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Could you have created a better world than god?

Forget the actual world. This is a choice between 2 identical possible worlds. So I will repeat the post here since you misunderstood it. Hopefully you see it in a different light now.

"The ceteris paribus (i.e. all else equal) clause is there to keep everything constant except for the pain and suffering experienced by one family which is isolated from the rest of humanity. It is this difference, indeed the only difference there is between these two worlds, that we want to allow. We keep all else constant in these worlds up until the time when the family in one of the worlds become ill so we can base our judge on this difference (pain and suffering being grater in one of the worlds) alone.

Please answer me this, if you had to choose one of these two worlds to be your family, which world would you choose and why?

Or another formulation of the same question, given the choice would you choose a world where you will suffer the most pain or the world in which you suffer the least pain?"

If you are setting up two hypothetical worlds, one with more suffering, and one with less suffering, I will choose the one where there is less suffering. The obvious problem with your analogy is that you can't extrapolate this into the world as we know it, in addition to the fact that your metric of suffering is arbitrary.



You misunderstood here too, forget this world and concider only the two imaginary worlds.

By the same token since you lack omniscience you cannot know that a conceivable life in which you suffer horribly all your life will be worse than this one. This is absurd in both directions. I think you simply can't admit that it is possible for there to be a better world.

I can't know if a better world is possible in the event that God exists, especially since if God exists better is not subjective, but objective.

So we cannot reason morally if there is no god. The fact that we can reason morally is because there is a god? Sorry bro but this doesn't follow at all. We do reason morally whether or not god exists. Whether morality is objective or not we do engage in moral reasoning. I don't believe that morality is objective, but I can reason morally, I can see and understand first order moral claims and their differences regardless of whether or not there are second order differences. I can take the bible and understand the moral teachings in it whether or not there is a god.

Every respected Christian philosopher accepts that we can reason morally even if morality is relatively, they all understand that humans are moral agents. This language is used in philosophy by atheist and theist philosophers and is not controversial. I am surprised that you would attack these premises. The same for gratuitous evil or pain. This is not a meaningless term. Denying that the world contains gratuitous evil is one thing but denying any difference between gratuitous and evil that has a function or use is ignorant.

What I am saying is that if there is no God there is no absolute morality in the same sense. This is the classic is-ought problem. Morality is simply an evolutionary adaptation without God, and that doesn't mean that you can't reason within this model.

It appears as if it strives to survive. You are projecting purpose into the system. It is like saying that rain flows down mountains and rivers into the sea because it want to be reunited with it. Living systems merely adapt to the environment by accident and they continue reproduce. The environment sets the conditions and the mutation that is best adapted continues, the other die off. You cannot say they all strive to survive when the majority does not survive.

I said that life strives to survive, not that it is always successful. This striving seems purposeful and every mechanism follows this pattern. It's not meant to be anything more than an inductive, and subjective, argument. You can disagree with this.
 
What do you mean, "like heaven"? Where people fly around with halos over their heads and play lyres all day? Is that what you think heaven is?

Heaven is a place where all inhabitants have communion with God (and each other). As long as creatures have free will, how can God guarantee that creatures always choose communion with him?



As long as a creature acts as if he himself is the ground of all reality, who determines right and wrong, over and against God, he is not in heaven. In heaven there are no delusions. If I understand you correctly, you're basically saying, "Why wouldn't God make it so that people in heaven deceive themselves and others?" Well, that wouldn't be heaven.



As I said earlier in this post, it would be helpful if you explained what you mean by "like heaven".



To your first sentence, yes there is. If people are ignorant that the Independent Fact (the self-existent ground of all reality) is sentient and loving, then they would not be in heaven. They would be in darkness.

So heaven is a place and the inhabitants of this place have a relation with god, the relation being communion.

What does communion with god actually mean? Can you unpack this a bit?

The heaven I had in mind was a place where people exist and have free will. The free will implies the possibility to act and do things. But the heaven you have in mind seems to be like a prison, no free will, no choice, no difference from person to person, they are all defined by their being in communion with god. Is this a caricature of you views?
 
It is one thing to not have any data for or against and therefore claim not to know, or to suspend judgement. But when we have data it has to be assessed and evaluated and then our belief updated accordingly. This is where the epistemic probability increases or decreases.

I believe that everyone who believes in god doesn't know that there is a god. You cannot know what is not true. It is your choice to believe or not.

Out of curiosity, you don't believe in the experience of the holy spirit and all that?

