The Jordan Peterson Thread - V2 -

Oh boy. We're going to have to establish how we're using the word "worth" here. He is absolutely not worth reading if what you're looking for is clear thinking, sound logic, or productive philosophy. He is worth reading, however, if you want to better understand the philosophical mechanisms behind much of the faulty thinking in contemporary philosophical circles (which, inevitably, has seeped into many other circles).

For the best sense of where Derrida was coming from with the philosophical practice of what he called "deconstruction," I'd go to his lengthy introduction to Edmund Husserl's The Origin of Geometry, from 1962; his most famous book, Of Grammatology, from 1967; and the edited collections of his essays Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy.

He was incredibly prolific and he wrote on tons of topics. It wasn't until the second half of his career that he started to wade into political waters, but even Simon Critchley, in his book The Ethics of Deconstruction, acknowledges that deconstruction can't function as a political tool and that it is incumbent upon Derrideans with a political interest to create something that can actually function in the world of politics (spoiler: nobody has done it yet and they never will because it's nonsense).

But that's a much longer conversation. Incidentally - and there's no way to say this without sounding like an arrogant tool, so please forgive me - in December, in the upcoming issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (yes, that's a real thing), I'm going to have a very long essay published in which I offer a thoroughgoing critique of the work of Barthes and Derrida. It's in an aesthetic register (I study film, so my work is geared towards the study of art), but it's philosophical criticism insofar as what I'm doing is demonstrating (a) that their ideas make no sense and (b) why their ideas when applied to art just fuck shit up. Sadly, nobody else has ever really done that, to actually work through their nonsense and follow their illogical bullshit to the end and show that it comes to nonsense. And NOBODY has done that in the humanities/arts. It's a seriously sad state of affairs in my neck of the woods and it's why I love it that Peterson isn't just some dude saying this shit, but an academic.

I wish there were more academics like him.



The American philosopher Stanley Cavell has gone a long way towards illuminating the debt Nietzsche owes Emerson, and as Emerson was himself often difficult to pin down on shit, I think it might be the case that Nietzsche's flip-flopping style could have at least a few roots in Emerson. I'm sure another part of it is whatever the fuck was going on in his head at any given time. But, with respect to Emerson (and I think this applies equally to Nietzsche), Cavell once observed:

"We know - do we not? - that one can generally find for every characteristic citation in Emerson another that contradicts it. It is said - and said that Emerson says - that he contradicts himself, that he is inconsistent [...] We who care about the Emersonian text will sometime have to make explicit how we choose citations from it - from which texts, and at what length."

That last part, about having sometime to make explicit how one uses something of Emerson's, is exactly the case with Nietzsche. Except I think Nietzsche's contradictions are deeper and darker than Emerson's, so while the nature is the same, the importance is greater in Nietzsche's case.



Hell, I'm on Lexapro (nowadays Escitalopram). I've been on it for over a decade. I'm a terribly anxious person (in the go, go, go, Tasmanian devil, can't power down sense) and I can't even begin to tell you how much Lexapro helped and continues to help. If I'm not really doing anything in my life, I don't need them, and I even went off them for about a year when I was a working stiff just grinding away between my BA and MA, but if I've got a lot of shit going and I'm pushing hard, I just can't find the off switch and that shit helps regulate me.

I don't really follow the pill arguments, so I don't know where that puts me, but I love my SSRI :D



I don't think I'm conflating those two things. I think the only sticking point would be what he means by God. Clearly, we know that when he says "truth" he doesn't mean what Sam Harris means when he says it. I think it's also safe to say that when he says "God" he also doesn't mean what Sam Harris means.

When he says "God," I think it's pretty clear that he's not talking about the white guy with the Santa beard sitting up on the clouds who created everything a few thousand years ago. For Peterson, he tends to use God the way Campbell did (seriously, people who like Peterson, read or reread your Campbell, they're working from the same playbook), as that for which we have no other words, as that beyond which we know nothing and might never learn anything. On one of his Rogan podcasts, he was talking about transcendence and about the mystery of the universe. That's what Campbell liked to emphasize (in stuff like The Power of Myth and The Inner Reaches of Outer Space) as the mysterium tremendum, which he took from Rudolf Otto's notion of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, Otto's conception of how one experiences God, as an awe-inspiring mystery beyond all knowledge/articulation.

Peterson likes to preserve that little slice of esoterica, that unknownness, that awe-inspiring mystery of the universe and our existence in it (it's the existentialist in him, it's probably what draws him to someone like Heidegger). And I think that's his "God."

As for Jesus and the Resurrection, I think he'll go the mythological route on that and discuss the eternal death and rebirth of the human subject, which he's discussed in different places (the second Rogan podcast, IIRC, as well as in the Q&A after his "Strengthen the Individual" talk).

Damn, I miss school a lot when I read your posts lol.
 
Oh boy. We're going to have to establish how we're using the word "worth" here. He is absolutely not worth reading if what you're looking for is clear thinking, sound logic, or productive philosophy. He is worth reading, however, if you want to better understand the philosophical mechanisms behind much of the faulty thinking in contemporary philosophical circles (which, inevitably, has seeped into many other circles).

For the best sense of where Derrida was coming from with the philosophical practice of what he called "deconstruction," I'd go to his lengthy introduction to Edmund Husserl's The Origin of Geometry, from 1962; his most famous book, Of Grammatology, from 1967; and the edited collections of his essays Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy.

He was incredibly prolific and he wrote on tons of topics. It wasn't until the second half of his career that he started to wade into political waters, but even Simon Critchley, in his book The Ethics of Deconstruction, acknowledges that deconstruction can't function as a political tool and that it is incumbent upon Derrideans with a political interest to create something that can actually function in the world of politics (spoiler: nobody has done it yet and they never will because it's nonsense).

But that's a much longer conversation. Incidentally - and there's no way to say this without sounding like an arrogant tool, so please forgive me - in December, in the upcoming issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (yes, that's a real thing), I'm going to have a very long essay published in which I offer a thoroughgoing critique of the work of Barthes and Derrida. It's in an aesthetic register (I study film, so my work is geared towards the study of art), but it's philosophical criticism insofar as what I'm doing is demonstrating (a) that their ideas make no sense and (b) why their ideas when applied to art just fuck shit up. Sadly, nobody else has ever really done that, to actually work through their nonsense and follow their illogical bullshit to the end and show that it comes to nonsense. And NOBODY has done that in the humanities/arts. It's a seriously sad state of affairs in my neck of the woods and it's why I love it that Peterson isn't just some dude saying this shit, but an academic.

I wish there were more academics like him.



The American philosopher Stanley Cavell has gone a long way towards illuminating the debt Nietzsche owes Emerson, and as Emerson was himself often difficult to pin down on shit, I think it might be the case that Nietzsche's flip-flopping style could have at least a few roots in Emerson. I'm sure another part of it is whatever the fuck was going on in his head at any given time. But, with respect to Emerson (and I think this applies equally to Nietzsche), Cavell once observed:

"We know - do we not? - that one can generally find for every characteristic citation in Emerson another that contradicts it. It is said - and said that Emerson says - that he contradicts himself, that he is inconsistent [...] We who care about the Emersonian text will sometime have to make explicit how we choose citations from it - from which texts, and at what length."

That last part, about having sometime to make explicit how one uses something of Emerson's, is exactly the case with Nietzsche. Except I think Nietzsche's contradictions are deeper and darker than Emerson's, so while the nature is the same, the importance is greater in Nietzsche's case.



