Why religious people should renounce their faith

[Deleted member 159002]

It is not the matter. Rather, it is the system that emerges from the matter.

Huh? So matter combined with lots of other matter doesn't equal matter?

 

[meauneau]

Huh? So matter combined with lots of other matter doesn't equal matter?

Do you know anything about emergence theories? Google it. Strong and weak emergence.

 

[Deleted member 159002]

Do you know anything about emergence theories? Google it. Strong and weak emergence.

No I don't, why don't you tell me about them?

And please answer my question: Do you think the matter that comprises your brain changes to a certain state when it 'interacts' with premises, based on what the premises are? If so, how do you imagine this works?

 

[meauneau]

No I don't, why don't you tell me about them?

And please answer my question: Do you think the matter that comprises your brain changes to a certain state when it 'interacts' with premises, based on what the premises are? If so, how do you imagine this works?

It is not simple to explain this here in a post. To answer your question no matter does that comprises my brain does not change. The matter realises the mind, the mind emerges from it.

 

[Deleted member 159002]

It is not simple to explain this here in a post. To answer your question no matter does that comprises my brain does not change. The matter realises the mind, the mind emerges from it.

I'm confused. So when you conclude that Socrates is mortal based on 'you' -- a bundle of matter and nothing more -- 'interacting' with the premises "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal", your brain does not change from one state to another?

 

[meauneau]

I'm confused. So when you conclude that Socrates is mortal based on 'you' -- a bundle of matter and nothing more -- 'interacting' with the premises "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal", your brain does not change from one state to another?

There are neural changes, changes in the neaural networks and such, but the process in en emergent one. There is extensive literature on this subject.

 

[Deleted member 159002]

There are neural changes, changes in the neaural networks and such, but the process in en emergent one. There is extensive literature on this subject.

So changes in matter do occur, and the particular changes that occur are determined by the premises matter 'encounters'? How does that work? How does Socrates being a man and all men being mortal cause neurons to behave a certain way?

 

[Voodoo_Child906]

Changes nothing. Calling it "kalam-esque" is just as ignorant as calling it "kalam-lite".

Calling it the AfR is ignorant, do you really think you've come up with anything new? It's just rehashed Kalam and Anselm.

I've already explained why defining rationality as "higher computational abilities" doesn't work: because by that definition of rationality, a non-rational creature could be considered rational.

You're a strange one, you can't see that it's our different definition of rational that is causing our argument? I do not accept your definition!

I agree that it's inconsistent with experience, but that doesn't mean it's metaphysically impossible. If you think it is, explain how. If you don't, then your 'objection' is a quibble.

For what the third time now... I never said it was metaphysically impossible. I'm saying that it's ridiculous because it's basically magic. This is at the heart of our disagreement, in my worldview a rock can never be 'rational' because it's not living and doesn't have a brain.

Can't you see that all the rest is fluff until we can agree on our axioms, your definition of rational is something you've made up.

You're a little confused. Grounds are premises e.g. "Socrates is a man. All men are mortal." These are the grounds for your belief that Socrates is mortal. They are not material.

Not confused at all, in my world view ultimately the ground for all is material. In this case our ability to understand a syllogism was formed from our evolved brains and our senses. All you're doing is defining 'Rational', 'Actions' and 'Events' in a way that presupposes a non-material cause... Oh wait, is that a form of Kalam?

No word play. Are you denying that when you make a rational inference, a change from one physical state to another occurs inside your brain? In fact, isn't this premise essential to your whole argument? The change from one physical state to another is an event.

Correct, they are physical changes programmed by millions of years of evolution. Once again our definition of "rational inference" is different.

This is a straw man. I have not made such an argument. IIRC I've actually said that the idea of nature being the IF is not (at least as far as I can tell) incoherent, as long as no rational inference would ever occur.

Well then what is your definition of an event? Let me guess, it requires an immaterial cause. Am I correct?

How is this word games? Are you claiming that when the doctor taps your knee and you kick, you're acting? That, as far as I'm concerned, is reacting, and there's a fundamental difference between those kinds of behaviors and purposive behavior. You haven't explained how the idea of actions emerging from reactions is coherent.

It's a word game because you define 'Action' as presupposing the immaterial, I don't share that definition.

Naturalism is an irrational belief, but nature itself is not irrational -- it's nonrational. It would be more accurate for you to say "Naturalism is irrational" as a conclusion, rather make it the second premise. I haven't used "Naturalism is irrational" as a presumption. It's something I've deduced.

No, it's something you're trying to define.

Then you have guessed wrong.

This is exactly what you're doing, you've made up terms which presuppose the immaterial and you think you've made some amazing argument from reason. You haven't!

