FINDINGS OF THE NATIONAL SCHOOL
SHIELD TASK FORCE
Finding No. 1: There has been insufficient attention paid to school security needs in our
nation, and the greatest security gap falls within the medium- to smaller-size schools,
which do not have the level of resources of the larger school districts.
Comment: A study of Virginia schools found that the elimination of SRO positions over a
two-year period occurred mainly in the smaller schools, and was most likely due to
reductions in federal and state grants for SRO programs. 53
In addition, another gap identified by the assessment teams sent out by the National
School Shield Task Force is that older schools, constructed more than ten years ago,
have greater security challenges than newer facilities. More recently designed schools
have more architectural attention devoted to security features in contrast to the building
design and layout of older facilities.
Prior to the Sandy Hook incident, most schools took the view that “it probably won’t
happen here.” Sandy Hook school leadership has since realized the vulnerability of an
unprotected school and the need to take action.
Finding No. 2: Many schools do not have a formal, written security plan, and even for
those that do, they are often either inadequate or not properly exercised. Schools across
the nation vary greatly based on size, geography, student composition, building design,
threats and a variety of other factors, all of which dictate the need for individualized
and tailor-made security plans adapted to the uniqueness of the particular school.
Comment: The plan should be an all-hazards approach that is uniquely designed for the
individual campus. The plan should set forth layers of security including use of
technology, perimeter security, staff training, properly conducted security drills, and
coordination with local law enforcement, fire service and emergency responders.
Finding No. 3: A properly trained armed school officer, such as a school resource
officer, has proven to be an important layer of security for prevention and response in
the case of an active threat on a school campus.
Comment: A study of SROs in Virginia found that they have become “an important
feature of local law enforcement and public schools.” 54 The success of any law-
enforcement presence and its deterrent value is always difficult to measure, but the
53 JOHN G. SCHUITEMAN, THE STATUS OF VIRGINIA SROS: 2007, at 2 (Virginia Department of Criminal Justice Services, Apr. 6, 2007).
54 Id. at 8. 12
assessments to date lead to the conclusion that a properly trained SRO is an important
part of the security efforts of any school.
Finding No. 4: Local school authorities are in the best position to make a final decision
on school safety procedures, specifically whether an armed security guard is necessary
and supported by the education and citizen community.
Finding No. 5: Many public and non-public schools are financially unable to include
armed security personnel as part of the school security plan and have resorted to school
staff carrying firearms in order to provide an additional level of protection for the
students and staff in the event of a violent incident on school property.
Comment: The school staff generally receives authorization from law enforcement as a
reserve deputy or authorized security officer, even though the training required is
inconsistent and often inadequate. Currently, there is no nationally recognized training
program for the safe and effective carry, storage, maintenance and administration of
firearms by school employees.
For example, in February, after the Sandy Hook tragedy, the Van, TX, school board,
which serves more than 2,000 students, voted to allow guns on campus. This action
authorized certain school employees to carry firearms on school property, at school
events and at board meetings. 55
Finding No. 6: While the local school leadership should make all final decisions
regarding the elements of the school security plan, the individual states, with few
exceptions, have not made school security an element of adequacy in school standards.
Comment: Every school is unique, and there is not a single security plan that covers all
schools. A school security plan must be locally tailored to be effective, reliable and safe.
What is essential is that every school conducts its own security assessment and
develops a plan that covers the vulnerabilities determined in the assessment. States
should set the requirements for security and risk assessment and the development of an
adequate all-hazards security plan for the school.
Finding No. 7: School officials are not generally trained in security assessments or the
development of comprehensive safety and security plans. Ideally, a school retains
professional assistance in developing their school security plans; however, there is a
compelling need for professional-quality online self-assessment tools. This need was
emphasized in a recent statement before the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce: “While there is certainly some information on websites and in other
literature, and products do exist and are on the market to secure our nation’s schools,
55 Molly Hennessy-Fiske, Texas school staffer shot during gun class, LA Times (Feb. 28, 2013),
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/28/nation/la-na-nn-texas-school-worker-shot-20130228. we have not been able to find in our research a website or other single source of
information that comprehensively integrates all of the security needs together.” 56
Comment: A professional security consultant generally costs $10,000 per school campus.
An online self-assessment tool will make the work of the security consultant more cost
effective, and it will assist the school officials in knowing what security enhancements
are needed.
Finding No. 8: Federal funding for the personnel costs of SROs has served as a pathway
for increased security in our schools, but federal funding has proved unreliable as a
long-term solution to the school safety and security needs of our nation.
Comment: Many states, including Connecticut 57 and Wyoming 58 , have been forced to
shut down or reduce their SRO programs after federal budget cuts, yet remain actively
searching for alternative funding options so they can bring SROs back to schools.
Finding No. 9: There are numerous federal agencies and programs that provide
valuable school safety resources; however, there is a lack of coordination between the
federal agencies resulting in gaps, duplication and inefficiencies.
Comment: There are at least three different Cabinet-level departments that have some
involvement in school safety policy, funding or initiatives. The Department of Justice,
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Education all have
programs focusing on school safety. Within each department there are multiple sub-
agencies that are working (sometimes independently of each other) on school safety
programs.
Finding No. 10: History teaches us that in most violent attacks at a school, there are
multiple early warning signs, called pre-incident indicators, of a student or outside
person who exhibits threatening behavior and poses a risk to the school. 59 In order to
properly use these indicators to minimize the risk of violence, schools must develop a
culture of awareness and willingness to share this information with the proper
individuals. A positive school culture has also been linked to reducing incidences of
bullying, which is frequently associated with an attackers’ decision to engage in a
violent act. The Best Practices Guidelines, in Appendix A (pp. 9-22), contains additional
information on school climate and the relationship to school violence.
The most widespread and effective tool that has been used to identify pre-incident
indicators and other indicators of school dynamics is the use of Threat Assessment
Groups or Behavioral Intervention Teams (BIT). These teams are trained to identify
individuals who may pose a risk to society, and assist in the development of an
individualized plan of mental health and educational services. The Best Practices
Guidelines, in Appendix A (pp. 16-20), has more information on pre-incident indicators
for adults and students.
Comment: The impact of threat assessment teams is demonstrated in a 2011 survey of
Virginia school safety. The schools that used the threat assessment guidelines
developed by the University of Virginia reported lower rates of weapons-related
disciplinary infractions and lower rates of school suspensions. 60 The students in these
schools experienced less bullying, were more likely to seek help for bullying and threats
of violence, and had more positive perceptions of school climate.