Hell, I'm on Lexapro (nowadays Escitalopram). I've been on it for over a decade. I'm a terribly anxious person (in the go, go, go, Tasmanian devil, can't power down sense) and I can't even begin to tell you how much Lexapro helped and continues to help. If I'm not really doing anything in my life, I don't need them, and I even went off them for about a year when I was a working stiff just grinding away between my BA and MA, but if I've got a lot of shit going and I'm pushing hard, I just can't find the off switch and that shit helps regulate me.

I don't really follow the pill arguments, so I don't know where that puts me, but I love my SSRI :D



I don't think I'm conflating those two things. I think the only sticking point would be what he means by God. Clearly, we know that when he says "truth" he doesn't mean what Sam Harris means when he says it. I think it's also safe to say that when he says "God" he also doesn't mean what Sam Harris means.

When he says "God," I think it's pretty clear that he's not talking about the white guy with the Santa beard sitting up on the clouds who created everything a few thousand years ago. For Peterson, he tends to use God the way Campbell did (seriously, people who like Peterson, read or reread your Campbell, they're working from the same playbook), as that for which we have no other words, as that beyond which we know nothing and might never learn anything. On one of his Rogan podcasts, he was talking about transcendence and about the mystery of the universe. That's what Campbell liked to emphasize (in stuff like The Power of Myth and The Inner Reaches of Outer Space) as the mysterium tremendum, which he took from Rudolf Otto's notion of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, Otto's conception of how one experiences God, as an awe-inspiring mystery beyond all knowledge/articulation.

Peterson likes to preserve that little slice of esoterica, that unknownness, that awe-inspiring mystery of the universe and our existence in it (it's the existentialist in him, it's probably what draws him to someone like Heidegger). And I think that's his "God."

As for Jesus and the Resurrection, I think he'll go the mythological route on that and discuss the eternal death and rebirth of the human subject, which he's discussed in different places (the second Rogan podcast, IIRC, as well as in the Q&A after his "Strengthen the Individual" talk).

I'll read this thoroughly when I have a little more time, then I'll get back to you. I won't do it justice right now.
 
Oh boy. We're going to have to establish how we're using the word "worth" here. He is absolutely not worth reading if what you're looking for is clear thinking, sound logic, or productive philosophy. He is worth reading, however, if you want to better understand the philosophical mechanisms behind much of the faulty thinking in contemporary philosophical circles (which, inevitably, has seeped into many other circles).

For the best sense of where Derrida was coming from with the philosophical practice of what he called "deconstruction," I'd go to his lengthy introduction to Edmund Husserl's The Origin of Geometry, from 1962; his most famous book, Of Grammatology, from 1967; and the edited collections of his essays Writing and Difference and Margins of Philosophy.

He was incredibly prolific and he wrote on tons of topics. It wasn't until the second half of his career that he started to wade into political waters, but even Simon Critchley, in his book The Ethics of Deconstruction, acknowledges that deconstruction can't function as a political tool and that it is incumbent upon Derrideans with a political interest to create something that can actually function in the world of politics (spoiler: nobody has done it yet and they never will because it's nonsense).

But that's a much longer conversation. Incidentally - and there's no way to say this without sounding like an arrogant tool, so please forgive me - in December, in the upcoming issue of The Journal of Ayn Rand Studies (yes, that's a real thing), I'm going to have a very long essay published in which I offer a thoroughgoing critique of the work of Barthes and Derrida. It's in an aesthetic register (I study film, so my work is geared towards the study of art), but it's philosophical criticism insofar as what I'm doing is demonstrating (a) that their ideas make no sense and (b) why their ideas when applied to art just fuck shit up. Sadly, nobody else has ever really done that, to actually work through their nonsense and follow their illogical bullshit to the end and show that it comes to nonsense. And NOBODY has done that in the humanities/arts. It's a seriously sad state of affairs in my neck of the woods and it's why I love it that Peterson isn't just some dude saying this shit, but an academic.

I wish there were more academics like him.

The American philosopher Stanley Cavell has gone a long way towards illuminating the debt Nietzsche owes Emerson, and as Emerson was himself often difficult to pin down on shit, I think it might be the case that Nietzsche's flip-flopping style could have at least a few roots in Emerson. I'm sure another part of it is whatever the fuck was going on in his head at any given time. But, with respect to Emerson (and I think this applies equally to Nietzsche), Cavell once observed:

"We know - do we not? - that one can generally find for every characteristic citation in Emerson another that contradicts it. It is said - and said that Emerson says - that he contradicts himself, that he is inconsistent [...] We who care about the Emersonian text will sometime have to make explicit how we choose citations from it - from which texts, and at what length."

That last part, about having sometime to make explicit how one uses something of Emerson's, is exactly the case with Nietzsche. Except I think Nietzsche's contradictions are deeper and darker than Emerson's, so while the nature is the same, the importance is greater in Nietzsche's case.



Hell, I'm on Lexapro (nowadays Escitalopram). I've been on it for over a decade. I'm a terribly anxious person (in the go, go, go, Tasmanian devil, can't power down sense) and I can't even begin to tell you how much Lexapro helped and continues to help. If I'm not really doing anything in my life, I don't need them, and I even went off them for about a year when I was a working stiff just grinding away between my BA and MA, but if I've got a lot of shit going and I'm pushing hard, I just can't find the off switch and that shit helps regulate me.

I don't really follow the pill arguments, so I don't know where that puts me, but I love my SSRI :D



I don't think I'm conflating those two things. I think the only sticking point would be what he means by God. Clearly, we know that when he says "truth" he doesn't mean what Sam Harris means when he says it. I think it's also safe to say that when he says "God" he also doesn't mean what Sam Harris means.

When he says "God," I think it's pretty clear that he's not talking about the white guy with the Santa beard sitting up on the clouds who created everything a few thousand years ago. For Peterson, he tends to use God the way Campbell did (seriously, people who like Peterson, read or reread your Campbell, they're working from the same playbook), as that for which we have no other words, as that beyond which we know nothing and might never learn anything. On one of his Rogan podcasts, he was talking about transcendence and about the mystery of the universe. That's what Campbell liked to emphasize (in stuff like The Power of Myth and The Inner Reaches of Outer Space) as the mysterium tremendum, which he took from Rudolf Otto's notion of the mysterium tremendum et fascinans, Otto's conception of how one experiences God, as an awe-inspiring mystery beyond all knowledge/articulation.

Peterson likes to preserve that little slice of esoterica, that unknownness, that awe-inspiring mystery of the universe and our existence in it (it's the existentialist in him, it's probably what draws him to someone like Heidegger). And I think that's his "God."

As for Jesus and the Resurrection, I think he'll go the mythological route on that and discuss the eternal death and rebirth of the human subject, which he's discussed in different places (the second Rogan podcast, IIRC, as well as in the Q&A after his "Strengthen the Individual" talk).

You lost me at The Origin of Geometry, I started erasing Derrida off my reading list, but you brought me back with your critique of him. Any chance you can elaborate on the basic idea that you're critiquing, the one that "makes no sense", and exactly how these ideas are applied to, and ruining, Film? That's philosophy I can get behind. I'm assuming it's going to be hard to distill an entire essay into a paragraph, but not being familiar with Derrida, I have no context. And good on you for being published, I'd like to read that when it comes out, though by the sounds of it, it will be over my head.

Peterson is hitting on some fundamental human truths in a way that's elegant but still simple enough for us laymen to understand. He's intoxicating. I went to see John Wick 2 the other day after listening to some of Peterson's lectures, and all I could focus on was the archetypes that the characters represented. It kind of ruined the movie for me, lol, but I think he's touching a nerve with many of us.
 