The epistemic probability of theism is subjective. I believe the evidence points to theism and it is why I believe God exists. I don't claim epistemic certainty, and neither should you.

Yes, I believe that God reveals himself, but that still doesn't provide epistemic certainty since I am human and fallible.
 
So heaven is a place and the inhabitants of this place have a relation with god, the relation being communion.

What does communion with god actually mean? Can you unpack this a bit?

It means valuing God (and thus our fellow creatures) as they ought to be valued. Communion with God means experiencing the beatific vision.

Matthew 5
1 When Jesus saw the crowds, he went up the mountain; and after he sat down, his disciples came to him. 2 Then he began to speak, and taught them, saying:
3 “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
4 “Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted.
5 “Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth.
6 “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled.
7 “Blessed are the merciful, for they will receive mercy.
8 “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God.
9 “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God.
10 “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
11 “Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on my account.

The heaven I had in mind was a place where people exist and have free will. The free will implies the possibility to act and do things.

There is some debate among Christians about whether or not people in heaven have free will or if God removes it. I personally believe we retain our free will in heaven. So we technically could choose to sin in heaven. But in heaven, we've reached such a level of spiritual maturity that sin has zero appeal to us, and utterly disgusts us the way it ought to. To illustrate by an analogy, I am utterly disgusted by the taste of celery. I could, of course, hold my nose and force a piece of celery down my throat, but why would the heck would I? I suspect people in heaven experience that kind of revulsion towards sin.

But the heaven you have in mind seems to be like a prison, no free will, no choice, no difference from person to person, they are all defined by their being in communion with god. Is this a caricature of you views?

I'm sure people in heaven have idiosyncrasies. You make it sound like communion with God is a bad thing. Would you consider a community bad if no one there committed rape, murder, or robbery?
 
When I used to play The Sims i would make Saddam Hussein and put him in a room with no doors or windows then he would pee himself and die of starvation.

Does that count?
 
If you are setting up two hypothetical worlds, one with more suffering, and one with less suffering, I will choose the one where there is less suffering. The obvious problem with your analogy is that you can't extrapolate this into the world as we know it, in addition to the fact that your metric of suffering is arbitrary.

Why would you choose the world with less suffering? Wouldn't you say that this is a universal tendency in humans and even animal, to avoid pain and seek pleasure? This is what I mean when I use the term "better", I mean "less pain, more pleasure".

We also refer to pain as being bad, evil, and wrong. And pleasure we refer to as being good and right.

Here then lies the tension. We live in a world where there is a lot of pain (bad, wrong and evil) which does not result in any good, this is what philosophers refer to as gratuitous pain and suffering. Pain which results in the survival, reproduction and moral and social improvement of humans and animal, etc., is not gratuitous. Pain and suffering which results in no good is gratuitous.

Since you chose the world with less pain and suffering it is safe to assume that you would choose the world with no gratuitous pain and suffering, because it is better or more good, than the world with gratuitous pain and suffering.

Now, if there exists a maximally good god, then he would choose the world that is most good (i.e. has no gratuitous pain and suffering). But since it is not the case that there is no gratuitous pain and suffering, then it follows that it is not the case that there exists a maximally good god.




I can't know if a better world is possible in the event that God exists, especially since if God exists better is not subjective, but objective.

This doesn't undermine the argument at all.



What I am saying is that if there is no God there is no absolute morality in the same sense. This is the classic is-ought problem. Morality is simply an evolutionary adaptation without God, and that doesn't mean that you can't reason within this model.
Fair enough.


I said that life strives to survive, not that it is always successful. This striving seems purposeful and every mechanism follows this pattern. It's not meant to be anything more than an inductive, and subjective, argument. You can disagree with this.

There is no striving. You could just say that animals and humans want to avoid gratuitous pain and seek pleasure. Those better suited to these tasks survive and the rest die off. The environment clears out those that aren't well adapted to it. The fact that the majority of species have died off is evidence that there is no regard for their suffering or their survival. Survival is an accident of genetic mutations.
 
Why would you choose the world with less suffering? Wouldn't you say that this is a universal tendency in humans and even animal, to avoid pain and seek pleasure? This is what I mean when I use the term "better", I mean "less pain, more pleasure".

We also refer to pain as being bad, evil, and wrong. And pleasure we refer to as being good and right.

I would choose the world where I am happier because I am selfish by nature and don't have the middle knowledge to see the outcome of any or all possible worlds. That doesn't translate to a meta-truth about what actually makes a better world.