I think you're making a false accusation. Rational creatures need to interact with natural causation to do things, including to think, but for our rationality to come from nonrational causation is, I think, impossible. Unlike a soul, a brain is physical, and since a brain is physical, if naturalism is true, all caused mental events must have only and ultimately nonrational causes. Theism on the other hand allows for nonrational causation to gives us shape (literally and figuratively) for our rational actions, with inferences being a key rational action. Nonrational causes by themselves cannot produce rationality nor (consequently) rational effects, much less produce rational causes. Nonrational causes cannot produce rationality at all. But they can and do help in producing our thinking. Rational behavior has the power to cause physical events. Premises are a product of rational behavior, too, but a sort of abstract derivation from rational action. Reason can cause physical events shaped both physically and abstractly by reason's knowledge of premises.

The more and more we discuss this I'm seeing that my accusation is spot on. You load your definitions, you're doing it here.

 

[meauneau]

So changes in matter do occur, and the particular changes that occur are determined by the premises matter 'encounters'? How does that work? How does Socrates being a man and all men being mortal cause neurons to behave a certain way?

The premises are merely information stored in neurons. This information is processed by the brain to produce conclusions, i.e., other bits of information. I think you confuse physicalism with materialism of the 19th century, i.e., all there is is bits of matter bumping into other bits of matter. Information isn't composed of matter, it is embodied in matter and it is physical and physically realised. Then there is supervenience to account for propositional causation. We make observations and these observations are encoded in our brains, they leave impressions, information that is stored in the brain's neural networks. We then reason validly or invalidly according to the laws of logic. That is, the brain does the thinking. Some people reason (process the information) thus: if p then q, q, therefore p; this we know is invalid. Others will reason thus: if p then q, not q, therefore not p; this we know is valid. Now these rules are true independently of whether there are rational being or not; so rational valid inferences are things that exist necessarily. It is an accident of history that there are such beings who have an organ with such neural structures which allow it to process information consciously, information that is stored in the brain and the whole system being realised by the brain.

There is no need to posit an extra kind, a mental kind, which we can't even explain nor understand how it interacts with substances of a different kind.

What I outlined here is physicalism. There are naturalists who allow for kinds other than the physical. They allow for the natural world to contain in addition to the physical also non physical entities such as numbers, propositions, properties, possibilities, etc. Non of this implies theism.

 

[Voodoo_Child906]

The premises are merely information stored in neurons. This information is processed by the brain to produce conclusions, i.e., other bits of information. I think you confuse physicalism with materialism of the 19th century, i.e., all there is is bits of matter bumping into other bits of matter. Information isn't composed of matter, it is embodied in matter and it is physical and physically realised. Then there is supervenience to account for propositional causation. We make observations and these observations are encoded in our brains, they leave impressions, information that is stored in the brain's neural networks. We then reason validly or invalidly according to the laws of logic. That is, the brain does the thinking. Some people reason (process the information) thus: if p then q, q, therefore p; this we know is invalid. Others will reason thus: if p then q, not q, therefore not p; this we know is valid. Now these rules are true independently of whether there are rational being or not; so rational valid inferences are things that exist necessarily. It is an accident of history that there are such beings who have an organ with such neural structures which allow it to process information consciously, information that is stored in the brain and the whole system being realised by the brain.

There is no need to posit an extra kind, a mental kind, which we can't even explain nor understand how it interacts with substances of a different kind.

What I outlined here is physicalism. There are naturalists who allow for kinds other than the physical. They allow for the natural world to contain in addition to the physical also non physical entities such as numbers, propositions, properties, possibilities, etc. Non of this implies theism.

If you haven't noticed, it's full on Chopra mode.

 

[Deleted member 159002]

Calling it the AfR is ignorant, do you really think you've come up with anything new? It's just rehashed Kalam and Anselm.

I didn't come up with the AFR, nor did I come up with the term. I'm not claiming to have come up with anything here. Have I not been upfront in crediting CS Lewis? You're the one making trying to come up with something new by mislabeling the AFR, "kalam-lite".

You're a strange one, you can't see that it's our different definition of rational that is causing our argument? I do not accept your definition!

What you're saying here does not address what you're quoting. So let me ask you: Does a dog have a higher computational ability than an ant? Do you think dogs are rational on this basis?

For what the third time now... I never said it was metaphysically impossible. I'm saying that it's ridiculous because it's basically magic. This is at the heart of our disagreement, in my worldview a rock can never be 'rational' because it's not living and doesn't have a brain.

Thanks for clarifying.

Can't you see that all the rest is fluff until we can agree on our axioms, your definition of rational is something you've made up.

I thought you agreed that rationality is the ability to make deductive inferences. (I would actually include inductive inferences too. Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a non-rational inference). Do you think a computer is rational?

Not confused at all, in my world view ultimately the ground for all is material. In this case our ability to understand a syllogism was formed from our evolved brains and our senses. All you're doing is defining 'Rational', 'Actions' and 'Events' in a way that presupposes a non-material cause... Oh wait, is that a form of Kalam?

Yes, you are confused. Let me try to clarify. The grounds of your belief that Socrates is mortal are: (a) Socrates is a man and (b) all men are mortal. (If we assume naturalism), then the cause for your belief that Socrates is mortal is the neurons in your brain behaving a certain way.

Correct, they are physical changes programmed by millions of years of evolution. Once again our definition of "rational inference" is different.