You lost me at The Origin of Geometry, I started erasing Derrida off my reading list, but you brought me back with your critique of him. Any chance you can elaborate on the basic idea that you're critiquing, the one that "makes no sense", and exactly how these ideas are applied to, and ruining, Film? That's philosophy I can get behind. I'm assuming it's going to be hard to distill an entire essay into a paragraph, but not being familiar with Derrida, I have no context. And good on you for being published, I'd like to read that when it comes out, though by the sounds of it, it will be over my head.

Peterson is hitting on some fundamental human truths in a way that's elegant but still simple enough for us laymen to understand. He's intoxicating. I went to see John Wick 2 the other day after listening to some of Peterson's lectures, and all I could focus on was the archetypes that the characters represented. It kind of ruined the movie for me, lol, but I think he's touching a nerve with many of us.

I had a similar experience when I was going through the Maps of Meaning lectures (picked up the book too @Bullitt68, though I've only had time to read it sparingly).

I went on at least a few "resist the chaos" rants during lunch breaks with my co-workers, to their great amusement. The material definitely has a mobilizing power.

What sucked is that I had to keep referring to Peterson as "that guy who opposed the transgender bill" lol.
 
Damn, I miss school a lot when I read your posts lol.

Well, I miss Sherdog when I'm in school. I'll leave it as an open question whether that means Sherdog is better than people think, school is worse than people think, or both o_O

You lost me at The Origin of Geometry, I started erasing Derrida off my reading list, but you brought me back with your critique of him.

Trust me, I didn't leave behind a great career in geometry to go into the humanities. You won't find someone dumber when it comes to math shit than me. For Derrida, it's more the idea of origin and Husserl's method of conducting his investigation into the origin of geometry than it is weirdo math talk.

Any chance you can elaborate on the basic idea that you're critiquing, the one that "makes no sense", and exactly how these ideas are applied to, and ruining, Film?

Sure. The tl/dr deconstruction critique ;)

Peterson does a great job explaining Derrida's position with his critique of what he originally called "logocentrism" and which he later expanded to "phallogocentrism." But Peterson has only occasionally used the word deconstruction and he's never worked down to the fundamental level of Derrida's thinking. He has pointed out that, as with most people, Derrida starts out from a sensible place (I like Wittgenstein's idea that errors in thinking "can be fitted into what [one] knows aright"). In his introduction to The Origin of Geometry, he frames his endeavor (at this point not yet called deconstruction) by pointing out that “every critical enterprise” allegedly suffers from a “natural naiveté of its language” and thus requires “rigorous philological or ‘etymological’” investigation.

So far, so good. He's basically saying that often people smuggle in assumptions or are sometimes even unaware of the assumptions driving their arguments. On the basis of that idea, you can easily see him as continuing in a Wittgensteinian vein with something like "grammatical" investigation. He wants to get down to the deepest levels of thinking, where we are "continually call[ed] back to the unnoticed presuppositions of ever recurring problems," and try to work shit out from the beginning.

(Let's leave to the side for the moment the Marxist logic here most influentially put forth by Louis Althusser regarding the presumption of stepping outside of all "language-games," like stepping outside of "ideology," to be able to investigate other people's language-games while at the same time whining about how it's the language-game as such that's fucking shit up with its inescapable/constitutive phallogocentrism.)

The key idea that Derrida extracts from this is that there's a basic metaphysical presupposition, an ontological and epistemological orientation, that goes all the way back to Aristotle. He calls this the metaphysics of presence. The idea of metaphysical, ontological presence - as well as, in terms of consciousness, the idea of self-presence - is a given. Derrida tries to argue that this "given" is a problematic "naiveté" in philosophy and he tries to deconstruct it. This leads him to try to invalidate the axiomatic concepts of existence, identity, and consciousness.

Derrida often makes a big show of deconstructing "binary logic." So, in the case of presence, what's really going on is a binary battle between presence/absence (and male/female, white/black, right/wrong, and on down the line). And, since objectivity has been off the table since at least Kant (and something very important that not enough people have been talking about, and Peterson is no exception, is how much this nonsense relies on Kantian ideas, though in his recent podcast with Hicks that I linked to, they finally get into some Kantian territory), Derrida goes on to argue that the side of the binary that's favored is not just a language-game, but a language-game of power.

This is where deconstruction runs off the rails and becomes silly, incoherent, contradictory, and ultimately self-refuting nonsense.

This should be pretty standard stuff. You've probably heard Peterson mention these ideas in a variety of contexts. What always sticks with me is when these morons start talking about art. Or, as they prefer, "texts." Not only is every artistic object - a book, a painting, a movie - a "text," it's an "infinitely polysemous" text. And, since we've gotten rid of objectivity, no text means anything except what a person decides to say it means. And nobody can be "right" about what they've arbitrarily decided to say a text means because what could the concept of "right" possibly be attached to in the absence of an objectively existing artwork?

Are you wondering where the author comes into the picture? Don't bother. He doesn't. If you ask about what the author of a "text" meant, you'd get laughed at for assuming (a) that authors actually know what they mean to do when they create an artwork and (b) that you could possibly know what an author actually meant to do.

It's a neat little trick whereby Derrida and his crew are able to invalidate the idea of an objectively existing artwork to which people can refer in conversations/criticism (so goodbye concepts of "right" and "wrong" and "good" and "bad"), the idea of texts having "fixed" meanings or identities (so goodbye to the concept of "meaning"), the idea of conscious intention (so goodbye authorial intention), and the idea of communication (so goodbye identifying intent).

So what's left? If this is a "victory" in any sense of the word, it's at best a Pyrrhic victory. But if you actually work through the "logic" in these arguments, it doesn't even stand as a Pyrrhic victory for long. And that's what I do in my essay. I work through Barthes and his retarded essay "The Death of the Author" and then I work through Derrida, focusing primarily on his writings on Husserl and phenomenology and how they undergird his idiotic aesthetic ideas. In the process, I point out shit like how Barthes' allegiance to altruism and Marxism produces a terrifyingly violent conception of art criticism and how Derrida's fear of responsibility makes him susceptible to nihilism and results in a corpus even more fractured and incoherent than Nietzsche's.

Unlike Peterson, though, I have a bit of sympathy for Derrida. None for Barthes. That guy was a piece of shit. Derrida was just scared and confused. But, like I said, I detail more of that shit in the essay itself. For an inkling, though, and so you get a sense of what Peterson means when he talks about the psychological weakness of people who cling to nonsense like this, consider that Derrida came up with deconstruction as a means by which to avoid in philosophical practice “aberration, forgetfulness, and irresponsibility." Yet, at the same time, he tried to argue that "no intention can ever be fully conscious, or actually present to itself," which would mean that language “leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something other than what we say and would have wanted to say.”

This is what I call, following Cavell, Derrida's fantasy of "necessary inexpressiveness." It's what allows him, in his fear of responsibility and accountability, to indulge in a fantasy in which responsibility is not even an option. It's a philosophical "safe space." But notice the contradiction. Is Derrida’s pathological fear throughout his career of “aberration, forgetfulness, and irresponsibility” not already a rejection of the claim that we are fated “to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say)”?

This is the type of shit that needs accounting for, that needs to be explained. But good luck getting an explanation that makes any more sense than the shit that needs explaining :rolleyes:

And good on you for being published, I'd like to read that when it comes out, though by the sounds of it, it will be over my head.

