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Note: This will be pretty long, and I won't give cliffs. Read on for a debate on Rules of Engagement, and a armchair military analysis on their tactics in the initial ambush.
...
Now I say Armchair military analysis because obviously I wasn't there, and I wasn't Special Ops. But I was infantry and I just watched Lone Survivor with a few Army buddies of mine and a huge debate erupted over what the Seals did wrong.
Even if you weren't in the Military there is some glaring errors in their interpretation of ROE and the tactics used that fateful day.
...
In November of 2004, 3rd bat Marines assume operational control of RC- East in the Kunar Province (Afghanistan) and initiate several high value target operations targeting Anti-Coalition Milita leaders and forming a JTF with the local SF elements already operating in that AO.
After capturing several cell leaders, they hear about another local ACM Taliban cell with possible links to Al-Qaeda with anywhere from 8 to 50 men led by Ahmad Shah.
After 3/3 hands over operational control to 2nd Bat Marines, using the acquired intel and the shell of an operation they initiate Operation Red Wings in June of 2005 to capture Shah.
To begin they send in a 4 man SEAL Search and Reconnaissance team instead of 2/3's Scout/Sniper team due to some capabilities they lacked, agreed to hand over the recon portion to SEALS and SOAR and the Marines would then handle the Cordon and Search after positive ID was made.
The SR team is inserted by SOAR near the summit of Sawtalo Sar, a mountain 20 miles west of Asadabad.
....
It's here where things get shaky, and the initial phase of this operation falls apart.
We only have Marcus Luttrells After Action Report to go on, and what spotty radio communication there was between Lt. Murphy's squad and their FOB.
Late the next morning the team was soft compromised by local shepherds stumbling upon their LP/OP overwatching Shahs camp. A debate then follows between the members of the team as to what to do with the locals. Supposedly they debated the operational ROE.
(This is a sample, the rules change due to operational and environmental necessity)
So they decide on two options:
A: They let them go, thereby compromise the mission and have to Exfil. Mission Failure.
B. .....They kill them and Continue Mission.
So obviously they let them go, and with only a matter of a half an hour before they reach Shahs men they decide to didi mau after failure to establish radio contact with their FOB.
They retreat back up the mountain to one of their fallback positions and somewhere along the way one of their team members gets a broken or sprained ankle. So these guys decide to wait at their first fallback position an hour out from Shahs base to try to re-establish radio contact for exfil.
Cool but that doesn't work, so by the time their done fucking around Shahs men catch up to them and a prolonged firefight happens and they break contact up the mountain and are eventually coralled into a corner, and 3 of the 4 are killed. Marcus Luttrell survives, 9 more SEALS and 8 Nightstalkers die.
...
Ok like I said, I wasn't there and what we got in the way of facts are a little muddled. All we really have to go on is Lutrells redacted AAR.
But I'm just a little critical of their actions once the shit hit the fan, starting with the soft compromise.
1. All's they had was a damn Sat phone and either took off without them or refused 2/3s offered comms. The An/prc.
2. Their two options once compromised were to let them go....or kill them? Wtf??
Dude even the lowliest infantry man carries flex-cuffs on him. Where was there's? Why didn't they just cuff them to a tree and leave em? This is the ROE argument. They could have just tied em up and bailed. It's not against ROE. They could have gotten out or been discovered later. That wouldn't have necessarily killed them.
3. They fall back only an hour away UP the mountain. Korangal valley was to their west and Shuryek valley to their east, where they could have cleared their signal and gtfo. Or they could have just you know. Kept moving. A sprained ankle stops them? Really? I would have been like fuck no, let's keep moving. There is possibly up to 50 OPFOR on our ass.
4. They continue to engage shahs men instead of breaking contact in a better direction. Supposedly they set up an ambush on Murphy's orders. The basic rule of infantry combat is you should be 3-1 odds in your favor. Never 4 on 50.
...
Ok now look, like I said I wasn't there so it's kind of ridiculous to second guess these guys operating in the field with no guidance from higher, being special ops and all. But from all available Intel on what went down I just have to question their judgement on this op.
So what do you guys think. Did They do the right thing no matter what?