Here then lies the tension. We live in a world where there is a lot of pain (bad, wrong and evil) which does not result in any good, this is what philosophers refer to as gratuitous pain and suffering. Pain which results in the survival, reproduction and moral and social improvement of humans and animal, etc., is not gratuitous. Pain and suffering which results in no good is gratuitous.

Since you chose the world with less pain and suffering it is safe to assume that you would choose the world with no gratuitous pain and suffering, because it is better or more good, than the world with gratuitous pain and suffering.

Now, if there exists a maximally good god, then he would choose the world that is most good (i.e. has no gratuitous pain and suffering). But since it is not the case that there is no gratuitous pain and suffering, then it follows that it is not the case that there exists a maximally good god.

If you could prove that there is gratuitous pain and suffering, which is to say that this world could actually be improved upon, then your argument would have weight, but we simply can't know. I don't mind you using this as an argument, but your conclusion is not necessary in a deductive sense.



This doesn't undermine the argument at all.

Since we can't know that God could have made a better world the argument is not conclusive.


There is no striving. You could just say that animals and humans want to avoid gratuitous pain and seek pleasure. Those better suited to these tasks survive and the rest die off. The environment clears out those that aren't well adapted to it. The fact that the majority of species have died off is evidence that there is no regard for their suffering or their survival. Survival is an accident of genetic mutations.

It may be an accident, or better said, it has to be an accident without God. I argue that it doesn't seem like an accident, but I understand it's subjective.
 
It means valuing God (and thus our fellow creatures) as they ought to be valued. Communion with God means experiencing the beatific vision.

Matthew 5
1 When Jesus saw the crowds, he went up the mountain; and after he sat down, his disciples came to him. 2 Then he began to speak, and taught them, saying:
3 “Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
4 “Blessed are those who mourn, for they will be comforted.
5 “Blessed are the meek, for they will inherit the earth.
6 “Blessed are those who hunger and thirst for righteousness, for they will be filled.
7 “Blessed are the merciful, for they will receive mercy.
8 “Blessed are the pure in heart, for they will see God.
9 “Blessed are the peacemakers, for they will be called children of God.
10 “Blessed are those who are persecuted for righteousness’ sake, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven.
11 “Blessed are you when people revile you and persecute you and utter all kinds of evil against you falsely on my account.



There is some debate among Christians about whether or not people in heaven have free will or if God removes it. I personally believe we retain our free will in heaven. So we technically could choose to sin in heaven. But in heaven, we've reached such a level of spiritual maturity that sin has zero appeal to us, and utterly disgusts us the way it ought to. To illustrate by an analogy, I am utterly disgusted by the taste of celery. I could, of course, hold my nose and force a piece of celery down my throat, but why would the heck would I? I suspect people in heaven experience that kind of revulsion towards sin.



I'm sure people in heaven have idiosyncrasies. You make it sound like communion with God is a bad thing. Would you consider a community bad if no one there committed rape, murder, or robbery?

Ok, so heaven is a place and we might or might not have free will. I still don't see how a person cannot be here if he didn't believe in god before he died. Once he awakes in the hereafter and sees god he will believe it is god.

I though you meant with communion with god a sort of pure being, just existing consciousness experiencing being in its purity and experiencing god, and that's it.

But then you mention that heaven is a place where people are located and can do stuff. So the question why unbelieves in this world cannot enter this place and do stuff there? And if there is no free will then god determines what they do or whatever, right?
 
I would choose the world where I am happier because I am selfish by nature and don't have the middle knowledge to see the outcome of any or all possible worlds. That doesn't translate to a meta-truth about what actually makes a better world.



If you could prove that there is gratuitous pain and suffering, which is to say that this world could actually be improved upon, then your argument would have weight, but we simply can't know. I don't mind you using this as an argument, but your conclusion is not necessary in a deductive sense.





Since we can't know that God could have made a better world the argument is not conclusive.




It may be an accident, or better said, it has to be an accident without God. I argue that it doesn't seem like an accident, but I understand it's subjective.

It seems like it all boils down to whether there is gratuitous painnand suffering. I claim there is, you claim that either there isn't or that we cannot know. In the case that you take the agnostic possition then the mere appearance of gratuitous pain and suffering is enough to tilt the ballance in favour of naturalism. But if there isn't an example it doesn't tilt it in favour theism because logically there could be worlds with less suffering. There is no logical contradiction in saying that there are possible worlds which contain less pain and suffering than the actual world. If you claim that it is impossible that there is or are worlds with less pain and suffering then you will have to demonstrate that there is a contradiction and therefore impossible that there is or are such worlds.