Even though I'm an academic and I write nerdy shit, I try to keep shit on the sensible level, which means it shouldn't go over anybody's head provided people are actually using their heads.

That's one of the key tricks used by people like Derrida. They hide their retardation inside of jargony gobbledygook. I don't let that shit slide. I shine a big bright light onto it so that the silly shit has nowhere to hide.

This is why Gad Saad, in his "Saad Truth" clips on postmodernism, always reads these ridiculously convoluted abstracts for papers that don't actually say or mean anything. And it's why he always emphasizes that, when you read that type of shit, don't go inside and think that you're not smart enough to "get it," that the profundity is over your head. If it sounds like a crock of shit, it probably is.

In my essay, I frame it as an attempt on my part to work through what Ayn Rand referred to as "the unreadable." It's really scary how right she was about academic practice, but this is what she said about unreadable garbage like Derrida. As she explained, an unreadable book or essay “does not count on men’s intelligence, but on their weaknesses, pretensions, and fears”; it “is not a tool of enlightenment, but of intellectual intimidation”; and it “is not aimed at the reader’s understanding, but at his inferiority complex":

"Within a few years [of the publication of an unreadable book or essay], commentators will begin to fill libraries with works analyzing, 'clarifying,' and interpreting its mysteries. Their notions will spread all over the academic map, ranging from the appeasers, who will try to soften [its] meaning—to the glamorizers, who will ascribe to it nothing worse than their own pet inanities—to the compromisers, who will try to reconcile its theory with its exact opposite—to the avant-garde, who will spell out and demand the acceptance of its logical consequences. The contradictory, antithetical nature of such interpretations will be ascribed to [its] profundity—particularly by those who function on the motto: 'If I don’t understand it, it’s deep.' The students will believe that the professors know the proof of [its] theory, the professors will believe that the commentators know it, the commentators will believe that the author knows it—and the author will be alone to know that no proof exists and that none was offered. Within a generation, the number of commentaries will have grown to such proportions that the original [unreadable book or essay] will be accepted as a subject of philosophical specialization, requiring a lifetime of study—and any refutation of [its] theory will be ignored or rejected if unaccompanied by a full discussion of the theories of all the commentators, a task which no one will be able to undertake."

I take the baton from the point where she says fighting this shit is "a task which no one will be able to undertake." That's too pessimistic for my taste. I also get sad when Peterson talks about how the humanities are dead and the university is beyond fixing. That may be true, but the only way I'll accept that is by trying to fix the shit myself and failing.

Peterson is hitting on some fundamental human truths in a way that's elegant but still simple enough for us laymen to understand. He's intoxicating. I went to see John Wick 2 the other day after listening to some of Peterson's lectures, and all I could focus on was the archetypes that the characters represented. It kind of ruined the movie for me, lol, but I think he's touching a nerve with many of us.

Have you ever read Joseph Campbell? I can't help but notice the coincidence that The Hero with a Thousand Faces was originally published in 1949, and then, exactly half a century later, in 1999, Peterson published Maps of Meaning. For the sake of his fascination with religion, it's like he's the second coming of Campbell :D

If you like the way Peterson can break shit down, check out some Campbell when you get a chance. He'll make religion and mythology make so much more sense for you. And bringing those two together will basically span the entirety of man's attempts to express ideas and values in story form.

I had a similar experience when I was going through the Maps of Meaning lectures (picked up the book too @Bullitt68, though I've only had time to read it sparingly).

Same. I've only read the first 20 pages or so. In a couple of months, I'm going to get to do a guest lecture in my supervisor's "Film and Visual Culture" class on Inception and philosophical skepticism, so I'm too busy going back over Descartes and Kant, but every time I go into my PDF folders, I can fucking hear Maps of Meaning calling to me :(

The material definitely has a mobilizing power.

You know what's worried me ever since I first read the words, though? What Wittgenstein said in his preface to the Tractatus: "Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it - or at least similar thoughts."

What do you do with that? If you find in Peterson's words something to grab onto, if you find in his thoughts similar thoughts to those that you've had yourself, great. But, ultimately, the goal is to get the people who think differently to abandon their stupid, dangerous, (self-)destructive thoughts. Have they ever had similar thoughts? If not, will they ever understand? If they will, how do you get them to understand?

The most logical answer is provided by Rand:

"We do not tell – we show. We do not claim – we prove. It is not your obedience that we seek to win, but your rational conviction. You have seen all the elements of our secret. The conclusion is now yours to draw – we can help you to name it, but not to accept it – the sight, the knowledge, and the acceptance must be yours."

Translation: You can bring a horse to water but you can't make it drink. Great. So what do we do once we get to the fucking water :mad::confused:
 
You know what's worried me ever since I first read the words, though? What Wittgenstein said in his preface to the Tractatus: "Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it - or at least similar thoughts."

It's funny you say this, because I have similar concerns but from the opposite direction.

Peterson's material overlaps with a lot of what I used to study, and even more with subjects I've been thinking about since that studying concluded. So when I hear him talk about recurring archetypes, or the (powerful) metaphorical meanings of religious texts, or the psychometrics of personality, I hear coming back to me exactly the sorts of things I used to read, and feel the draw of how nicely it's all put together.

But things that fit too nicely together arouse my skepticism too, and that's part of the stumbling block that's keeping me from accepting Peterson wholeheartedly. To move from evolution to neurobiology to religion is to make huge, expansive leaps - like I can't even properly communicate how much work a person would have to do to tie two of those fields together coherently, let alone move from top-to-bottom between them. It's an incredibly ambitious task.

Part of the role of mythology, in my opinion, is to smooth over the complexity of human existence in order to make it more comprehensible and palatable, and even though Peterson's work is scientific I do believe the content of his Maps of Meaning is his own sort of mythology for the modern age. So I try to approach it the same way I approach mythology in general - very useful, probably oversimplified, and most effective when one is able to live it without being self-conscious about what it really is.

(This mode of thinking is why you'll rarely, if ever, see me proselytizing lol).

I'm open to him being smarter than I realize - I work for a woman who makes decisions every day I can barely comprehend because she's that many steps ahead of the rest of us. But I'm also open to him being dumber than he realizes, though his thorough-going attempt at intellectual sincerity means a lot to me either way.

Sadly I just don't have enough time at present to figure out which direction the truth lies.
 
But this is the problem with Nietzsche: For every claim he makes in one place, you can find him contradicting it in another place. He's one of the most schizophrenic philosophers I've ever read. Do you think it's a coincidence that people like Roland Barthes and Jacques Derrida were influenced by him?

I also actually find it more than a little perverse that Peterson - a man who gave a talk called "Strengthen the Individual" and is so preoccupied with the individual subject - is so attached to a man who argued in The Will to Power the following:

"'The subject.' This is the term for our belief in a unity underlying all the different impulses of the highest feeling of reality. We understand this belief as the effect of one cause – we believe so firmly in our belief that for its sake we imagine ‘truth,’ ‘reality,’ ‘substantiality’ in general. ‘The subject’ is the fiction that many similar states in us are the effect of one substratum. But it is we who first created the ‘similarity’ of these states; our adjusting them and making them similar is the fact, not their similarity (which ought rather to be denied).”

I also think something like this from Daybreak is more than a little worrisome in the ease with which it can be understood as a license for moral irresponsibility:

"We are none of us that which we appear to be in accordance with the states for which alone we have consciousness and words, and consequently praise and blame."