Would tying them up have solved the situation? That's my biggest gripe.
Feel free to correct me if I got something wrong.
...
Now I say Armchair military analysis because obviously I wasn't there, and I wasn't Special Ops. But I was infantry and I just watched Lone Survivor with a few Army buddies of mine and a huge debate erupted over what the Seals did wrong.
Even if you weren't in the Military there is some glaring errors in their interpretation of ROE and the tactics used that fateful day.
...
In November of 2004, 3rd bat Marines assume operational control of RC- East in the Kunar Province (Afghanistan) and initiate several high value target operations targeting Anti-Coalition Milita leaders and forming a JTF with the local SF elements already operating in that AO.
After capturing several cell leaders, they hear about another local ACM Taliban cell with possible links to Al-Qaeda with anywhere from 8 to 50 men led by Ahmad Shah.
After 3/3 hands over operational control to 2nd Bat Marines, using the acquired intel and the shell of an operation they initiate Operation Red Wings in June of 2005 to capture Shah.
To begin they send in a 4 man SEAL Search and Reconnaissance team instead of 2/3's Scout/Sniper team due to some capabilities they lacked, agreed to hand over the recon portion to SEALS and SOAR and the Marines would then handle the Cordon and Search after positive ID was made.
The SR team is inserted by SOAR near the summit of Sawtalo Sar, a mountain 20 miles west of Asadabad.
....
It's here where things get shaky, and the initial phase of this operation falls apart.
We only have Marcus Luttrells After Action Report to go on, and what spotty radio communication there was between Lt. Murphy's squad and their FOB.
Late the next morning the team was soft compromised by local shepherds stumbling upon their LP/OP overwatching Shahs camp. A debate then follows between the members of the team as to what to do with the locals. Supposedly they debated the operational ROE.
(This is a sample, the rules change due to operational and environmental necessity)So they decide on two options:
A: They let them go, thereby compromise the mission and have to Exfil. Mission Failure.
B. .....They kill them and Continue Mission.
So obviously they let them go, and with only a matter of a half an hour before they reach Shahs men they decide to didi mau after failure to establish radio contact with their FOB.
They retreat back up the mountain to one of their fallback positions and somewhere along the way one of their team members gets a broken or sprained ankle. So these guys decide to wait at their first fallback position an hour out from Shahs base to try to re-establish radio contact for exfil.
Cool but that doesn't work, so by the time their done fucking around Shahs men catch up to them and a prolonged firefight happens and they break contact up the mountain and are eventually coralled into a corner, and 3 of the 4 are killed. Marcus Luttrell survives, 9 more SEALS and 8 Nightstalkers die.
...
Ok like I said, I wasn't there and what we got in the way of facts are a little muddled. All we really have to go on is Lutrells redacted AAR.
But I'm just a little critical of their actions once the shit hit the fan, starting with the soft compromise.
1. All's they had was a damn Sat phone and either took off without them or refused 2/3s offered comms. The An/prc.
2. Their two options once compromised were to let them go....or kill them? Wtf??
Dude even the lowliest infantry man carries flex-cuffs on him. Where was there's? Why didn't they just cuff them to a tree and leave em? This is the ROE argument. They could have just tied em up and bailed. It's not against ROE. They could have gotten out or been discovered later. That wouldn't have necessarily killed them.
3. They fall back only an hour away UP the mountain. Korangal valley was to their west and Shuryek valley to their east, where they could have cleared their signal and gtfo. Or they could have just you know. Kept moving. A sprained ankle stops them? Really? I would have been like fuck no, let's keep moving. There is possibly up to 50 OPFOR on our ass.
4. They continue to engage shahs men instead of breaking contact in a better direction. Supposedly they set up an ambush on Murphy's orders. The basic rule of infantry combat is you should be 3-1 odds in your favor. Never 4 on 50.
...
Ok now look, like I said I wasn't there so it's kind of ridiculous to second guess these guys operating in the field with no guidance from higher, being special ops and all. But from all available Intel on what went down I just have to question their judgement on this op.
So what do you guys think. Did They do the right thing no matter what?
Would tying them up have solved the situation? That's my biggest gripe.
Feel free to correct me if I got something wrong.