What are you saying "correct" in response to? Before you suggested that it's "word play" to call the physical changes that occur in your brain when you make inferences "events". Are you now agreeing that to call them "events" is accurate?

Well then what is your definition of an event? Let me guess, it requires an immaterial cause. Am I correct?

I'm not sure how this is a response to what you quoted here, but to answer your first question: an event is something that happens. In this this context, it is marked by some kind of change. To answer your second question, I have not found any compelling metaphysical arguments for theism aside from the AFR. So I would say no, as far as I can tell (and of course I could be wrong), a non-rational event would not require an immaterial cause.

It's a word game because you define 'Action' as presupposing the immaterial, I don't share that definition.

I define "action" as addition to, instigation in, and freedom (to some extent) from the web of non-purposive causation. What's your definition of action?

No, it's something you're trying to define.

What is something I'm trying to define? What are you trying to argue here?

This is exactly what you're doing, you've made up terms which presuppose the immaterial and you think you've made some amazing argument from reason. You haven't!

You seem to think that believing there is a difference between you producing an inference and you kicking your leg out when the doctor taps your knee, and distinguishing the types of events as action and reaction, is "presupposing the immaterial" and "loading definitions". That's nonsense. Surely you can recognize the difference between action and reaction. Do you consider squirrels or birds actors? What about single-celled organisms? Do you think computers are actors?

The more and more we discuss this I'm seeing that my accusation is spot on. You load your definitions, you're doing it here.

I am not "loading definitions". An example of "loading definitions" would be saying that the idea of a miracle (e.g. God making a rock rational) is "ridiculous" because it doesn't conform to naturalistic presuppositions.

 

[Deleted member 159002]

The premises are merely information stored in neurons. This information is processed by the brain to produce conclusions, i.e., other bits of information. I think you confuse physicalism with materialism of the 19th century, i.e., all there is is bits of matter bumping into other bits of matter. Information isn't composed of matter, it is embodied in matter and it is physical and physically realised. Then there is supervenience to account for propositional causation. We make observations and these observations are encoded in our brains, they leave impressions, information that is stored in the brain's neural networks. We then reason validly or invalidly according to the laws of logic. That is, the brain does the thinking. Some people reason (process the information) thus: if p then q, q, therefore p; this we know is invalid. Others will reason thus: if p then q, not q, therefore not p; this we know is valid. Now these rules are true independently of whether there are rational being or not; so rational valid inferences are things that exist necessarily. It is an accident of history that there are such beings who have an organ with such neural structures which allow it to process information consciously, information that is stored in the brain and the whole system being realised by the brain.

There is no need to posit an extra kind, a mental kind, which we can't even explain nor understand how it interacts with substances of a different kind.

What I outlined here is physicalism. There are naturalists who allow for kinds other than the physical. They allow for the natural world to contain in addition to the physical also non physical entities such as numbers, propositions, properties, possibilities, etc. Non of this implies theism.

Unless the new properties with consequent laws are rational actions then nothing has changed, the illusion of rational behavior has only deepened on the face of it. You're still making a claim of actions from reactions. Talking about the details in more detail means nothing unless the more-details somehow detail true action capability being produced by the mere reactions. And they don't. You might as well say "...and then a miracle happens!" and look around to see if anyone buys that a bunch of non-rational behaviors can produce an actual, legitimate miracle of supernatural ontology.

The reductive and especially the eliminative materialists don't buy that for a second, which is why they try to go the route of appealing to "information", as a way of bridging their disagreements with the non-reductive materialists. (The non-reducts say the information isn't physical, just physically embodied. The reducts and elims say it's physical; the reducts agree it's truly information; the elims allow that it works like information but ultimately an eliminativist will end up claiming that any apparent 'information' is a conceptual illusion.)

But information is question-begging: it only counts as "information" to agents capable of truly (not illusionarily) parsing information per se, after the fact. Information theorists (a topic particularly important in biophysics at the genetic and similar levels, such as the sugar code on the surface of cells, which is totally alien to DNA coding, or the structural coding of D/RNA apart from its specific four-element protein coding), will quickly stress that it's pointless to call something information unless it's being used as information, which opens back up the question of how that information as information got there. Computers do not actually regard their code as information; rational agents do, even when they aren't what is using the information themselves: because rational agents put the information there. If I say my computer is behaving "rationally", I mean that what my computer does makes coherent logical sense, and tacitly I'm adding "to a rational agent".

 

[Voodoo_Child906]

I didn't come up with the AFR, nor did I come up with the term. I'm not claiming to have come up with anything here. Have I not been upfront in crediting CS Lewis? You're the one making trying to come up with something new by mislabeling the AFR, "kalam-lite".

Well then CS Lewis came up with Kalam-lite, thanks for your citation.

What you're saying here does not address what you're quoting. So let me ask you: Does a dog have a higher computational ability than an ant? Do you think dogs are rational on this basis?

I don't think a dog is quite there with rationality, maybe after a few more millennia of evolution where higher brain functions are selected.

Thanks for clarifying.