I think there's just too much cherry picking that has to be done to make Nietzsche not sound like a whack job, and if, at the end of the day, all you're left with is a heap of contradictions where every potentially good point has its opposite somewhere in the same corpus, then why not just move on to someone else?

There have been credible left-Nietzscheans and credible right-Nietzscheans, for as you claim, Nietzsche is full of contradictions, except when he is not.

For example, through Daybreak and all the way to Will to Power he has a remarkably consistent view on the lack of free will and the misunderstanding inherent in most epistemology: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/cgi/p/po...of-the-will.pdf?c=phimp;idno=3521354.0007.007

From Daybreak:
We laugh at him who steps out of his room at the moment when the sun steps out of its room, and then says: “I will that the sun shall rise”; and at him who cannot stop a wheel, and says: “I will that it shall roll”; and at him who is thrown down in wrestling, and says: “here I lie, but I will lie here!” But, all laughter aside, are we ourselves ever acting any differently whenever we employ the expression “I will"?

On this and several other subjects, like self over-becoming, will to power- he is remarkably consistent. Where he isn't, well, the best description I've ever seen given of Nietzsche's philosophy is that it is scientific- no, not in the meaning you are thinking of, not to say precise, but to say experimental. He posits statements, asks the reader to figure out why he is saying what he is saying, what the premise might mean logically, and then decide for himself- all the while often disclaiming the opinions later as 'his own truth'.

It has gradually become clear to me what every great philosophy up till now has consisted of – namely, the confession of its originator, and a species of involuntary and unconscious autobiography; and moreover that the moral (or immoral) purpose in every philosophy has constituted the true vital germ out of which the entire plant has always grown.”

I've read almost all of his works, and I have to agree that although Nietzsche was an incredible genius, he was, as you say, also a complete and total contrarian maniac. The process says more than the positions he takes.
 
One last interesting thing I'll note, which really surprised me, is that Peterson praises the use of anti-depressants, and has been on SSRIs for years. He said that he has no intention of ever coming off them, and claims that his decision to use them was a pivotal moment in his life. Perhaps my surprise is not warranted and the result of my own bias, but it definitely took me back.
Its definitely from your own bias but I don't blame you. SSRIs are often connected with big high profile incidents like mass shootings but of course most people on them won't commit such acts. SSRIs get a bad rap but at the end of the day they're a tool that can be used and misused. On their own they won't cure depression but used properly they help depressed persons function normally and they can be a first step to helping depressed people treat their depression holistically. They're sort of like painkillers in that sense. You don't give someone painkillers to heal their broken arm but to help them function in their day to day lives.
 
Well, I miss Sherdog when I'm in school. I'll leave it as an open question whether that means Sherdog is better than people think, school is worse than people think, or both o_O



Trust me, I didn't leave behind a great career in geometry to go into the humanities. You won't find someone dumber when it comes to math shit than me. For Derrida, it's more the idea of origin and Husserl's method of conducting his investigation into the origin of geometry than it is weirdo math talk.



Sure. The tl/dr deconstruction critique ;)

Peterson does a great job explaining Derrida's position with his critique of what he originally called "logocentrism" and which he later expanded to "phallogocentrism." But Peterson has only occasionally used the word deconstruction and he's never worked down to the fundamental level of Derrida's thinking. He has pointed out that, as with most people, Derrida starts out from a sensible place (I like Wittgenstein's idea that errors in thinking "can be fitted into what [one] knows aright"). In his introduction to The Origin of Geometry, he frames his endeavor (at this point not yet called deconstruction) by pointing out that “every critical enterprise” allegedly suffers from a “natural naiveté of its language” and thus requires “rigorous philological or ‘etymological’” investigation.

So far, so good. He's basically saying that often people smuggle in assumptions or are sometimes even unaware of the assumptions driving their arguments. On the basis of that idea, you can easily see him as continuing in a Wittgensteinian vein with something like "grammatical" investigation. He wants to get down to the deepest levels of thinking, where we are "continually call[ed] back to the unnoticed presuppositions of ever recurring problems," and try to work shit out from the beginning.

(Let's leave to the side for the moment the Marxist logic here most influentially put forth by Louis Althusser regarding the presumption of stepping outside of all "language-games," like stepping outside of "ideology," to be able to investigate other people's language-games while at the same time whining about how it's the language-game as such that's fucking shit up with its inescapable/constitutive phallogocentrism.)

The key idea that Derrida extracts from this is that there's a basic metaphysical presupposition, an ontological and epistemological orientation, that goes all the way back to Aristotle. He calls this the metaphysics of presence. The idea of metaphysical, ontological presence - as well as, in terms of consciousness, the idea of self-presence - is a given. Derrida tries to argue that this "given" is a problematic "naiveté" in philosophy and he tries to deconstruct it. This leads him to try to invalidate the axiomatic concepts of existence, identity, and consciousness.

Derrida often makes a big show of deconstructing "binary logic." So, in the case of presence, what's really going on is a binary battle between presence/absence (and male/female, white/black, right/wrong, and on down the line). And, since objectivity has been off the table since at least Kant (and something very important that not enough people have been talking about, and Peterson is no exception, is how much this nonsense relies on Kantian ideas, though in his recent podcast with Hicks that I linked to, they finally get into some Kantian territory), Derrida goes on to argue that the side of the binary that's favored is not just a language-game, but a language-game of power.

This is where deconstruction runs off the rails and becomes silly, incoherent, contradictory, and ultimately self-refuting nonsense.

This should be pretty standard stuff. You've probably heard Peterson mention these ideas in a variety of contexts. What always sticks with me is when these morons start talking about art. Or, as they prefer, "texts." Not only is every artistic object - a book, a painting, a movie - a "text," it's an "infinitely polysemous" text. And, since we've gotten rid of objectivity, no text means anything except what a person decides to say it means. And nobody can be "right" about what they've arbitrarily decided to say a text means because what could the concept of "right" possibly be attached to in the absence of an objectively existing artwork?

Are you wondering where the author comes into the picture? Don't bother. He doesn't. If you ask about what the author of a "text" meant, you'd get laughed at for assuming (a) that authors actually know what they mean to do when they create an artwork and (b) that you could possibly know what an author actually meant to do.

It's a neat little trick whereby Derrida and his crew are able to invalidate the idea of an objectively existing artwork to which people can refer in conversations/criticism (so goodbye concepts of "right" and "wrong" and "good" and "bad"), the idea of texts having "fixed" meanings or identities (so goodbye to the concept of "meaning"), the idea of conscious intention (so goodbye authorial intention), and the idea of communication (so goodbye identifying intent).

So what's left? If this is a "victory" in any sense of the word, it's at best a Pyrrhic victory. But if you actually work through the "logic" in these arguments, it doesn't even stand as a Pyrrhic victory for long. And that's what I do in my essay. I work through Barthes and his retarded essay "The Death of the Author" and then I work through Derrida, focusing primarily on his writings on Husserl and phenomenology and how they undergird his idiotic aesthetic ideas. In the process, I point out shit like how Barthes' allegiance to altruism and Marxism produces a terrifyingly violent conception of art criticism and how Derrida's fear of responsibility makes him susceptible to nihilism and results in a corpus even more fractured and incoherent than Nietzsche's.

Unlike Peterson, though, I have a bit of sympathy for Derrida. None for Barthes. That guy was a piece of shit. Derrida was just scared and confused. But, like I said, I detail more of that shit in the essay itself. For an inkling, though, and so you get a sense of what Peterson means when he talks about the psychological weakness of people who cling to nonsense like this, consider that Derrida came up with deconstruction as a means by which to avoid in philosophical practice “aberration, forgetfulness, and irresponsibility." Yet, at the same time, he tried to argue that "no intention can ever be fully conscious, or actually present to itself," which would mean that language “leaves us no choice but to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say), to say something other than what we say and would have wanted to say.”

