Response to Dissenting Argument
ncordless begins his opening statement with an eloquent appeal to the fall of Rome. In his telling, Rome was toppled because it chose to no longer assimilate the various Germanic hordes - Goths, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, Vandals, Sueves, Angles, Franks, etc. - who spent nearly a century dividing up the Roman empire before deposing of its last Western emperor in 476. Roman leaders instead chose to build walls to stop this migration and thus sealed their fate. ncordless says there is a lesson in this example for contemporary America.
But this history is fanciful. Not a single part of it is true.
First, the Romans built walls as defensive fortifications from their earliest days. The city of Rome itself had a wall built around it - the Servian Wall - long before it ever became an empire. If walls truly hurt Rome, as ncordless believes, then the city would have never risen to became the supreme power of the Mediterranean world. Indeed, walls were a standard part of Roman defensive fortifications at every point in Rome’s history. Building them had nothing to do with its decline and fall.
The Servian Wall
Second, Rome did try to assimilate the Germans. Many were allowed to settle in the empire. They eventually became a significant part of Rome’s military. They were sometimes used to fight other Germans. But as Rome became weak, it was easier for the German tribes to invade and plunder. Why settle down and pay taxes to a power they no longer feared? The Romans even gave away significant land holdings in their provinces to keep the peace. None of these stalling tactics worked. There were always more Germans who wanted a piece of the action. In fact, Rome would’ve fallen much faster had the various German tribes been united. But the Germans were a squabbling group of invaders, almost as likely to fight each other as they were the Romans.
Third, the Romans did NOT build a large series of walls and fortifications in the last century before their fall. To the contrary, most of their border fortifications were empty in the decades before the final Western emperor was deposed. There was no money for such fortifications. The German invasions had eroded the tax base. Besides, the border was meaningless. The Germans were already in the empire.
Here is how Bryan Ward-Perkins puts it in
The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization.
It may have been the intention of the imperial government that Roman rule would continue within the territories where Germanic peoples were settled by treaty. For instance, this appears to have been the hope in Aquitaine in 419: the imperial government planned to go on ruling the Garonne valley through the normal structures of provincial civilian administration; the newly settled Visigoths were, in theory, a friendly and obedient force settled on territory that was still Roman.
But, whatever the intention, the introduction of large numbers of heavily armed and experienced fighters under the rule of their own king in reality led to the rapid transfer of effective power [from the Romans to the Germans].
Ward-Perkins, Bryan (2005-06-23). The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization (p. 56). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
And that’s the largest anachronism in ncordless’s comparison of Imperial Rome with contemporary America. The ancient Germans were not migrants looking for honest work in the empire. They were warriors looking for opportunity. And Rome’s weakness provided that opportunity, a weakness that was borne out of an inability to man the walls and forts along the empire’s borders.
More to the point of this debate, Ward-Perkins mentions that walls in ancient Rome did exactly what they were intended to do:
Roman military dominance over the Germanic peoples was considerable, but never absolute and unshakeable. The Romans had always enjoyed a number of important advantages: they had well-built and imposing fortifications; factory-made weapons that were both standardized and of a high quality; an impressive infrastructure of roads and harbours; the logistical organization necessary to supply their army, whether at base or on campaign; and a tradition of training that ensured disciplined and coordinated action in battle, even in the face of adversity. Furthermore, Roman mastery of the sea, at least in the Mediterranean, was unchallenged and a vital aspect of supply. It was these sophistications, rather than weight of numbers, that created and defended the empire, and the Romans were well aware of this fact. Vegetius, the author of a military treatise dating from the late fourth or the first half of the fifth century, opened his work with a chapter entitled ‘The Romans Conquered All Peoples Only through their Military Training’, in which he stressed that, without training, the Roman army would have achieved nothing: ‘What could small Roman forces achieve against hordes of Gauls? What could the short Roman soldier dare to do against the tall German?’
These advantages were still considerable in the fourth century. In particular, the Germanic peoples remained innocents at sea (with the important exception of the Anglo-Saxons in the north), and notorious for their inability to mount successful siege warfare. One Gothic leader is said to have advised his followers to concentrate on looting the undefended countryside, observing wryly that ‘he was at peace with walls’. Consequently, small bands of Romans were able to hold out behind fortifications, even against vastly superior numbers, and the empire could maintain its presence in an area even after the surrounding countryside had been completely overrun. For instance, in 378, despite a terrible defeat in the field, Roman forces were still able to hold the nearest town, and, most importantly of all, were able to protect the imperial city, Constantinople.
Ward-Perkins, Bryan (2005-06-23). The Fall of Rome: And the End of Civilization (p. 35). Oxford University Press. Kindle Edition.
As a side note to this debate, it’s important to remember that not all of Rome fell in 476. In the eastern empire, the rule of Constantinople continued for another millennium. And those Romans in the east would be surprised to hear my opponent's argument that walls did not provide them with security.
The Walls of Constantinople
*****
When ncordless gets to the meat of his argument, he says he has nothing against a border wall as long as it’s limited. He prefers, instead, to argue against building a coast-to-coast wall.
I'm surprised to hear this. Not even Trump believes that building a coast-to-coast wall is necessary. So ncordless appears to want to argue against a position that no one is seriously arguing for.
Could the U.S. build such a long wall? Of course it could. It has both the resources and money to do so. But should the U.S. build such a wall? Probably not. Why build it if you don’t need it? The wall need only be as long as it has to be in order to be effective.
My opponent also points out that many illegal aliens do not cross the border. They come here legally, and then overstay their visas.
This is true, but irrelevant. Many tens of thousands still cross the border illegally every year. They’re forced to cross it because they can’t get a visa to legally come to the United States. They’re either too poor or they have a criminal background or they traffic in drugs. In other words, they are the kind of illegals who will cause the U.S. the most trouble if they are allowed into the country. A wall is designed to keep them out.
I do agree with ncordless that building a wall by itself is insufficient to restrict the flow of illegal immigrants into the United States. He rightly points out that many illegals come here legally and then overstay their visa. A wall will do nothing to prevent this kind of illegal alien from settling in the U.S. But I’m not aware of a single restrictionist who believes it will. A wall is only part of the solution, but it is a part. No one believes it is the entire solution.