No problem, it's ridiculous and based on magic but not metaphysically impossible

I thought you agreed that rationality is the ability to make deductive inferences. (I would actually include inductive inferences too. Strictly speaking there is no such thing as a non-rational inference). Do you think a computer is rational?

And once again you load your definition with "deductive" and "inductive" inferences. Your definitions of rational, deductive and I'm guessing inductive are loaded in such a way that they can only be caused by god. We do not agree on any of these terms, for example, yes with advancements in Artificial Intelligence and fuzzy logic a computer can become rational (Though we're not there yet).

My definition of rational, deductive and inductive reasoning does not require anything immaterial, it is a measurement of cognitive ability and nothing more.

Yes, you are confused. Let me try to clarify. The grounds of your belief that Socrates is mortal are: (a) Socrates is a man and (b) all men are mortal. (If we assume naturalism), then the cause for your belief that Socrates is mortal is the neurons in your brain behaving a certain way.

No, not confused, I think it may be you. The cause of my belief that Socrates is mortal is found in Mind/Brain Identity, Evolutionary Theory, Genetics and Neuro-Science.

What are you saying "correct" in response to? Before you suggested that it's "word play" to call the physical changes that occur in your brain when you make inferences "events". Are you now agreeing that to call them "events" is accurate?

I am saying that physical changes inside our brain, programmed by millions of years of evolution with natural selection cause rational inferences.

I'm not sure how this is a response to what you quoted here, but to answer your first question: an event is something that happens. In this this context, it is marked by some kind of change. To answer your second question, I have not found any compelling metaphysical arguments for theism aside from the AFR. So I would say no, as far as I can tell (and of course I could be wrong), a non-rational event would not require an immaterial cause.

I believe rational and non-rational events are caused by the material and do not require the immaterial

I define "action" as addition to, instigation in, and freedom (to some extent) from the web of non-purposive causation. What's your definition of action?

An action is something done to accomplish a purpose

What is something I'm trying to define? What are you trying to argue here?

That you're trying to define rationality as having an immaterial cause

You seem to think that believing there is a difference between you producing an inference and you kicking your leg out when the doctor taps your knee, and distinguishing the types of events as action and reaction, is "presupposing the immaterial" and "loading definitions". That's nonsense. Surely you can recognize the difference between action and reaction. Do you consider squirrels or birds actors? What about single-celled organisms? Do you think computers are actors?

An action is done to accomplish a purpose, any sentient organism can perform an action

I am not "loading definitions". An example of "loading definitions" would be saying that the idea of a miracle (e.g. God making a rock rational) is "ridiculous" because it doesn't conform to naturalistic presuppositions.

Yes you are, your definition of rational and action can only be caused by the immaterial. That is where we disagree.

 

[meauneau]

Unless the new properties with consequent laws are rational actions then nothing has changed, the illusion of rational behavior has only deepened on the face of it. You're still making a claim of actions from reactions. Talking about the details in more detail means nothing unless the more-details somehow detail true action capability being produced by the mere reactions. And they don't. You might as well say "...and then a miracle happens!" and look around to see if anyone buys that a bunch of non-rational behaviors can produce an actual, legitimate miracle of supernatural ontology.

The reductive and especially the eliminative materialists don't buy that for a second, which is why they try to go the route of appealing to "information", as a way of bridging their disagreements with the non-reductive materialists. (The non-reducts say the information isn't physical, just physically embodied. The reducts and elims say it's physical; the reducts agree it's truly information; the elims allow that it works like information but ultimately an eliminativist will end up claiming that any apparent 'information' is a conceptual illusion.)

But information is question-begging: it only counts as "information" to agents capable of truly (not illusionarily) parsing information per se, after the fact. Information theorists (a topic particularly important in biophysics at the genetic and similar levels, such as the sugar code on the surface of cells, which is totally alien to DNA coding, or the structural coding of D/RNA apart from its specific four-element protein coding), will quickly stress that it's pointless to call something information unless it's being used as information, which opens back up the question of how that information as information got there. Computers do not actually regard their code as information; rational agents do, even when they aren't what is using the information themselves: because rational agents put the information there. If I say my computer is behaving "rationally", I mean that what my computer does makes coherent logical sense, and tacitly I'm adding "to a rational agent".

Your thesis that there is, in audition to the physical/material stuff everything is made of, an immaterial, non physical substance which can interact and move matter is more problematic than the thesis that everything is material or physical. Your thesis posits an explainable and mysterious mechanism, by which the non physical can affect the physical. It is also less parsimonious. The naturalist (or the physicalist) thesis has no mystery and is more parsimonious. For the latter there is inductive evidence from the fact that every things we come across in the world is physical. Even the stuff which in the past people thought were of another non physical substance, for instance planets mechanisms responsible for bodily functions turned out to be physical. So this is also evidence that a priori arguments such as the one you put forth here end up rejected by a posteriori arguments.

 

[Deleted member 159002]

Well then CS Lewis came up with Kalam-lite, thanks for your citation.

You're only making yourself look foolish.