This is what I call, following Cavell, Derrida's fantasy of "necessary inexpressiveness." It's what allows him, in his fear of responsibility and accountability, to indulge in a fantasy in which responsibility is not even an option. It's a philosophical "safe space." But notice the contradiction. Is Derrida’s pathological fear throughout his career of “aberration, forgetfulness, and irresponsibility” not already a rejection of the claim that we are fated “to mean (to say) something that is (already, always, also) other than what we mean (to say)”?

This is the type of shit that needs accounting for, that needs to be explained. But good luck getting an explanation that makes any more sense than the shit that needs explaining :rolleyes:



Even though I'm an academic and I write nerdy shit, I try to keep shit on the sensible level, which means it shouldn't go over anybody's head provided people are actually using their heads.

That's one of the key tricks used by people like Derrida. They hide their retardation inside of jargony gobbledygook. I don't let that shit slide. I shine a big bright light onto it so that the silly shit has nowhere to hide.

This is why Gad Saad, in his "Saad Truth" clips on postmodernism, always reads these ridiculously convoluted abstracts for papers that don't actually say or mean anything. And it's why he always emphasizes that, when you read that type of shit, don't go inside and think that you're not smart enough to "get it," that the profundity is over your head. If it sounds like a crock of shit, it probably is.

In my essay, I frame it as an attempt on my part to work through what Ayn Rand referred to as "the unreadable." It's really scary how right she was about academic practice, but this is what she said about unreadable garbage like Derrida. As she explained, an unreadable book or essay “does not count on men’s intelligence, but on their weaknesses, pretensions, and fears”; it “is not a tool of enlightenment, but of intellectual intimidation”; and it “is not aimed at the reader’s understanding, but at his inferiority complex":

"Within a few years [of the publication of an unreadable book or essay], commentators will begin to fill libraries with works analyzing, 'clarifying,' and interpreting its mysteries. Their notions will spread all over the academic map, ranging from the appeasers, who will try to soften [its] meaning—to the glamorizers, who will ascribe to it nothing worse than their own pet inanities—to the compromisers, who will try to reconcile its theory with its exact opposite—to the avant-garde, who will spell out and demand the acceptance of its logical consequences. The contradictory, antithetical nature of such interpretations will be ascribed to [its] profundity—particularly by those who function on the motto: 'If I don’t understand it, it’s deep.' The students will believe that the professors know the proof of [its] theory, the professors will believe that the commentators know it, the commentators will believe that the author knows it—and the author will be alone to know that no proof exists and that none was offered. Within a generation, the number of commentaries will have grown to such proportions that the original [unreadable book or essay] will be accepted as a subject of philosophical specialization, requiring a lifetime of study—and any refutation of [its] theory will be ignored or rejected if unaccompanied by a full discussion of the theories of all the commentators, a task which no one will be able to undertake."

I take the baton from the point where she says fighting this shit is "a task which no one will be able to undertake." That's too pessimistic for my taste. I also get sad when Peterson talks about how the humanities are dead and the university is beyond fixing. That may be true, but the only way I'll accept that is by trying to fix the shit myself and failing.



Have you ever read Joseph Campbell? I can't help but notice the coincidence that The Hero with a Thousand Faces was originally published in 1949, and then, exactly half a century later, in 1999, Peterson published Maps of Meaning. For the sake of his fascination with religion, it's like he's the second coming of Campbell :D

If you like the way Peterson can break shit down, check out some Campbell when you get a chance. He'll make religion and mythology make so much more sense for you. And bringing those two together will basically span the entirety of man's attempts to express ideas and values in story form.



Same. I've only read the first 20 pages or so. In a couple of months, I'm going to get to do a guest lecture in my supervisor's "Film and Visual Culture" class on Inception and philosophical skepticism, so I'm too busy going back over Descartes and Kant, but every time I go into my PDF folders, I can fucking hear Maps of Meaning calling to me :(



You know what's worried me ever since I first read the words, though? What Wittgenstein said in his preface to the Tractatus: "Perhaps this book will be understood only by someone who has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed in it - or at least similar thoughts."

What do you do with that? If you find in Peterson's words something to grab onto, if you find in his thoughts similar thoughts to those that you've had yourself, great. But, ultimately, the goal is to get the people who think differently to abandon their stupid, dangerous, (self-)destructive thoughts. Have they ever had similar thoughts? If not, will they ever understand? If they will, how do you get them to understand?

The most logical answer is provided by Rand:

"We do not tell – we show. We do not claim – we prove. It is not your obedience that we seek to win, but your rational conviction. You have seen all the elements of our secret. The conclusion is now yours to draw – we can help you to name it, but not to accept it – the sight, the knowledge, and the acceptance must be yours."

Translation: You can bring a horse to water but you can't make it drink. Great. So what do we do once we get to the fucking water :mad::confused:

Thanks for taking the time to write that, I'd like to read your full critique when it comes out. I have to review a lot of philosophy to really understand what you're saying, and I likely have to learn a bit more as well.

I'm in the middle of Maps of Meaning, I'm just dragging my feet because I don't like reading pdfs on the computer, I need a hard copy to really appreciate it.
 
Its definitely from your own bias but I don't blame you. SSRIs are often connected with big high profile incidents like mass shootings but of course most people on them won't commit such acts. SSRIs get a bad rap but at the end of the day they're a tool that can be used and misused. On their own they won't cure depression but used properly they help depressed persons function normally and they can be a first step to helping depressed people treat their depression holistically. They're sort of like painkillers in that sense. You don't give someone painkillers to heal their broken arm but to help them function in their day to day lives.

Yeah, I have a misconception about anti-depressants no doubt, but just the fact that Peterson is a clinical psychologist, and appears as being very mentally strong, it just surprised me. His family has a history of depression, and his daughter also suffers from clinical depression and swears by her meds.

Interesting discussion about it here:

 
Part of the role of mythology, in my opinion, is to smooth over the complexity of human existence in order to make it more comprehensible and palatable, and even though Peterson's work is scientific I do believe the content of his Maps of Meaning is his own sort of mythology for the modern age. So I try to approach it the same way I approach mythology in general - very useful, probably oversimplified, and most effective when one is able to live it without being self-conscious about what it really is.

That last part is interesting. What do you mean by "without being self-conscious"? Because, for me (the armchair psychologizer), to lack even the least bit of awareness or to even approach the "ignorance is bliss" line is to court (existential and external) danger.

More generally, my sense of Peterson is, to keep ringing this same bell, that he's like Campbell. He's on that Jungian track where, if this is the Nietzschean age in which God is dead, we need to come up with a way to breathe life back into our symbols and our myths. Either that, or we need to develop new symbols and create new myths.

I do think that he has the (self-)awareness to know that mythology in general and personal mythologies (or worldviews, or value systems, or whatever you want to call them) are attempts by individuals to carve out a piece of reality and shape it in the image of their thought, to try to stake a piece of existence on which they may build a world in keeping with their moral ideals.

I don't think it's a mere terminological oddity that he likes to talk about meaning and belief as opposed to knowledge and fact. That's not to say that, when he's talking about evolution or biology or "hard science" shit that he is resistant to knowledge or facts. He's absolutely not. But what interests him most and what he devotes the most amount of time and energy to is belief structures and the different ways different people(s) make/give meaning out of/to their lives.

