Boxing had its UFC, it was called the IBC of New York, & it was forcibly disbanded by the SCOTUS for breaking anti trust laws in the 1950's, & rightly so
THE CASE AGAINST THE IBC
Here for the first time SI presents the government case in the attempt of the Department of Justice to break up the boxing monopoly of James D. Norris, IBC, et al.
March 23, 1956
The government case rests on a 1955 decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, delivered by Chief Justice Earl Warren, that boxing is a business in interstate commerce and therefore comes under the antitrust laws.
That decision permitted the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice to move against IBC on allegations that it had bought control of boxing championships, bought out competitors, acquired exclusive use of the big stadiums
and forced championship contenders to agree that, if they won the championship, they would fight only for IBC. Through these means, the government contends, IBC has become boxing's colossus, promoting 80% of championship bouts in the period involved (June 1949 to May 1953, for purposes of the suit), with revenues in that period of more than $7 million. The extent of the IBC's control of champions—and the lucrativeness of that control—are set forth in the tables, from the government's brief, on the opposite page and on pages 28 and 29.
In addition to controlling the championships, of course, IBC promotes nonchampionship bouts, including the big television shows on Wednesday and Friday nights.
By controlling the champions—in all but the flyweight and bantamweight divisions, which are no longer important in the United States—IBC has been able to force the loyalty of lesser fighters, managers and copromoters. For if a fighter wants to get a crack at the championship some day he must be an IBC-pleaser as well as a crowd-pleaser. If a promoter or a manager wants an occasional IBC-TV fight he must be an amiable fellow.
But if the government wins its case, then championship fight promotion will be wide open to competition. Other promoters will be able to bid for the fighters' services and have access to the big indoor and outdoor arenas where such fights can be staged profitably. Fighters and managers will not have to consider IBC wishes when they sign for a fight in the hinterlands outside its domain.
Some good fighters who have found it difficult and even impossible to win national recognition may at last have their chance.
The immediate result, if all this comes to pass, is likely to be the kind of confusion that comes with word of a gold strike in hitherto inaccessible territory. Managers of top fighters will be in the saddle (though the bridle in some cases may still be held by the likes of Frankie Carbo). Promoters and would-be promoters will doubtless join in a frantic scramble for fights. Television promotion will be affected,
since managers will be able to drive hard bargains for more than the current $4,000 minimum, and the IBC, recently re-signed to its $962,000 Pabst-Mennen contract for 52 weekly TV fights (in addition to its similar Gillette contract), may have difficulty in guaranteeing schedules of acceptable matches to the sponsors.
Competition, of a sort long since gone from boxing, will be restored.
A government-favored decision will have an effect, too, on the hoodlums who have infested the sport for many a long year but thrive best under monopoly conditions. Fight managers have long known that the man to see, if you want to be sure of getting fights for your boy, is the hoodlum and killer Carbo, who wants first to know whether the manager and his fighter are "businessmen." If they are (and "businessmen" is a hoodlum euphemism for those willing to do as they are told) they get fights. With independent promoters running loose, Carbo may be reduced to his stature of the '40s when, for the most part, though a big-time betting operator, he could offer only sporadic money bribes to a fighter or manager instead of a steady livelihood. As IBC took over more and more of boxing, Carbo's influence, whether real or pretended, mounted in managerial circles. He and Norris had known each other for 20 years. The Carbo name became a whispered byword. But his influence could now decline...
By 1951 every champion—except Joey Maxim, who held the light heavyweight title, and the bantam and flyweight champions—was under exclusive contract to IBC. Maxim's manager is Jack (Doc) Kearns, a loner. That failure was corrected in 1952 when Archie Moore won the title from Maxim and went into the IBC bag.
As the government points out in its brief, "control of the heavyweight championship is usually the most lucrative source of revenue in boxing." It cost IBC $165,000 to win control of those first four heavyweight contenders but, after all, the first Charles-Walcott fight alone brought in more than $179,000 in gate receipts, as well as $35,000 from home TV and radio and $2,500 from theater TV, then in its infancy. (By the time of the Marciano-Walcott fight in September 1952, theater TV brought in $108,000, movies $273,000, and even greater returns were realized in later fights.)
Since that Charles-Walcott fight IBC has promoted or participated in the promotion of every heavyweight championship bout held in the United States. In order to get a shot at the current champion the current contender had to agree to fight title bouts exclusively for IBC if he won.
And so it went through the other divisions. From Archie Moore to Sandy Saddler, IBC came eventually to own them all, under a system which almost assured perpetual ownership.
(Recently Rocky Marciano's exclusive contract with IBC expired and was not renewed. A fortuitous public feud between Norris and Rocky's manager, Al Weill, may or may not be genuine, but should provide a very timely portion of grist for IBC's defense.
IBC can now claim that it no longer controls the heavyweight championship. But IBC certainly controlled Rocky's services during the lush years.)...
And, of course, if IBC controls the fighter's goal—the championship—its influence on him as to where and when and whom he fights is enormous. If it determines, as promoter-matchmaker for TV sponsors, who fights whom on television and what loyal copromoter shall share its fees in an occasional Washington, Miami, Los Angeles or San Francisco TV bout, its influence on boxing is greater than any promotional organization has ever enjoyed in the history of the sport.
This case presents classic instances of violations of the antitrust laws. A group of men have banded together to seek domination of a field. In this, they
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The funny thing is that just 14 years later in 1969 a reporter was interviewing Rocky about the "good old days" of 1950's vs the sad state of boxing then & Rocky wasn't correcting him about the reality of mob linked IBC dominating boxing & boxers (including himself) back then. Instead he joined in & was giving the usual talk about how fighters now are so risk averse & only fight for money blah blah blah
Note too all the now so called "golden age" decades that people now nostalgically jerk off to came after IBC was disbanded. Boxing produced its 2 global icons in Ali & Tyson long after the IBC was dead. The 4 kings era of Hearns, Leonard, Hagler, & Duran also came long after these events
Boxing didn't die in 1 year for lack of a Czar "to clean up the game" as Dempsey was demanding in 1937 nor did it die with the death of IBC (the closest thing to UFC that Boxing ever had), many of the people who have predicted the imminent death of boxing over the last 100+ years though are dead. For as Kid McCoy once told us here:
"Fear not, when all the kid games have faded to lore, people will still fight with their fists for money."