I don't think a dog is quite there with rationality, maybe after a few more millennia of evolution where higher brain functions are selected.

Then you are conceding that defining rationality as "higher computational ability" doesn't work.

No problem, it's ridiculous and based on magic but not metaphysically impossible

If it's not metaphysically impossible then how is the idea of God being able to make a rock rational "ridiculous"?

And once again you load your definition with "deductive" and "inductive" inferences. Your definitions of rational, deductive and I'm guessing inductive are loaded in such a way that they can only be caused by god. We do not agree on any of these terms, for example, yes with advancements in Artificial Intelligence and fuzzy logic a computer can become rational (Though we're not there yet).

I'm using "deductive" and "inductive" as described here: http://www.iep.utm.edu/ded-ind/

Your claim that strong artificial intelligence is possible is nothing more than a sheer assertion, which you could never verify. Mental masturbation.

My definition of rational, deductive and inductive reasoning does not require anything immaterial,

I don't understand what this is supposed to mean. Instead of "require", I think you mean, "presuppose". Well, 'my' definitions of these terms does not presuppose the immaterial.

it is a measurement of cognitive ability and nothing more.

This is an insufficient description of rationality for reasons I have explained: a dog, for example, has higher cognitive ability than, say, an ant, and yet a dog is not rational. If aliens came to Earth and their average IQ was 300, would you say humans have ceased to be rational on the basis of there being a species with higher cognitive ability? I don't think so.

No, not confused, I think it may be you. The cause of my belief that Socrates is mortal is found in Mind/Brain Identity, Evolutionary Theory, Genetics and Neuro-Science.

Someone could claim the cause of something "is found in" astrology or alchemy. Claiming the cause of something "is found in" X, Y, and Z is not an argument.

I am saying that physical changes inside our brain, programmed by millions of years of evolution with natural selection cause rational inferences.

You derailed what we were discussing here by questioning my use of the term "physical event" to describe what you claim produces an inference. So lets take a step back.

• You: I'm talking about rationality being the product of brain architecture that will allow for deductive reasoning. The metric was agreed upon before hand I believe, the ability to comprehend a syllogism, for me that is strictly a product of brain architecture.

• Me: Which doesn't work, because then you are claiming that 'good reasons' (which are not physical) cause physical events (the things that go on in your brain when you make a rational inference).

You responded by blustering about how you think God being able to make a rock rational is "ridiculous" (which you've conceded is not metaphysically impossible), without explaining how premises (e.g. Socrates is a man; all men are mortal) cause the physical events in your brain that produce inferences, (which very clearly seems to be impossible per the causal closure of the physical theory of atheists). So I said:

• Me: Are the grounds for concluding that Socrates is mortal -- "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal" -- material? No. But they are necessary for this rational inference to be made. Ground/consequents, however, don't produce events. So if atheism is true then either you have to come up with a way to explain how something that doesn't produce events produces events, or you have to come up with a way for a rational abstract relationship (ground/consequent) to be an effect of a non-purposive and (if naturalism is true) a physical cause.

To which you replied:

• You: Yes the grounds for our brains higher computational ability are material, "Events"... I'm guessing your definition will be more word play [...] "Rational Inferences" "Actions" and I'm guessing "Events" are just terms where you've made up the definition to fit your narrative.

Now that you no longer protest that it's inaccurate to call the physical changes that occur in your brain to produce inferences "events" you can attempt to explain how things like 'good reasons' cause neurons to behave in a way that produces inferences.

I believe rational and non-rational events are caused by the material and do not require the immaterial

I know.

An action is something done to accomplish a purpose

This is fairly similar to my definition; you seem to appreciate that purposiveness is essential to action.

That you're trying to define rationality as having an immaterial cause

This is a false accusation. Though you claim rationality is materially caused, I have not resorted to accusing you of "trying to define rationality as having a material cause".

An action is done to accomplish a purpose, any sentient organism can perform an action

Not if you use a definition of action relevant to the distinction between theism and atheism (just like for rationality) (from dictionary.com "an act that one consciously wills and that may be characterized by physical or mental activity" http://www.dictionary.com/browse/action?s=t) You can complain about that if you want, but if you want to substitute a meaning for action that elides between rationality and non-rationality -- which seems convenient at first to avoid problems with atheism from rationality -- then you'll also have eliminated the distinction between theism and atheism in just the same way.

Atheists understand the distinction just fine, in other words, when you want to oppose theism with atheism. If you want to use a lesser definition of action for another topic, fine, but you don't get to turn around and elide from that usage back into this topic without accounting for the consequences. Atheists as atheists are not objecting to the IF "acting" merely like a conglomeration of purely automatic behaviors. Nor do they regard their own arguments as "acting" merely like a conglomeration of purely automatic behaviors. A bait-and-switch dodge to avoid implications is not superior philosophy.

Yes you are, your definition of rational and action can only be caused by the immaterial. That is where we disagree.