Imagine isis has captured 100 people, children and adults, it is going to kill them all on that same day. Before they are killed some terrorist enters secretly into where the captives are and rape some and torture others. Then hourse later all prisoners are killed. Wasn't all that pain and suffering gratuitous? There is nothing logically necessary in this extra pain and suffering they experienced that would result in some benefit for the undividual or the world.

How many people have been captured raped and killed by terrorists? Hundreds.

What about babies who will die in a matter of hours but suffer all throughout till they die. What if this causes the family to feel abandoned by god and give up their faith. All these things happen.

You also have animals suffering in the wild till they die for no greater good. They are going to die, but the pain and suffering they experience before they die, what good results from that?
 
Also, denying that there is gratuitous evil comes with the absurd implication that all evil is justified and so trivialises human pain and suffering. When someone gets raped or tortured it is not gratuitous, it results in some greater good. So the next time I witness a rape or any crime I will keep walking, maybe my interference will cancel the good that will necessarily result from the pain and suffering experienced by the rape victim or the person stabbed in a mugging.
 
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Ok, so heaven is a place and we might or might not have free will. I still don't see how a person cannot be here if he didn't believe in god before he died. Once he awakes in the hereafter and sees god he will believe it is god.

I'm a little confused with what your contention is. It's not mere knowledge of God's existence that saves a creature. Satan obviously believes that God exists. And as James said in his epistle, demons know that God exists -- and they shudder!

I though you meant with communion with god a sort of pure being, just existing consciousness experiencing being in its purity and experiencing god, and that's it.

But then you mention that heaven is a place where people are located and can do stuff. So the question why unbelieves in this world cannot enter this place and do stuff there? And if there is no free will then god determines what they do or whatever, right?

I don't believe that people who biologically die in unbelief cannot enter heaven. God keeps willing their repentance for as long as it takes. In fact, I believe Satan himself will be saved.
 
I'm a little confused with what your contention is. It's not mere knowledge of God's existence that saves a creature. Satan obviously believes that God exists. And as James said in his epistle, demons know that God exists -- and they shudder!



I don't believe that people who biologically die in unbelief cannot enter heaven. God keeps willing their repentance for as long as it takes. In fact, I believe Satan himself will be saved.

Then unbelievers can enter heaven. That's my point. God could have had all his creatures in heaven straight away without the need of this world.
 
Then unbelievers can enter heaven. That's my point. God could have had all his creatures in heaven straight away without the need of this world.

No, unbelievers can't enter heaven.

What premise is your first sentence supposed to be the conclusion of?
 
Since it wasn't created by an omnipotent supernatural entity, the question is moot.

But yes, at least one that makes a bit more sense.

First I'd fix the division situation and title shot requirements


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It seems like it all boils down to whether there is gratuitous painnand suffering. I claim there is, you claim that either there isn't or that we cannot know. In the case that you take the agnostic possition then the mere appearance of gratuitous pain and suffering is enough to tilt the ballance in favour of naturalism. But if there isn't an example it doesn't tilt it in favour theism because logically there could be worlds with less suffering. There is no logical contradiction in saying that there are possible worlds which contain less pain and suffering than the actual world. If you claim that it is impossible that there is or are worlds with less pain and suffering then you will have to demonstrate that there is a contradiction and therefore impossible that there is or are such worlds.

Imagine isis has captured 100 people, children and adults, it is going to kill them all on that same day. Before they are killed some terrorist enters secretly into where the captives are and rape some and torture others. Then hourse later all prisoners are killed. Wasn't all that pain and suffering gratuitous? There is nothing logically necessary in this extra pain and suffering they experienced that would result in some benefit for the undividual or the world.

How many people have been captured raped and killed by terrorists? Hundreds.

What about babies who will die in a matter of hours but suffer all throughout till they die. What if this causes the family to feel abandoned by god and give up their faith. All these things happen.

You also have animals suffering in the wild till they die for no greater good. They are going to die, but the pain and suffering they experience before they die, what good results from that?

I think we've reached an impasse.