I'm rambling now, but my sense of the man: He's smart enough to know where the lines are beyond which he's talking out of his ass and expressing desires more than facts, so that, when he inevitably crosses those lines - as he should, and as all people should - he knows and can be comfortable knowing that everyone listening to him knows that he's entered a more speculative realm (which, IMO, is the Nietzschean influence).

I've read almost all of his works, and I have to agree that although Nietzsche was an incredible genius, he was, as you say, also a complete and total contrarian maniac. The process says more than the positions he takes.

I agree with your whole post, and I like what you said about his "scientific" process of thinking (that's what I was referring to in my response to Caveat about the form Peterson's own Nietzschean influence takes, at least as I see it), but I especially liked this part, particularly the idea that "the process says more than the positions he takes."

And, again, Emerson was the same way. It's quite a burden to take on as a reader to commit yourself to following someone's thought as they are trying to figure out what they think themselves. It's also a dangerous road for the thinker himself to travel. I think it took Nietzsche into a lot of unfortunate places, but the best-case scenario is to recognize and understand going in that you're not reading a structured, systematized body of knowledge but rather an experimental diary of sorts in which thoughts and ideas and arguments are being formulated and tested "live," so to speak, in the philosophical "lab."

I tend to be harder on someone like Nietzsche than someone like Derrida because Nietzsche (like Barthes after him, and probably the most explicitly Nietzschean of the poststructuralists/postmodernists) was far more forceful and vociferous, which makes the whacky experimental stuff so dangerous because it's so easy to sloganize it and take it up as a battle cry.

Thanks for taking the time to write that

No problem. Caveat can tell you, long posts are what I do. And that one was especially easy, as I've not only written an essay on that shit, it's part of my PhD thesis, so I've got this shit down cold.

That can come in handy, too, because there's a great line from a film scholar named David Bordwell who quipped that scholars in the humanities typically avoid confronting arguments with counterarguments. Instead, they come back at you with a bibliography. And that's painfully true. If I make a point, the response I get isn't where I went wrong or a counter, it's, "But have you read ______?"

At this point, I've read more Derrida than most hardcore Derrideans. And that really pisses them off, because the last line of defense for these types of people is to rest easy in the knowledge that I don't really understand this stuff, because, if I did, then I'd think what they think. But when I've read everything they've read plus shit they haven't read and I can point this shit out, I'm immune to the "But have you read _______?" and the "But you just don't understand..." crap.

It's fun, but it'd be more fun if that'd result in me actually changing some fucking minds :confused:

I'd like to read your full critique when it comes out.

I don't know what the deal is with this particular journal, but since it's not an open access journal and requires subscriptions, they might not let me put up a full PDF on my personal academic page and therefore I might not be able to link to the full thing. But, if I can, I'll make it available in here when it comes out.

I have to review a lot of philosophy to really understand what you're saying, and I likely have to learn a bit more as well.

This is another trick with these people, and especially Derrida. It's so hard to read something like Derrida's famous essay "Signature Event Context" if you haven't read J.L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words; it's so hard to read Speech and Phenomena if you haven't read Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. It's a form of intellectual intimidation where the fact that they've read so much shit and can name drop so many famous thinkers and famous texts, the natural assumption is that they know what they're talking about. But when you actually read through all of their stuff and the stuff they've read, the stupid fucking house of cards comes right down.

It's very time-consuming and it takes a hell of a lot of patience, but if you're interested in these ideas and interested in combating stupid ideas, then I think it'd be time and energy well-spent, because there's nothing more satisfying than stopping one of these knuckleheads in their tracks when they realize you know more than they do about the idiots whose idiocy they constantly spout.

I'm in the middle of Maps of Meaning, I'm just dragging my feet because I don't like reading pdfs on the computer, I need a hard copy to really appreciate it.

Since I've been doing my PhD, I've almost completely left hard copies behind. I'm all about those PDFs. From a practical perspective, it's so much easier to highlight shit and add notes to digital copies rather than dog-earing pages or scribbling down handwritten notes, to say nothing of how gloriously easy it is to search a digital text as opposed to flipping back-and-forth through a book just to find one sentence you can only remember four words from.

But even generally speaking, I've come to love reading PDFs on my computer. At this point, I have a fucking top-notch university library worth of books and essays on my lap :cool:
 
Thanks for taking the time to write that, I'd like to read your full critique when it comes out. I have to review a lot of philosophy to really understand what you're saying, and I likely have to learn a bit more as well.

I'm in the middle of Maps of Meaning, I'm just dragging my feet because I don't like reading pdfs on the computer, I need a hard copy to really appreciate it.

I printed mine out and it was like 300 pages.
 
That last part is interesting. What do you mean by "without being self-conscious"? Because, for me (the armchair psychologizer), to lack even the least bit of awareness or to even approach the "ignorance is bliss" line is to court (existential and external) danger.

More generally, my sense of Peterson is, to keep ringing this same bell, that he's like Campbell. He's on that Jungian track where, if this is the Nietzschean age in which God is dead, we need to come up with a way to breathe life back into our symbols and our myths. Either that, or we need to develop new symbols and create new myths.

I do think that he has the (self-)awareness to know that mythology in general and personal mythologies (or worldviews, or value systems, or whatever you want to call them) are attempts by individuals to carve out a piece of reality and shape it in the image of their thought, to try to stake a piece of existence on which they may build a world in keeping with their moral ideals.

I don't think it's a mere terminological oddity that he likes to talk about meaning and belief as opposed to knowledge and fact. That's not to say that, when he's talking about evolution or biology or "hard science" shit that he is resistant to knowledge or facts. He's absolutely not. But what interests him most and what he devotes the most amount of time and energy to is belief structures and the different ways different people(s) make/give meaning out of/to their lives.

I'm rambling now, but my sense of the man: He's smart enough to know where the lines are beyond which he's talking out of his ass and expressing desires more than facts, so that, when he inevitably crosses those lines - as he should, and as all people should - he knows and can be comfortable knowing that everyone listening to him knows that he's entered a more speculative realm (which, IMO, is the Nietzschean influence).



I agree with your whole post, and I like what you said about his "scientific" process of thinking (that's what I was referring to in my response to Caveat about the form Peterson's own Nietzschean influence takes, at least as I see it), but I especially liked this part, particularly the idea that "the process says more than the positions he takes."

And, again, Emerson was the same way. It's quite a burden to take on as a reader to commit yourself to following someone's thought as they are trying to figure out what they think themselves. It's also a dangerous road for the thinker himself to travel. I think it took Nietzsche into a lot of unfortunate places, but the best-case scenario is to recognize and understand going in that you're not reading a structured, systematized body of knowledge but rather an experimental diary of sorts in which thoughts and ideas and arguments are being formulated and tested "live," so to speak, in the philosophical "lab."

I tend to be harder on someone like Nietzsche than someone like Derrida because Nietzsche (like Barthes after him, and probably the most explicitly Nietzschean of the poststructuralists/postmodernists) was far more forceful and vociferous, which makes the whacky experimental stuff so dangerous because it's so easy to sloganize it and take it up as a battle cry.



No problem. Caveat can tell you, long posts are what I do. And that one was especially easy, as I've not only written an essay on that shit, it's part of my PhD thesis, so I've got this shit down cold.