I defined action as: "instigation in, and freedom (to some extent) from the web of non-purposive causation." I defined rationality as: "the ability to make inferences so that one can know things independent of observation" (and I later modified my definition to include inductive inferences). Where in these definition do I say these phenomena must be caused by the immaterial?

You confuse something that is inferred and something that is presumed.

 

[Deleted member 159002]

Your thesis that there is, in audition to the physical/material stuff everything is made of, an immaterial, non physical substance which can interact and move matter is more problematic than the thesis that everything is material or physical. Your thesis posits an explainable and mysterious mechanism, by which the non physical can affect the physical. It is also less parsimonious. The naturalist (or the physicalist) thesis has no mystery and is more parsimonious.

Occam's razor only works if unnecessary elements of a hypothesis are trimmed off. Simply removing elements of a hypothesis to have fewer of them isn't the purpose of Occam's Razor (but naturally people abuse it that way anyway). Your appeal to Occam's in this case tacitly implies that we have already established that naturalistic atheism works sufficiently to produce rational behavior, and so that the AFR has already been defeated. Consequently, it can't be used as an appeal against theism by itself, without massively begging the question and/or arguing in a circle.

For the latter there is inductive evidence from the fact that every things we come across in the world is physical. Even the stuff which in the past people thought were of another non physical substance, for instance planets mechanisms responsible for bodily functions turned out to be physical. So this is also evidence that a priori arguments such as the one you put forth here end up rejected by a posteriori arguments.

Let's test how well that principle works conceptually. Atheism conceptually fails, leaving over at least some varieties of theism as a not-fail (when also checked). Deduction trumps induction; theism may seem improbable to you, but when the impossible of a dichotomy has been eliminated then whatever is left over, however improbable, will be true. "But Occam's Razor says theism is more complex!" So what?! We've already established the simpler idea can't even get coherently going as an idea under closer examination. Occam, who was a deist by the way, would be the first to agree.

Just because an explanation is "more parsimonious" doesn't mean it's plausible. But the main objection is that Occam's can't be deployed to decide between elements unless one of those elements has already been decided as sufficiently exhaustive to produce the effect(s) which the theory is hypothesizing about. Occam's merely gets rid of unnecessary additions. "I have no need for that hypothesis," as Laplace (himself a Catholic) told Napoleon when asked whether the planets needed God's action to stay in their orbits. Laplace was applying Occam's Razor (in effect), but he wasn't simply eliminating to a simpler explanation. He had already decided he didn't need that explanation to account for the effect.

The formal version of the AFR only needs to establish that usually non-rational behaviors only produce non-rational behaviors, establishing a skeptical threat to rationality; total impossibility would be great, too, (and I'm willing to conclude that, too), but it isn't strictly necessary for the formal version to work as a deduction: the proposal of atheism puts human rationality into a skeptical threat which could only even perhaps be resolved by necessarily presuming what has to be justified for the resolution. A proposal that can only get going by circular argument or begging the question should be deducted from the option list, leaving over any proposals that don't need such logical cheats to get going: and there's a dichotomy between atheism and theism; and theism doesn't broadly fail the same skeptical threat on examination. That leaves theism as the explanation for our presumed rationality.

 

[meauneau]

Occam's razor only works if unnecessary elements of a hypothesis are trimmed off. Simply removing elements of a hypothesis to have fewer of them isn't the purpose of Occam's Razor (but naturally people abuse it that way anyway). Your appeal to Occam's in this case tacitly implies that we have already established that naturalistic atheism works sufficiently to produce rational behavior, and so that the AFR has already been defeated. Consequently, it can't be used as an appeal against theism by itself, without massively begging the question and/or arguing in a circle.

My appeal to simplicity, or rather, ontological parsimony, is based on inductive evidence for physicalism which I mentioned earlier, and also on the difficulty dualists have in explaining the interaction of the immaterial with the material. My appeal to ontological parsimony is not based on the assumption that naturalistic atheism, or rather physicalism, has been established. Rather, it is based on inductive evidence for physicalism, on the problems of dualism (physical and non physical interaction) and also on the dependence of mental phenomena on the neurology; we never have mental phenomena without neural activity.

This isn't against theism, we are comparing two theories to explain what we observe: humans capable of rational thought. I claim that the physicalist theory has the most theoretically virtuous, it is ontologically more parsimonious and based on evidence: inductive evidence for physicalism, mental dependence on the neural activity and the mysterious and unexplained interaction of dualism.

This is not circular or question begging. This is two theories one being more theoretically virtuous than the other and based on evidence.

Let's test how well that principle works conceptually. Atheism conceptually fails, leaving over at least some varieties of theism as a not-fail (when also checked). Deduction trumps induction; theism may seem improbable to you, but when the impossible of a dichotomy has been eliminated then whatever is left over, however improbable, will be true. "But Occam's Razor says theism is more complex!" So what?! We've already established the simpler idea can't even get coherently going as an idea under closer examination. Occam, who was a deist by the way, would be the first to agree.