My claim is that we cannot know if this is the best possible world and most importantly that this metric lines up with what an all knowing creator thinks is best. Yes, we can hypothetically come up with a world with less suffering, but you cannot know if our current world is already such a world, or that pain and suffering is the only consideration. This is the equivalent of a small child imagining a world with one more candy bar and claiming that such a world is better; he's right because he's set the parameters himself.

One thing I think you've overlooked is that any world you can come up with is subject to the problem of evil unless there is zero pain and suffering, which becomes an incoherent world. The problem of evil applies to any world that is not heaven.
 
No, unbelievers can't enter heaven.

What premise is your first sentence supposed to be the conclusion of?

You said: "I don't believe that people who biologically die in unbelief cannot enter heaven. God keeps willing their repentance for as long as it takes. In fact, I believe Satan himself will be saved."

Isn't someone who dies in unbelief an unbeliever? As I understand you these will repent or whatever and enter heaven.
 
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I think we've reached an impasse.

My claim is that we cannot know if this is the best possible world and most importantly that this metric lines up with what an all knowing creator thinks is best. Yes, we can hypothetically come up with a world with less suffering, but you cannot know if our current world is already such a world, or that pain and suffering is the only consideration. This is the equivalent of a small child imagining a world with one more candy bar and claiming that such a world is better; he's right because he's set the parameters himself.

One thing I think you've overlooked is that any world you can come up with is subject to the problem of evil unless there is zero pain and suffering, which becomes an incoherent world. The problem of evil applies to any world that is not heaven.

The problem is not any pain and suffering but rather gratuitous pain and suffering. I thought this was clear.

You say that "we can hypothetically come up with a world with less suffering", less suffering than the actual world that is, for instance a world where there is only biologically and socially/morally useful pain. But then you make an inconsistent claim: "but you cannot know if our current world is already such a world" which is absurd.

It is like saying you can imagine a red basket with 5 eggs which has less compared to our basket which contains 10, but then claim we cannot know if our basket is the one with less eggs, i.e. less than 10.

The candy analogy is a caricature and shows a misunderstanding of the argument. The consideration is gratuitous pain. Pain is in opposition to good or right when it is gratuitous. A morally correct person will always choose the right or good thing, he wouldn't choose to cause gratuitous pain to his fellow humans or animals. What about a morally perfect person who is also maximally loving and maximally knowledgeable and powerful? Would he choose to allow his creatures to suffer gratuitous pain?

For the nth time now bro, I am not claiming that all pain and suffering must go, some of it is necessary. All I argue is that gratuitous pain and suffering is in conflict with there being a god.
 
You said: "I don't believe that people who biologically die in unbelief cannot enter heaven. God keeps willing their repentance for as long as it takes. In fact, I believe Satan himself will be saved."

Isn't someone who dies in unbelief an unbeliever? As I understand you these will repent or whatever and enter heaven.

Right, they will repent in Gehenna.
 
The problem is not any pain and suffering but rather gratuitous pain and suffering. I thought this was clear.

You say that "we can hypothetically come up with a world with less suffering", less suffering than the actual world that is, for instance a world where there is only biologically and socially/morally useful pain. But then you make an inconsistent claim: "but you cannot know if our current world is already such a world" which is absurd.

It is like saying you can imagine a red basket with 5 eggs which has less compared to our basket which contains 10, but then claim we cannot know if our basket is the one with less eggs, i.e. less than 10.

The candy analogy is a caricature and shows a misunderstanding of the argument. The consideration is gratuitous pain. Pain is in opposition to good or right when it is gratuitous. A morally correct person will always choose the right or good thing, he wouldn't choose to cause gratuitous pain to his fellow humans or animals. What about a morally perfect person who is also maximally loving and maximally knowledgeable and powerful? Would he choose to allow his creatures to suffer gratuitous pain?

For the nth time now bro, I am not claiming that all pain and suffering must go, some of it is necessary. All I argue is that gratuitous pain and suffering is in conflict with there being a god.

Let's take your analogy of the basket. What I am saying is that it's unclear whether it's possible to hold 5 eggs in one basket, but we can hypothetically imagine it, which is why it begs the question.

You cannot know if this world is not the best possible world. Any hypothetical is just that.
 
Let's take your analogy of the basket. What I am saying is that it's unclear whether it's possible to hold 5 eggs in one basket, but we can hypothetically imagine it, which is why it begs the question.

You cannot know if this world is not the best possible world. Any hypothetical is just that.

This is interesting, are you saying that we can't know if some suffering is unnecessary even though it seems like it is? That's the only real way out of this dilemma that I can see.
 
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