That can come in handy, too, because there's a great line from a film scholar named David Bordwell who quipped that scholars in the humanities typically avoid confronting arguments with counterarguments. Instead, they come back at you with a bibliography. And that's painfully true. If I make a point, the response I get isn't where I went wrong or a counter, it's, "But have you read ______?"

At this point, I've read more Derrida than most hardcore Derrideans. And that really pisses them off, because the last line of defense for these types of people is to rest easy in the knowledge that I don't really understand this stuff, because, if I did, then I'd think what they think. But when I've read everything they've read plus shit they haven't read and I can point this shit out, I'm immune to the "But have you read _______?" and the "But you just don't understand..." crap.

It's fun, but it'd be more fun if that'd result in me actually changing some fucking minds :confused:



I don't know what the deal is with this particular journal, but since it's not an open access journal and requires subscriptions, they might not let me put up a full PDF on my personal academic page and therefore I might not be able to link to the full thing. But, if I can, I'll make it available in here when it comes out.



This is another trick with these people, and especially Derrida. It's so hard to read something like Derrida's famous essay "Signature Event Context" if you haven't read J.L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words; it's so hard to read Speech and Phenomena if you haven't read Edmund Husserl's Logical Investigations. It's a form of intellectual intimidation where the fact that they've read so much shit and can name drop so many famous thinkers and famous texts, the natural assumption is that they know what they're talking about. But when you actually read through all of their stuff and the stuff they've read, the stupid fucking house of cards comes right down.

It's very time-consuming and it takes a hell of a lot of patience, but if you're interested in these ideas and interested in combating stupid ideas, then I think it'd be time and energy well-spent, because there's nothing more satisfying than stopping one of these knuckleheads in their tracks when they realize you know more than they do about the idiots whose idiocy they constantly spout.



Since I've been doing my PhD, I've almost completely left hard copies behind. I'm all about those PDFs. From a practical perspective, it's so much easier to highlight shit and add notes to digital copies rather than dog-earing pages or scribbling down handwritten notes, to say nothing of how gloriously easy it is to search a digital text as opposed to flipping back-and-forth through a book just to find one sentence you can only remember four words from.

But even generally speaking, I've come to love reading PDFs on my computer. At this point, I have a fucking top-notch university library worth of books and essays on my lap :cool:

I minored in philosophy, so I am vaguely familiar with the general view of most philosophies, but it's been so long that I need a refresher course to really grok what you're saying. I haven't read most of what you've cited in this thread. Really intriguing, though. I'm going to ease into Derrida and see if it strikes a chord.
 
I minored in philosophy, so I am vaguely familiar with the general view of most philosophies, but it's been so long that I need a refresher course to really grok what you're saying.

Well, if you've got a background in philosophy, then you'll hit the ground running. I'm a fucking movie nerd who's never taken a single philosophy class. I just read this shit so I can tell other movie nerds who use it that they're stupid and wrong and the people they're quoting are also stupid and wrong. In order to do that, though, I have to make sure I know what I'm talking about, so I'm stuck doing a hell of a lot of reading :D

I haven't read most of what you've cited in this thread.

The easiest way to proceed will probably be to settle on the Derrida shit you want to read first. Of Grammatology is Derrida's main calling card, and that's the one where he goes through Ferdinand de Saussure and his Course in General Linguistics and Jean-Jacques Rousseau and his Essay on the Origin of Languages. However, I'd probably recommend the edited collection Writing and Difference, where you can go one at a time through easier-to-manage essays rather than giant volumes of crap and take the thinkers and texts he selects one at a time. So there'll be one essay where he's dealing with Michel Foucault, and you can go one-to-one. Then something with Husserl, then something with Freud, then something with Hegel, and on and on down the line.

I also have to recommend his "fight" with John Searle. In 1972, Derrida wrote an essay called "Signature Event Context" in which he critiqued J.L. Austin's How to Do Things with Words in which Austin developed his theory of "performative utterances." Searle wrote a reply to Derrida in which he basically called him out on (a) not making sense and (b) failing to understand Austin. Derrida then replied in one of the most hysterical replies you're likely to find in philosophy. The mask was gone and it was the flailing hysterics of someone whose safe space had been invaded. In a way, it's actually sad to read, but it's proof of what Peterson always mentions about how these types of people don't believe in and have no desire to enter into a dialogue with you. They just want you to accept the nonsense on faith, fall in line, and help push the bullshit forward.

Really intriguing, though. I'm going to ease into Derrida and see if it strikes a chord.

Best of luck. I hope you come out the other side still believing in philosophy :oops:
 
@Rusk @ReAnimator Reagan @Caveat @dontsnitch

Have you guys watched this?



If you're interested, this is the most explicit and detailed discussion of his views on theology/religion and belief in "God"/"Jesus" that I've yet to find.
 
@Rusk @ReAnimator Reagan @Caveat @dontsnitch

Have you guys watched this?



If you're interested, this is the most explicit and detailed discussion of his views on theology/religion and belief in "God"/"Jesus" that I've yet to find.


I haven't watched the whole thing, but I intend to.

I'll note that the anti-theist community that has gained prominence with the likes of the Four Horsemen does not like that Peterson believes in God.

Degrasse Tyson once noted that it's a disgrace that 7% of the elite scientific community believes in God. Given that Peterson is seen as an intellectual, I believe they are at odds with him. Perhaps this is why Peterson is so reluctant to take a strong stance, but from what I've heard, Peterson is not making epistemic claims, and he doesn't want to betray that by simply saying he believes God exists.

Here is a video from a representative of the anti-theist movement who had a large following before he was banned from YT. His lack of subscribers on this channel doesn't speak to his popularity. I think this acts as a pretty good litmus test. You don't need to watch more than 50 seconds to get the gist (after the young Asian guy).

 
Philosophy, what a futile endeavor. A lot of wasted talk with 0 modern contributions.
 
Degrasse Tyson once noted that it's a disgrace that 7% of the elite scientific community believes in God.

I can sympathize with him on this point. Knowing that Peterson likes esoteric/mystical crap (or, for another example, that Ben Shapiro is super religious) kind of bums me out. But I understand where Peterson is coming from. It's an easy logical chain to follow.

Human beings are limited, finite creatures ---> We've barely scratched the surface when it comes to understanding ourselves, let alone understanding existence as such ---> It's plainly true that there's more that we don't know than there is that we do know ---> For all we know, "God" as He/It is described in the most orthodox sense does exist...and that'd be pretty cool.

I get that logic. And I can't deny that it'd be cool if God existed. It'd also be cool if I could fly. But I can't. And I don't pretend that I can.

But if Peterson wants to hold onto some mystery and if he wants to hold onto the possibility of there being a literal supernatural dimension, then so long as it doesn't get in the way of him making intelligent points - and, as far as I've seen, it hasn't - I don't give a shit.

Here is a video from a representative of the anti-theist movement who had a large following before he was banned from YT.

That was painfully stupid.

Philosophy, what a futile endeavor. A lot of wasted talk with 0 modern contributions.

Two things. First, this post makes me want to respond to you with the quote in your sig, because, in my experience, anti-intellectualism is invariably the product of either laziness or some kind of inferiority complex.

Second, philosophy has made innumerable modern contributions, both good and bad, and it'll continue to do so. It's our responsibility to make sure its future contributions are good ones. But, at present, it's contributing more bad than good.

And if you doubt the ability of philosophy to have an impact on contemporary life, just pick your head up and look around. What do you think the cause is if not philosophy?

I tend to agree with Peterson's claim that what happens in the university happens in the rest of the world 5-10 years later. And, again, if you need proof, just take a look around when you have a minute.
 
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