That is an appeal to authority by the way. Regardless, OR as it is formulated today is not the exact same thing Occam had in mind. Also, this isn't about theism or atheism, this is about dualism or physicalism, or about two competing theories which explain what we observe. There are many atheists and naturalists who are not physicalists, who are dualists and accept that other than the physical there are also non physical stuff. But this does not entail that theism is true or that atheism is false. If you think this then you are confused.

Just because an explanation is "more parsimonious" doesn't mean it's plausible. But the main objection is that Occam's can't be deployed to decide between elements unless one of those elements has already been decided as sufficiently exhaustive to produce the effect(s) which the theory is hypothesizing about. Occam's merely gets rid of unnecessary additions. "I have no need for that hypothesis," as Laplace (himself a Catholic) told Napoleon when asked whether the planets needed God's action to stay in their orbits. Laplace was applying Occam's Razor (in effect), but he wasn't simply eliminating to a simpler explanation. He had already decided he didn't need that explanation to account for the effect.

The more parsimonious is the more probable statistically and probabilistically. I have no idea where you came with that formulation of Occam's, but it is not what I appeal to. I appeal to ontological parsimony: it is more rational to prefer the parsimonious theory. Laplace is irrelevant here, he wasn't appealing to non empirical desiderata to choose a theory, he merely claimed that he didn't need to add another explanation that is superfluous to his theory. In our case, we are comparing two theories, one is more parsimonious, it posits only one kind which explains the phenomena we observe. The other posits two kinds of stuff to account of the phenomena we observe but creates more problems and mysteries.

The formal version of the AFR only needs to establish that usually non-rational behaviors only produce non-rational behaviors, establishing a skeptical threat to rationality; total impossibility would be great, too, (and I'm willing to conclude that, too), but it isn't strictly necessary for the formal version to work as a deduction: the proposal of atheism puts human rationality into a skeptical threat which could only even perhaps be resolved by necessarily presuming what has to be justified for the resolution. A proposal that can only get going by circular argument or begging the question should be deducted from the option list, leaving over any proposals that don't need such logical cheats to get going: and there's a dichotomy between atheism and theism; and theism doesn't broadly fail the same skeptical threat on examination. That leaves theism as the explanation for our presumed rationality.

That non-rational behaviours only produce non-rational behaviours is what needs to be established. So far we have no reason to believe that this is the case. In nature we observe that first order properties are realised or emerge from second order properties from which we would have never been able to predict the first order properties. Then we have the enumerative inductive evidence for physicalism and the dependence of the mental on neural activity; we never get mental phenomena without the neural activity and changes in neural activity. Add to this the mystery of how non physical stuff can causally affect physical stuff and we see how more rational it is to prefer the materialist or physicalist theory.

 

[meauneau]

I would like to point out the absurdity in the belief that there is a god who created the physical world with some non-physical stuff which can causally interact with the physical. So god could finely tune this causal mechanism responsible for the interaction of this non-physical stuff with the physical stuff, yet cannot fine tune a mechanism to stop gratuitous pain and suffering. For example, falling asleep in a forest and being woken by the heat and smoke caused by a fire which would have killed you had you remained asleep is an instance of biologically useful pain; this pain is not gratuitous, it serves a biological purpose, survival and reproduction. But imagine there is no way out of the forest fire, you are surrounded by fire and you will die. In this case you will feel the pain and suffer it till you die; this pain is not biologically useful, it is gratuitous.

Couldn't god have fine tuned this non-physical stuff in a way such that we only feel pain when it is morally and biologically useful? The fact that there is no such fine tuning is what we expect from a natural world where there is no fundamental purpose and no designer or fine tuner.

 

[mrbaapt]

I would like to point out the absurdity in the belief that there is a god who created the physical world with some non-physical stuff which can causally interact with the physical. So god could finely tune this causal mechanism responsible for the interaction of this non-physical stuff with the physical stuff, yet cannot fine tune a mechanism to stop gratuitous pain and suffering. For example, falling asleep in a forest and being woken by the heat and smoke caused by a fire which would have killed you had you remained asleep is an instance of biologically useful pain; this pain is not gratuitous, it serves a biological purpose, survival and reproduction. But imagine there is no way out of the forest fire, you are surrounded by fire and you will die. In this case you will feel the pain and suffer it till you die; this pain is not biologically useful, it is gratuitous.

Couldn't god have fine tuned this non-physical stuff in a way such that we only feel pain when it is morally and biologically useful? The fact that there is no such fine tuning is what we expect from a natural world where there is no fundamental purpose and no designer or fine tuner.

The answers to your questions from Christians will always be:
"god is mysterious"
"Humans can't understand god"
"Pain is part of original sin"

 

[Voodoo_Child906]

You're only making yourself look foolish.

I think it's yourself and Mr CS with his AfK that's looking foolish.

Then you are conceding that defining rationality as "higher computational ability" doesn't work.

Rationality is higher computational ability among sentient beings, basically cognitive functions that we associate with human minds like learning, problem solving, reasoning. It works pretty well.

If it's not metaphysically impossible then how is the idea of God being able to make a rock rational "ridiculous"?

