Islam Makhachev, The Southpaw Kick, and the Nature of Weaknesses

The MM Analyst

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I wrote something about Makhachev's kicking tactics and the openings in Volkanovski's game that allowed them to work.

When the first fight between Islam Makhachev and Alexander Volkanovski wrapped up, everyone was already thinking about the rematch. Not only was it wonderfully competitive, but the areas in which each had success left lots of room for compelling adjustments. Against all expectations, Makhachev largely won on the feet, while Volkanovski did a brilliant job mitigating the grappling threat through crafty use of elevators, hip-heists, and whizzers.

The open-side kicks and counters of Makhachev proved to be a big obstacle for Volkanovski, as he struggled to close the distance and ended up paying when he did. Against an orthodox opponent, Volkanovski looks to pick at range with non-committal kicks to draw out their offense and feint into his own entries. These entries usually involve a level change on his step in, which then flows into a multitude of finishers. He’ll feint into a jab, then once you’ve adjusted to counter it, the jab becomes a hook, or a right hand that takes him into the clinch, then complex combinations, etc. Opponents are left guessing which strike will come off the entry, and that means they’re always a step behind his adjustments.

Against southpaws however, the lead hands and feet clash, extending the distance. Volkanovski is less comfortable covering that gap methodically and tends to resort to explosive forward shifts that take him into southpaw, primarily the shifting right hook. The shifting hook served him well against Max Holloway and Yair Rodriguez, who tend to respond to rushes by giving ground straight backwards, and don’t operate too consistently on the counter.

But Makhachev would take a subtle step back and plant his feet to counter the shifting hook, either giving him a clean counter as he slipped Volkanovski’s punch and ripped his own, or creating a messy exchange where Volkanovski’s pursuit would land him with his feet square, open for Makhachev’s punches.

The biggest question coming into the fight for me was how Volkanovski would approach closing the distance, as his trademark shifting hook proved ineffective the first time. But Makhachev didn’t even give him the chance, shutting him down and ending the fight before Volkanovski was able to implement whatever his gameplan was to be.

Before we take a look at the classic pairing that lead to Makhachev’s finish, I want to examine a few of their clinch exchanges.

Makhachev only shot once in the fight, and Volkanovski immediately downblocked and dug an underhook to pull Makhachev off his hips and into the clinch. But Makhachev quickly turned the stuffed shot into a favorable situation for himself:



He secured his own underhook as he came up and controlled Volkanovski’s underhooking elbow, making it difficult to pull his arm out. From there he walked Volkanovski from the middle of the Octagon all the way to the cage wall.

As Makhachev primarily looks to extend the distance and often fights off the back-foot, his ability to convert on failed shots is crucial to getting his wrestling going. Where Khabib Nurmagomedov can leap on a shot, miss, then simply pressure his opponent back to the cage again, Makhachev gets fewer opportunities and has instead become adept at keeping the exchange going when the initial shot fails. Volkanosvki maintains head position and a frame on the hips as he’s walked back to the cage to prevent Makhachev from hitting a takedown, but when opponents resist his pressure and give him a push reaction, Makhachev will go with their momentum and attempt a footsweep.

With his back to the cage, Volkanovski quickly managed to pummel an underhook and turn Makhachev off the cage, but his work wasn’t done yet. Makhachev is deadly playing off the overhook with his back to the cage, using the position to throw several of his recent opponents. Makhachev will use knees to bait his opponent into returning them and set up his whizzer kick, but he’s also unusually focused on controlling the elbow with a hard bite on the whizzer halt his opponent’s move to disengage.



Volanovski framed with his forearm across the chin to hold Makhachev in place while he disengaged, but Makhachev was able to clamp down on the overhook and stall his exit. Makhachev then grabs the head around Volkanovski frame and sends a knee up the middle, which makes Volkanovski drop his frames to address it and allows Makhachev to lock up his trademark double collar tie. Volkanovski is crafty in addressing it though, timing another Makhachev knee and looking to wrap up a bodylock past the collar ties. Makhachev’s forearms keep him from getting chest to chest, but he’s still able to cut an angle outside and force Makhachev to turn his own back to the cage to maintain the position.

A moment after the sequence above, they found themselves in the clinch again and this time Volkanovski was able to use the forearm frame to disengage, turning his overhooked elbow inwards and limp-armping out. If the fight had gone on longer it would have been interesting to see how the clinch battle played out, with Volkanovski likely looking to strike off the breaks he created and Makhachev looking to force conditions that would open up his throws and trips, as well as hunting knees in transition.

As an interesting aside, Nathaniel Wood also did some neat work with clinch frames on the undercard. He hit a couple lovely outside trips in the first few rounds, but wound on his back being controlled a bit. In the third round, he was determined to force striking exchanges without falling into the clinch, and he used framing to accomplish it:



Wood would blast Muhammad Naimov with a couple straight punches, then pull his elbows back in to push off his collarbone or lay the forearm across his face, creating a barrier when he tried to hold on. These sort of reactive frames combine particularly well with straight hitting, as the elbows coming away from the body are what creates lanes for easy clinch entries. A hook will open the elbow fully and allow a clean underhook to slot in, but straight punches present a much smaller window, making it easier to retract the elbow straight back and get some bone in front of the opponent’s head or neck.

But aside from a few brief clinch exchanges, the story of the fight was Makhachev’s kicking. He had occasional success with his rear kicks in the first fight, but he focused heavily on them from the opening bell this time, pairing his body kick with a snapping front kick. The front kick didn’t land too hard, but it served to enforce his range and threatened to spear Volkanovski if he tried to step in past the body kicks. His kicks were interspersed with level changes at range, reminding Volkanovski about the threat of the reactive takedown should he close distance too aggressively.

Continued Here...
 
At first I though boxingislife was back and was waiting for a Conor reference
 
It actually reminded me of the head kick KO in Poirier vs. Gaethje. Both of them were round kicks from the power side in an open stance matchup, and both Poirier and Volkanovski got knocked loopy trying to block the kick with only one arm by the head.

Dariush vs Oliveira too and Benoit st Denis turned Bonfim's arms into jelly with a bunch of kicks and then quickly choked him, there's been a lot of them lately. I wonder if a wave of headkick KOs will encourage guys to change their response to them. Probably doesn't make a lot of sense for most MMA fighters to check body kicks outside of specific matchups and most don't have the eyes to pull their upper body back, but attacking the standing leg is a good way to avoid having to play the guessing game with blocking. Aldo did it to Mendes in their second fight, kicked out his leg when he threw a head kick.
 
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