without much military background can easily understand. I'll begin with part 8 where he covers part of the Kiev operation, and goes over what the Russians actually committed to the offensive along with its possible goals. Note how he explains the importance of logistics, including the differences between NATO and Russian systems and the implications & limitations which it places on Russian operations. He also thoroughly debunks the Western narrative that the Russians are stupid incompetents, they're actually well trained professional soldiers who didn't suffer anywhere close to the losses claimed by Western media.
Next, we do some reading. The following excerpt is from the Royal United Services Institute which is the UK's strategy & defence think tank. It gives an overview of Russian doctrine and explains the logic & reasoning behind it. We need to understand the Russian thought process and what makes them tick before we can throw around the usual claims of "they're retards and failures who don't know what they're doing". The Russians have their own art of war, and it's actually a very sophisticated and effective system. It explains why the Western claims of "Russia is failing because the can't take any ground" is gravely mistaken, and a product of the prejudices of Western doctrine.
rusi.org
Excerpt:
Attritional wars require their own ‘Art of War’ and are fought with a ‘force-centric’ approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are ‘terrain-focused’. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.
The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short ‘winner takes all’ clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.
We continue with an article from Parameters which is the publication where members of the US Army War College present & debate their ideas. It builds on the previous article I posted and explains some of the problems NATO would run into if they tried to fight in the Ukraine. Some folks might be shocked to learn that NATO forces would suffer significantly higher casualties than the Ukrainians, but it shouldn't be surprising considering that we have no experience with modern peer level war.
Excerpt:
The Russia-Ukraine War is exposing significant vulnerabilities
in the Army’s strategic personnel depth and ability to withstand and replace
casualties.11 Army theater medical planners may anticipate a sustained
rate of roughly 3,600 casualties per day, ranging from those killed in action
to those wounded in action or suffering disease or other non-battle injuries.12
With a 25 percent predicted replacement rate, the personnel system will
require 800 new personnel each day. For context, the United States sustained
about 50,000 casualties in two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In large-scale combat operations, the United States could experience that same
number of casualties in two weeks.
In addition to the disciplined disobedience required to execute effective
mission command, the US Army is facing a dire combination of a recruiting
shortfall and a shrinking Individual Ready Reserve. This recruiting shortfall,
nearly 50 percent in the combat arms career management fields, is a longitudinal
problem. Every infantry and armor soldier we do not recruit today is a strategic
mobilization asset we will not have in 2031.14 The Individual Ready Reserve,
which stood at 700,000 in 1973 and 450,000 in 1994, now stands at 76,000.15
These numbers cannot fill the existing gaps in the active force, let alone
any casualty replacement or expansion during a large-scale combat operation.
The implication is that the 1970s concept of an all-volunteer force has outlived
its shelf life and does not align with the current operating environment.
The technological revolution described below suggests this force has reached
obsolescence. Large-scale combat operations troop requirements may well
require a reconceptualization of the 1970s and 1980s volunteer force and
a move toward partial conscription.
That should give y'all a couple hours of information to digest so you can better understand what's really going on and sort through the propaganda that's getting put out by everyone for cheap clicks. If @Ludwig von Mises or any other members want to contribute you're all welcome to do so. Just be warned that propaganda & BS will be ruthlessly debunked, so don't be posting anything from Perun, ISW, or anything of that nature.
Next, there's the excellent Operational Art of War channel on youtube which is run by a Canadian military historian and graduate of the Staff College which is where they teach strategy and how to plan wars & operations. He has 8 videos so far on the opening stage of the war including the offensive on Kiev. The videos are long & somewhat dry, but they're packed with shitloads of background info and explained in a way that people without much military background can easily understand. I'll begin with part 8 where he covers part of the Kiev operation, and goes over what the Russians actually committed to the offensive along with its possible goals. Note how he explains the importance of logistics, including the differences between NATO and Russian systems and the implications & limitations which it places on Russian operations. He also thoroughly debunks the Western narrative that the Russians are stupid incompetents, they're actually well trained professional soldiers who didn't suffer anywhere close to the losses claimed by Western media.