I'm willing to retract my statement if you can explain how god can make a rock rational.

I'm using "deductive" and "inductive" as described here: http://www.iep.utm.edu/ded-ind/

Your claim that strong artificial intelligence is possible is nothing more than a sheer assertion, which you could never verify. Mental masturbation.

What would be the test to verify? What would a computer have to accomplish to be considered rational to you?

I don't understand what this is supposed to mean. Instead of "require", I think you mean, "presuppose". Well, 'my' definitions of these terms does not presuppose the immaterial.

Of course your definitions presuppose the immaterial, that's why you use them. You view "rational" as strictly a product of the immaterial, that's why you believe god can make a rock "rational". It is impossible for a rock to be rational under materialism. Now will you just admit it, your denial is getting silly.

This is an insufficient description of rationality for reasons I have explained: a dog, for example, has higher cognitive ability than, say, an ant, and yet a dog is not rational. If aliens came to Earth and their average IQ was 300, would you say humans have ceased to be rational on the basis of there being a species with higher cognitive ability? I don't think so.

Higher computational ability cognitive functions that we associate with human minds like learning, problem solving, reasoning. These functions are a product of our evolved human brain.

Someone could claim the cause of something "is found in" astrology or alchemy. Claiming the cause of something "is found in" X, Y, and Z is not an argument.

Would you like links to all the studies conducted in the above fields related to the human experience? Mind/Brain Identity, Evolutionary Theory, Genetics and Neuro-Science provides a model for human rationality as materialists define it.

You derailed what we were discussing here by questioning my use of the term "physical event" to describe what you claim produces an inference. So lets take a step back.

• You: I'm talking about rationality being the product of brain architecture that will allow for deductive reasoning. The metric was agreed upon before hand I believe, the ability to comprehend a syllogism, for me that is strictly a product of brain architecture.

• Me: Which doesn't work, because then you are claiming that 'good reasons' (which are not physical) cause physical events (the things that go on in your brain when you make a rational inference).

You responded by blustering about how you think God being able to make a rock rational is "ridiculous" (which you've conceded is not metaphysically impossible), without explaining how premises (e.g. Socrates is a man; all men are mortal) cause the physical events in your brain that produce inferences, (which very clearly seems to be impossible per the causal closure of the physical theory of atheists). So I said:

• Me: Are the grounds for concluding that Socrates is mortal -- "Socrates is a man" and "all men are mortal" -- material? No. But they are necessary for this rational inference to be made. Ground/consequents, however, don't produce events. So if atheism is true then either you have to come up with a way to explain how something that doesn't produce events produces events, or you have to come up with a way for a rational abstract relationship (ground/consequent) to be an effect of a non-purposive and (if naturalism is true) a physical cause.

To which you replied:

• You: Yes the grounds for our brains higher computational ability are material, "Events"... I'm guessing your definition will be more word play [...] "Rational Inferences" "Actions" and I'm guessing "Events" are just terms where you've made up the definition to fit your narrative.

Now that you no longer protest that it's inaccurate to call the physical changes that occur in your brain to produce inferences "events" you can attempt to explain how things like 'good reasons' cause neurons to behave in a way that produces inferences.

I had no idea what you meant by "events" when you first used it. A lot of your definitions so far have been esoteric hogwash.

This is fairly similar to my definition; you seem to appreciate that purposiveness is essential to action.

Sure

This is a false accusation. Though you claim rationality is materially caused, I have not resorted to accusing you of "trying to define rationality as having a material cause".

The accusation is spot on, it's obvious what you are doing. I myself am trying to define rationality as having a material cause, i'll admit it. Why don't you?

Not if you use a definition of action relevant to the distinction between theism and atheism (just like for rationality) (from dictionary.com "an act that one consciously wills and that may be characterized by physical or mental activity" http://www.dictionary.com/browse/action?s=t) You can complain about that if you want, but if you want to substitute a meaning for action that elides between rationality and non-rationality -- which seems convenient at first to avoid problems with atheism from rationality -- then you'll also have eliminated the distinction between theism and atheism in just the same way.

Atheists understand the distinction just fine, in other words, when you want to oppose theism with atheism. If you want to use a lesser definition of action for another topic, fine, but you don't get to turn around and elide from that usage back into this topic without accounting for the consequences. Atheists as atheists are not objecting to the IF "acting" merely like a conglomeration of purely automatic behaviors. Nor do they regard their own arguments as "acting" merely like a conglomeration of purely automatic behaviors. A bait-and-switch dodge to avoid implications is not superior philosophy.

Can you define what the "lesser" definition of action is?

I defined action as: "instigation in, and freedom (to some extent) from the web of non-purposive causation." I defined rationality as: "the ability to make inferences so that one can know things independent of observation" (and I later modified my definition to include inductive inferences). Where in these definition do I say these phenomena must be caused by the immaterial?

You confuse something that is inferred and something that is presumed.

non-purposive causation = the material. So action is instigated from outside and free from the material

observation = the material. Rationality is the ability to make inferences independent of the material

You really can't admit that this is what you are saying?