Next, we do some reading. The following excerpt is from the Royal United Services Institute which is the UK's strategy & defence think tank. It gives an overview of Russian doctrine and explains the logic & reasoning behind it. We need to understand the Russian thought process and what makes them tick before we can throw around the usual claims of "they're retards and failures who don't know what they're doing". The Russians have their own art of war, and it's actually a very sophisticated and effective system. It explains why the Western claims of "Russia is failing because the can't take any ground" is gravely mistaken, and a product of the prejudices of Western doctrine.
The Attritional Art of War: Lessons from the Russian War on Ukraine
If the West is serious about the possibility of a great power conflict, it needs to take a hard look at its capacity to wage a protracted war and to pursue a strategy focused on attrition rather than manoeuvre.
rusi.org
Excerpt:
Attritional wars require their own ‘Art of War’ and are fought with a ‘force-centric’ approach, unlike wars of manoeuvre which are ‘terrain-focused’. They are rooted in massive industrial capacity to enable the replacement of losses, geographical depth to absorb a series of defeats, and technological conditions that prevent rapid ground movement. In attritional wars, military operations are shaped by a state’s ability to replace losses and generate new formations, not tactical and operational manoeuvres. The side that accepts the attritional nature of war and focuses on destroying enemy forces rather than gaining terrain is most likely to win.
The West is not prepared for this kind of war. To most Western experts, attritional strategy is counterintuitive. Historically, the West preferred the short ‘winner takes all’ clash of professional armies. Recent war games such as CSIS’s war over Taiwan covered one month of fighting. The possibility that the war would go on never entered the discussion. This is a reflection of a common Western attitude. Wars of attrition are treated as exceptions, something to be avoided at all costs and generally products of leaders’ ineptitude. Unfortunately, wars between near-peer powers are likely to be attritional, thanks to a large pool of resources available to replace initial losses. The attritional nature of combat, including the erosion of professionalism due to casualties, levels the battlefield no matter which army started with better trained forces. As conflict drags on, the war is won by economies, not armies. States that grasp this and fight such a war via an attritional strategy aimed at exhausting enemy resources while preserving their own are more likely to win. The fastest way to lose a war of attrition is to focus on manoeuvre, expending valuable resources on near-term territorial objectives. Recognising that wars of attrition have their own art is vital to winning them without sustaining crippling losses.
We continue with an article from Parameters which is the publication where members of the US Army War College present & debate their ideas. It builds on the previous article I posted and explains some of the problems NATO would run into if they tried to fight in the Ukraine. Some folks might be shocked to learn that NATO forces would suffer significantly higher casualties than the Ukrainians, but it shouldn't be surprising considering that we have no experience with modern peer level war.
Excerpt:
The Russia-Ukraine War is exposing significant vulnerabilities
in the Army’s strategic personnel depth and ability to withstand and replace
casualties.11 Army theater medical planners may anticipate a sustained
rate of roughly 3,600 casualties per day, ranging from those killed in action
to those wounded in action or suffering disease or other non-battle injuries.12
With a 25 percent predicted replacement rate, the personnel system will
require 800 new personnel each day. For context, the United States sustained
about 50,000 casualties in two decades of fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan.
In large-scale combat operations, the United States could experience that same
number of casualties in two weeks.
In addition to the disciplined disobedience required to execute effective
mission command, the US Army is facing a dire combination of a recruiting
shortfall and a shrinking Individual Ready Reserve. This recruiting shortfall,
nearly 50 percent in the combat arms career management fields, is a longitudinal
problem. Every infantry and armor soldier we do not recruit today is a strategic
mobilization asset we will not have in 2031.14 The Individual Ready Reserve,
which stood at 700,000 in 1973 and 450,000 in 1994, now stands at 76,000.15
These numbers cannot fill the existing gaps in the active force, let alone
any casualty replacement or expansion during a large-scale combat operation.
The implication is that the 1970s concept of an all-volunteer force has outlived
its shelf life and does not align with the current operating environment.
The technological revolution described below suggests this force has reached
obsolescence. Large-scale combat operations troop requirements may well
require a reconceptualization of the 1970s and 1980s volunteer force and
a move toward partial conscription.
That should give y'all a couple hours of information to digest so you can better understand what's really going on and sort through the propaganda that's getting put out by everyone for cheap clicks. If @Ludwig von Mises or any other members want to contribute you're all welcome to do so. Just be warned that propaganda & BS will be ruthlessly debunked, so don't be posting anything from Perun, ISW, or anything of that nature.
